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Résumé
Cette thèse examine les e¤ets des imperfections des marchés nanciers sur la
macroéconomie. Plus particulièrement, elle se penche sur les conséquences de la faillite
dans les contrats nanciers dans une perspective déquilibre général dynamique.
Le premier papier construit un modèle qui utilise lavantage comparatif des banques
dans la gestion des situations de détresse nancière pour expliquer le choix des rmes
entre les prêts bancaires et les prêts du marché nancier. Le modèle réussit à expli-
quer pourquoi les rmes plus petites préfèrent le nancement bancaire et pourquoi
les prêts bancaires sont plus répandus en Europe. Le premier fait est expliqué par le
lien négatif entre la valeur nette de lentreprise et la probabilité de faire faillite. Le
deuxième fait sexplique par le coût xe démission de bons plus élevé en Europe.
Le deuxième papier examine linteraction entre les contraintes de nancement
a¤ectant les ménages et les rmes. Une interaction positive pourrait amplier et
augmenter la persistance de le¤et dun choc agrégé sur léconomie. Je construis un
nouveau modèle qui contient des primes de nancement externes pour les rmes et
les ménages. Dans le modèle de base avec prix et salaires exibles, jobtiens une faible
interaction négative entre les coûts de nancement des rmes et des ménages. Le
facteur clé qui explique ce résultat est le¤et du changement contre cyclique du coût
de nancement des ménages sur leur o¤re de travail et leur demande de prêts. Dans
une période dexpansion, cet e¤et augmente les taux dintérêt, réduit linvestissement
et augmente le coût de nancement des entreprises.
Le troisième papier ajoute les contraintes de nancement des banques dans un
modèle macroéconomiques avec des prêts hypothécaires et des uctuations dans les
prix de limmobilier. Les banques dans le modèle ne peuvent pas complètement diver-
sier leurs prêts, ce qui génère un lien entre les risques de faillite des ménages et des
banques. Il y a deux e¤ets contraires des cycles économiques qui a¤ectent la prime de
nancement externe de la banque. Premièrement, il y a un lien positif entre le risque
de faillite des banques et des emprunteurs qui contribue à rendre le coût de nance-
ment externe des banques contre cyclique. Deuxiément, le lissage de la consommation
par les ménages rend la proportion de nancement externe des banques pro cyclique,
ce qui tend à rendre le coût de nancement bancaire pro cyclique. En combinant ces
deux e¤ets, le modèle peut reproduire des prots bancaires et des ratios dendettement
bancaires pro cycliques comme dans les données, mais pour des chocs non-nanciers
les frictions de nancement bancaire dans le modèle nont pas un e¤et quantitati-
vement signicatif sur les principales variables agrégées comme la consommation ou
iv
linvestissement.
Mots-clés : frictions nancières, verication côuteuse de létat, détresse nancière,
prime de nancement externe, cycles économiques, contraintes de crédit,capital ban-
caire
vAbstract
This Dissertation examines the e¤ect of nancial market imperfections on the Ma-
croeconomy. More particularly, it focuses on the consequences of equilibrium default
using a Dynamic General Equilibrium approach.
The rst paper builds a dynamic general equilibrium model that emphasizes
banks comparative advantage in monitoring nancial distress in order to explain
rms choice between bank loans and market debt. Banks can deal with nancial
distress more cheaply than bond holders, but this requires a higher initial expenditure
proportional to the loan size. In contrast, bond issues may involve a small xed cost.
Entrepreneurs choice of bank or bond nancing depends on their net worth. The
model can explain why smaller rms tend to use more bank nancing and why bank
nancing is more prevalent in Europe than in the US. The rst fact can be explained
by the negative link between the net worth of a business and its default probability.
Explaining the second fact requires taking into account the higehr xed cost of issuing
market debt in Europe.
The second paper examines the possibility of feedback e¤ects between between
the nancing constraints of households and of rms. A positive interaction between
the nancial strength of household and rm balance sheets may amplify aggregate
shocks and increase the persistence of aggregate uctuations. I develop a new model
that incorporates both rm and household external nance spreads and time varying
leverage. Contrary to a common intuition, the baseline Real Business Cycle model
with credit constraints produces a small negative interaction between the costs of
external nancing for rms and households. The key factor in this result is the e¤ect of
changes in the external nance premium on borrowerslabour supply and the demand
for loans. The reduction in householdscost of borrowing in a boom decreases labour
supply and raises houshold loan demand. This increases interest rates, crowds out
investment, and raises borrowing costs for nancially constrained rms.
The third paper integrates household nancing frictions with bank nancing fric-
tions and house price uctuations in a dynamic general equilibrium model. The key
assumption in the model is that a bank cannot fully diversify shocks, leading to a link
between household and bank sectorsdefault risks. The cyclical behaviour of banks
external funding cost is determined by two main factors. On one hand, booms im-
prove the nancial health of the banksborrowers which tends to reduce the cost of
bank funding. On the other hand, consumption smoothing by savers and borrowers
during booms increases the proportion of external nancing in the banksbalance
vi
sheet which tends to increase the cost of bank funding. As a result of these opposing
e¤ects, the model matches procyclical prots and leverage in the nancial sector, as
observed in the data, but for non nancial shocks the banking frictions in the model
have an insignicant impact on the main macroeconomic aggregates such as output,
consumption and investment.
Keywords : nancial frictions,costly state verication, nancial distress, external
nance premium, business cycle ,credit constraints, bank capital
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1Introduction
Cette thèse regarde de plus près les conséquences macroéconomiques du défaut
sur les contrats nanciers. Les imperfections des marchés nanciers ont pris une place
de plus en plus importante dans les débats et les modèles macroéconomiques. Les mo-
dèles déquilibre général permettent de mieux structurer les débats et les décisions sur
les politiques qui essaient de contrer les e¤ets de ces imperfections nancières. Géné-
ralement ces modèles se concentrent sur limpact du choix entre le nancement interne
et lémission de dette, ce qui se justie par la dominance de ces types de nancement
(Damodaran (1999) [46]. Le niveau dendettement des agents économiques est limité
dans la plupart des modèles par une contrainte de collatéral qui exclut le défaut sur le
contrat (voir Kiyotaki et Moore (1997) [83] et Carroll (2001) [35] pour des exemples
représentatifs). Dans ce type de modèle un contrat de dette garantit un taux dintérêt
sans risque qui est le même pour le gouvernement ou pour une petite entreprise. En
réalité, les entreprises et les ménages font occasionnellement défaut sur leurs paie-
ments de dette et les taux dintérêts sur la dette contiennent une prime qui compense
ce risque. Il existe des modèles qui permettent le défaut (par exemple Bernanke et
al. (1999) [19] pour les entreprises et Chaterjee et al. (2007) [38] pour les ménages ),
mais ces modèles doivent souvent simplier en supposant des emprunteurs neutres au
risque ou en se restreignant a létude détats stationnaires sans uctuations agrégées.
Un des objectifs de cette thèse est de relâcher ces contraintes en proposant un modèle
qui préserve au moins partiellement les conséquences de laversion au risque de la plu-
part des agents économiques tout en permettant facilement létude des uctuations
agrégées.
Le premier chapitre étudie le choix de lentreprise entre les prêts bancaires et la
dette de marché en équilibre général. Il existe déjà une vaste littérature théorique qui
étudie ce choix en équilibre partiel (voir par exemple Diamond (1991) [49] et Rajan
(1992) [103]. Il y a aussi des études empiriques en forme réduite qui étudient cette
décision (par exemple Kashyap et al. (1993) [78] ou Cantillo et Wright (2000) [29].
Mais avec lexception de De Fiore et Uhlig (2005) [55], les implications déquilibre
général de ce choix nont pas été étudiés. Ici je propose un modèle inspiré du fait
stylisé que généralement les banques ont un meilleur contrôle sur les problèmes causés
par la détresse nancière des entreprises que les investisseurs du marché nancier qui
sont plus dispersés et qui ont souvent moins dinformation que les banques sur les
emprunteurs. Je généralise le modèle dasymétrie dinformation de Townsend (1979)
[114] où le prêteur peut apprendre létat nancier de lemprunteur en payant un
2coût de vérication. Je permets à lentreprise un choix entre la banque qui a un
coût de verication plus faible mais un coût ex-ante plus élevé et un contrat du
marché nancier. Tant quil existe un certain niveau de rendements décroissants à
léchelle dans la production (qui peut être pris comme une forme réduite pour de la
compétition imparfaite ou un autre facteur de production di¢ cile a ajuster comme
lapport spécique du gérant de la rme) les entreprises avec une valeur nette plus
faible dans ce modèle préfèrent le nancement bancaire. Ceci reproduit le fait stylisé
que les entreprises de plus petite taille utilisent plus fréquemment le nancement
bancaire. En tenant compte aussi du coût xe plus élevé démission de bons en Europe
le modèle peut aussi capter la dépendance beaucoup plus importante sur les prêts
bancaires en Europe par rapport aux Etats Unis.
Le deuxième chapitre examine les liens entre le niveau dendettement des entre-
prises et des ménages dans un cadre déquilibre général dynamique. Lidée quun
resserrement des contraintes nancières des ménages peut empirer une récession est
présente dans beaucoup des débats sur les politiques scales par exemple. La même
idée est avancée pour les contraintes nancières des entreprises. Lidée principale est
celle de laccélérateur nancier (Bernanke et al (1999) [19] dans lequel un choc négatif
réduit laccès aux fonds externes des entreprise, ce qui réduit encore plus lactivité
économique, qui contribue à un déclin encore plus fort de la capacité de nancement
des entreprises. Ceci suggère que linteraction entre ces deux types de contraintes
nancières pourrait être positive et contribuer a aggraver les cycles économiques.
Jétudie cette possibilité dans un modèle où une partie des ménages et les entre-
prises font face à des contraintes nancières.
Le modèle permet aux ménages et aux rmes de faire défaut sur leurs paiements
quand la valeur de leur collatéral est relativement faible, tout en permettant laver-
sion au risque des emprunteurs et les uctuations agrégées. Ceci génère des primes
de nancement externes et des mouvements endogènes dans le ratio dendettement
des emprunteurs, ce qui nest pas le cas des modèles sans défaut déquilibre comme
Kiyotaki et Moore (1997) [83].
Pour mieux isoler linteraction entre les contraintes de nancement des rmes
et des ménages, jutilise une modèle à prix et salaires exibles. Ce modèle génère
facilement des primes de nancement externes contre cycliques, mais linteraction
entre les primes de nancement des rmes et des ménages est faiblement négative.
Même si le resserrement de contraintes nanciers réduit la consommation des ménages,
qui tend a réduire la production et serrer les contraintes nancières des entreprises,
il y a dautres forces qui vont dans le sens contraire. Lempirement de la situation
nancière des ménages les pousse à travailler plus et réduit les salaires déquilibre.
Laugmentation de la prime de nancement externe réduit la demande des prêts des
ménages, ce qui réduit les taux dintérêt auxquels font face les entreprises. Ces e¤ets
sur les salaires et les taux dintérêt réduisent le coût de nancement externe des
entreprises.
Finalement, le dernier chapitre ajoute des imperfections dans le nancement des
banques au cadre danalyse du deuxième chapitre. Ceci nous permet détudier linter-
action entre les risques du crédit des prêts aux ménages et des prêts aux banques qui
3nancent les ménages. En comparaison, la supposition standard dans les modèles
déquilibre général est que les banques peuvent complètement diversier le risque
de faillite de leurs prêts. Pour un ratio donné de nancement externe des banques, il y
a un lien positif entre la probabilité de défaut des banques et des ménages. Ceci tend
à rendre la prime de nancement externe des banques contre cyclique. Par contre, le
lissage de consommation par les ménages tend à rendre le ratio de nancement externe
des banques pro cycliques. Ceci contribue à une prime de nancement externe des
banques pro cyclique. Pour toutes les calibrations essayées, on trouve que face à des
chocs non nanciers le deuxième e¤et domine.
Chapitre 1
Banks As Better Monitors and
FirmsFinancing Choices in
Dynamic General Equilibrium
Abstract
This paper builds a dynamic general equilibrium model that emphasizes banks
comparative advantage in monitoring nancial distress in order to explain rmschoice
between bank loans and market debt. Banks can deal with nancial distress more
cheaply than bond holders, but this requires a higher initial expenditure proportional
to the loan size. In contrast, bond issues may involve a small xed cost. Entrepreneurs
choice of bank or bond nancing depends on their net worth. The steady state of the
model can explain why smaller rms tend to use more bank nancing and why bank
nancing is more prevalent in Europe than in the US. We nd that a higher xed cost
of issuing market debt is a key factor in replicating the higher use of bank nancing
relative to market debt in Europe. Finally, we nd that for plausible calibrations one
can predict aggregate quantities just as well using a model with only one type of loan
with costs of nancial distress that are an average of the costs for bank loans and
market debt.
JEL classication : E4, G3
Key words : nancial frictions, costly state verication, nancial distress
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51.1 Introduction
Debt nancing is the most prevalent form of external nancing in most developed
countries(see for example Damodaran (1999) [46] and Gorton andWinton (2002)[64]).
One of the most important characteristics of debt is whether it is issued by a bank(or
a similar institution such as a nance company) or whether it is market debt. There
is a vast theoretical litterature discussing the di¤erence between these two types
on debt(Diamond (1991)[49] and Rajan (1992)[103] are seminal contributions), em-
phasizing the trade o¤ between the better loan monitoring or information gathering
abilities of banks and the extra costs attached to borrowing from a bank. Because the
level of nancial frictions attached to the two types of loans is di¤erent, the composi-
tion of nancing between them may matter for the overall level of nancial frictions
a¤ecting rms and for macroeconomic outcomes. To complicate matters, the choice
between bank and market debt almost certainly depends on aggregate macroeconomic
conditions.
Most dynamic general equilibrium models with nancial frictions ignore the dis-
tinction between bank loans and market debt[32][19]. Models that examine the e¤ect
of frictions between banks and their depositors assume that banks are responsible for
all lending in the economy[91][42]. This assumption leads to a potential overestimate
of the impact of bank lending on the transmission of shocks, since it eliminates the
possibility of using other types of nancing. Market debt accounts for 57:5% of total
non nancial sector debt in the US and for 12% of non nancial sector debt in the
Euro area (De Fiore and Uhlig (2005) [55]). Clearly assuming 100% bank or bond
lending may be misleading in analyzing nancial frictions in the US. For the Euro
area such an assumption may seem like a good approximation, except that it is still
possible that the low average proportion of bond nancing hides important variation
across the business cycle which may be relevant for the propagation of various shocks.
Investigation of the e¤ect of the nancing choice between bank and market debt on
macroeconomic outcomes has been mostly based on reduced form models. In studies
with aggregate level VARs such as Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993)[78] or Oliner
and Rudebusch (1996) [96] it is di¢ cult to distinguish between the hypothesis that
nancial frictions in general a¤ect the transmission of economic shocks from the hy-
pothesis that that the source of nancing matters. Micro level data as in Cantillo and
Wright (2000) [29] can provide stronger evidence on the importance of macroecono-
mic conditions for the choice between bank and market debt, but without a general
equilibrium framework it is impossible to go in the other direction and judge the
impact of nancing choice on macroeconomic outcomes.
In this paper we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of the rms choice
between bank and bond market nancing based on the idea that banks are better
loan monitors than markets in nancial distress situations. Firms facing nancial
frictions can use either bank nancing or bond nancing. Lending to rms is subject
to a costly state verication problem as in [32]. Banks are better monitors than debt
markets, but their superior lending technology requires them to spend more resources
6per dollar of loans before the rm produces. Market debt has higher monitoring costs,
and it may require a xed under-writing cost. This paper studies the implications of
the model for the steady state of such an economy.
The use of a dynamic general equilibrium framework allows us to make a more
quantitative assessment of the magnitude of frictions required to generate realistic
nancing choice patterns. It also allows investigation of nancing choice dynamics
in reaction to structural changes in nancing costs as well as in reaction to business
cycles.
Our modeling of banks as better monitors in the costly state verication framework
is based on empirical evidence suggesting that bankskey advantage is in dealing with
nancial distress situations. Bank loans are easier to renegotiate, and banks have a
better understanding of the businesses they are dealing with than bondholders, for
example by forcing borrowers to maintain a transactions account at the bank[93].
As a result banks are more capable of dealing with problems such as risk shifting in
default, and they are less likely to engage in ine¢ cient liquidation of rms[62][29][23].
In contrast to most papers that model costly state verication in dynamic general
equilibrium, such as Carlstrom and Fuerst, (1998) [32], and Bernanke Gertler and
Gilchrist (1999) [19], we assume that rmsproduction technology exhibits decreasing
returns to scale. As a result, rmsnancing choice depend on their net worth. Our
analysis shows that di¤erences in net worth may be important in accounting for
the choices between bank and bond nancing observed in the data. In particular, as
in the data, higher net worth reduces the likelihood of choosing bank nancing(see
Cantillo and Wright (2000)[29] and Su (2005)[112] for evidence on this point). This
occurs in our model despite the fact that all rms are equally productive ex-ante,
before signing the nancial contract. One could imagine that the link between net
worth and nancing choice is natural in the presence of a xed cost of issuing bonds.
However, the benchmark model produces a strong negative correlation between bank
nancing and net worth even without the xed cost. Intuitively, higher net worth
reduces the probability of nancial distress, which makes the banks comparative
advantage in handling nancial distress less valuable. The direct link between net
worth and nancing choice in the model is in contrast with most previous theoretical
work that has explained why less productive rms may prefer bank loans, with the
link between rm size and bank nancing explained through a positive correlation
between rm size and productivity(see for example Rajan (1992) [103]and Diamond
(1991) [49]).
The benchmark model , where the only cost of bond nancing is the cost of
auditing distressed rms, cannot explain the high relative use of bank nancing in
Europe without unrealistically low costs of bank nancing. 1 Therefore, we extend
the model by assuming that issuing a bond in Europe also requires a small xed cost.
The extra cost is motivated by evidence that until recently bond nancing was more
expensive in Europe than in the US[107]. The xed cost assumption is motivated by
1Europe refers to the Euro Area in this paper.
7evidence of large economies of scale in market debt issue costs, which are not present
for bank debt[46][37]. We nd that a small xed cost of bond issue (around 0:22% of
the average value of issued bonds) can explain most of the discrepancy between the
relative amount of bank nancing in Europe and the US. To the degree that bond
markets in Europe have become more competitive[107], the ratio of bond to bank
nancing in Europe may converge to that in the US.
Finally, we examine the importance of explicitly modeling the choice between bank
and market debt for aggregate output and consumption. We nd that for reasonable
calibrations, the steady state aggregates of the model are virtually identical to those
of a model with only one type of nancial intermediary with monitoring costs that
are an average of those of the bank and bond contracts. This suggests that at least
for the analysis of the steady state, a researcher interested only in aggregates may
choose to ignore the choice between bank and market nancing.
Several papers have studied the choice between bank and market debt in par-
tial equilibrium (prominent examples include Rajan (1992)[103], Diamond (1991)[49],
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) [69]and Bolton and Freixas (2000) [23]). The general
message of most of these papers is that more protable(for a xed loan size) or hi-
gher quality rms tend to prefer market debt, while lower quality rms will prefer
bank loans. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)[69] distinguish between unmonitored len-
ding(market bonds) and monitored lending(bank lending), where monitoring increases
entrepreneur e¤ort and the success probability of projects. Their model generates a
negative link between bank nacncing and net worth, just like our model. Meh and
Moran(2007) [91] incorporate the Holmstrom and Tirole model into a fully specied
dynamic general equilibrium model with entrepreneur and bank capital dynamics.The
model in this paper examines a mechanism for the link betwee net worth and nan-
cing choice which complements the moral hazard based mechanism in Holmstrom
and Tirole[69], while being more focused on the role of banks in managing nancial
distress emphsized by the empirical evidence. Furthermore, Holmstrom and Tirole
only explore the extreme assumptions of a xed project size and variable project size
with linear returns. Assuming linear returns as in Meh and Morans paper eliminates
any possible link between the size of rms and nancing choice, while assuming only
a xed project size is usually unrealistic.
Perhaps the closest papers to this one are Cantillo and Wright (2000) [29] and
De Fiore and Uhlig (2005) [55]. Cantillo and Wrights model generates a negative
link between net worth and nancing and bank nancing due to a higher default rate
for smaller rms and banks providing cheaper reorganisation in default. They use a
partial equilibrium framework with a xed project size. As a result their framework
ignores the possibility that larger rms may prefer bank nancing if they are allowed
to undertake a larger project and (as in their model and in essentially all applications
of the costly state verication framework) monitoring costs are increasing in the size of
the project. This e¤ect is eliminated by assumption in a xed project size model. This
paper explores the intermediate case of variable project size with nonlinear returns
and provides conditions that generalize some of the insights from the xed project
size model to the more general setup.
8De Fiore and Uhlig[55] model the rms choice between bank and bond nancing
in a costly state verication framework and integrate this choice into a standard RBC
framework. They model banks as o¤ering better ex ante screening of projects at a cost,
generating a tradeo¤ in which lower productivity entrepreneurs prefer bank nancing.
The realism of their focus on superior ex ante screening by banks is unclear. In fact,
it may be more realistic to model bond market lenders as better screeners of projects
due to the screening activities of bond rating agencies and investment banks[61].
Furthermore, the prediction of their model that more protable rms prefer market
debt is empirically controversial(see Su (2005)[112] and Cantillo and Wright (2000)
[29]). Furthermore, their model does not capture the key stylized fact that the use of
bank nancing relative to market debt decreases with the size of rms. 2
In the rest of the paper we proceed as follows : section 2 describes the model and
provides a su¢ cient condition for the model to match the empirical link between rm
size and the choice between bank and market debt. Section 3 discusses the results of
numerical simulations of the models steady state. Section 4 concludes.
1.2 The Model
The model features overlapping generations of risk neutral entrepreneurs, a re-
presentative risk averse worker and a continuum of pefectly competitive nancial
intermediaries. Entrepreneurs produce all the output in the economy using capital
and labour. They accumulate net worth using capital. When their accumulated net
worth is insu¢ cient to fully fund their desired output level, they require loans from
nancial intermediaries. Due to information frictions, loans require using one of two
types of nancial intermediaries :banks and bond mutual funds. The di¤erences bet-
ween these intermediaries and the choice between them will be described in greater
detail below.
1.2.1 Entrepreneurs
The heart of the model is the entrepreneurs intratemporal nancing and produc-
tion decision. Therefore we start by describing the nancial contracting environment
in any given period.
2A recent paper by Champonnois[37] estimates a structural model of bank versus bond nancing
that reproduces the empirical link between the use of bank loans and rm size, assuming that
larger rms have systematically higher productivity levels than smaller rms. The two period nature
of the model and the assumption that entrepreneurs do not have any net worth(no equity) makes
integration of the model into standard dsges di¢ cult, and may miss important dynamics of nancing
choice. Also, it is not clear that larger rms are always more productive.
9Entrepreneur Production and Financing Decisions for a Fixed Level of Net
Worth
Entrepreneur j produces nal output using the production function
yjt = zt!jtk

jtl

jt; , 0 <   +  < 1;
The rm specic productivity shock !jt 2 [0;1) is i.i.d across both entrepreneurs
and time, has a CDF (!), a PDF (!) and E!jt = 1: !jt is unknown when signing
the nancial contract. We dene yjt  Eyjt = ztkjtljt: The realisation of !jt is the
private information of the entrepreneur, but can be observed by a type i intermediary
at a cost of iyjt: zt is an aggregate productivity shock with a mean of 1.
Entrepreneurs rent capital at a rate rt and buy labour from households at a wage
rate wt. Production requires spending xjt = rtkjt+wtljt before output is obtained. The
entrepreneur has njt in internal funds available, of which he devotes njt  njt to the
project. If the desired xjt exceeds the entrepreneurs internal funds dedicated to the
project, the entrepreneur will require external nancing from a lender. Alternatively,
we can think of the entrepreneur as being able to post a collateral of njt before output
is realized: Any loan below njt does not involve any nancing frictions or other costs.
But any part of the loan above njt will be subject to information frictions.
There is a continuum of fully diversied nancial intermediaries of two types :
banks and mutual funds, indexed by i 2 fb;mg: Both intermediaries collect funds
from households, and use them to make loans to entrepreneurs. Competition for bor-
rowers ensures that the nancial intermediaries make zero prots. Because nancial
intermediaries can fully diversify the idiosyncratic risk of the entrepreneurs, house-
holds are risk neutral with respect to intermediaries loan portfolios. Because the
loans are intratemporal and risk free, the required gross rate of return is 1:
The di¤erence between the two types of intermediaries is that banks are better
informed about borrowers than mutual funds. This superior information makes banks
better monitors in case of nancial distress. In particular, banks can observe !jt at a
lower cost than mutual funds.
Banks can learn !jt at a cost of byjt: Mutual funds can learn !jt at a cost of
myjt;where m > b: With a more general interpretation of audit costs as nancial
distress costs one can imagine for example that auditing prevents entrepreneur from
taking on risky projects that may benet him but reduces the expected value of
the assets obtained by lender, and banks are better at controlling this risk-shifting.
In order to o¤er lower cost monitoring, banks must spend (xjt   njt), where  > 0:
These could be interpreted directly as costs of gathering more information on lenders.
They could also be seen as a reduced form for costs related to frictions between banks
and depositors in a model where banks cannot accumulate any capital. 3 At the same
time, bond mutual funds may require a xed cost Cm in order to issue a bond.
To simplify notation we can abstract from time and entrepreneur subscripts. It
3For example, we can imagine 1 period bankers that can run away with and consume a proportion
 of the loan. In this case the loan contract must ensure that the expected repayments by entrepre-
neurs net of the audit costs and the deposit repayments exceed (xjt   njt); which is exactly the
banks break-even constraint in the nancial contract.
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is convenient to rst pick the optimal amounts of capital and labour given a total
expenditure x = rk + wl and characterize the solution to the contract in terms
of x and the bankruptcy threshhold !. For a given expenditure level the optimal
expected output is y = Mx; where M = z 

rw
: Once we have solved the nancial
contract, factor demands are given by k = 
r
x and l = 
w
x:We start by solving for the
entrepreneurs production level when he is restricted to self nancing.The expenditure
level without access to external nancing solves
ea = maxxMx
 + (n  x)
subject to
x  n:
x  0:
Depending on the availability of internal funds, the entrepreneur either picks the
rst-best interior solution xa = x^  (M)1=(1 ), or he sets xa = n: In fact since x^ is
independent of n; any entrepreneur with n above a certain threshold value will prefer
self-nancing.
We now turn to the contract conditional on the entrepreneur requiring external
nancing and having chosen a type i intermediary. Let Ri be the required gross rate
of return to the lender(Rb = 1+  ; Rm = 1): Because the entrepreneur has access to a
storage technology, his opportunity cost of funds is 1. The optimal contract species a
state contingent repayment schedule and the set of audited states in order to maximize
entrepreneur prots subject to incentive compatibility constraints for the entrepreneur
and the lenders break-even constraint.The distribution of ! and the auditing costs
satisfy the conditions in Gale and Hellwig (1985) [58] for the optimal contract to be
a debt contract with a threshhold ! such that the repayment is b(!) = y for !  !
and b(!) = !y if ! > !.
We dene the entrepreneurs and the lendersexpected shares of y as
f(!) =
Z 1
!
!d  ![1  (!)] for the entrepreneur.
m(!) =
Z !
0
!d + ![1  (!)]  (!) for the lender.
Like other papers(e.g Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) [19] and Covas and Den
Haan (2007) [45]), we assume that the hazard rate of ! is increasing in ! at the
optimal !;
Assumption 1 :
d
d!

(!)
1  (!)

> 0, (!) > 0 when ! > 0.
This assumption is satised by commonly used distributions such as the lognormal
or uniform distributions. Dene Ci  0 to be the xed cost of issuing debt for type
i intermediary, where Cb = 0: Dene 1(x   n > 0) as the indicator function for
x  n > 0:
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The optimal contract with type i 2 fb;mg nancial intermediary solves
ei = max
x;!;n
f(!i)Mx

i + (n  ni)
subject to
m(!i)yi  Ri(xi   ni) + Ci1(x  n > 0) (1.1)
ni  n: (1.2)
ni  0 (1.3)
xi   n  0 (1.4)
If (0) = 0,R = 1 and Cm = 0; then x  n > 0 whenever n < x^; the rst best level
of output. Otherwise, when Cm = 0 we can guarantee that x  n > 0 on an interval
of n0s (0; n); where n tends to x^ as  and  go to 0 (See the appendix for the proof):
When Cm > 0; x   n > 0 as long as Cm is not too large. In this section, we assume
x  n > 0: 4 The numerical algorithm in the next sections allows for the possibility of
rationing. Let i; i;  i be the lagrange multipliers for constraints (1-3) respectively.
Besides the complementary slackness conditions, the rst order conditions are
x : Mx 1i [f(!i) + im(!i)] = iRi (1.5)
! : f 0(!i) + im0(!i) = 0 (1.6)
n :  i + iRi = i + 1: (1.7)
Finally, the entrepreneur picks Eye = max[ea; 
e
m; 
e
b]:
The following lemma collects some straightforward results that simplify the solu-
tion of the model and help us characterize the nancing choice of entrepreneurs :
Lemma 1. a) At the optimum, m0(!) > 0 and the banks break-even constraint
is binding.b) Under the assumption that 0(!) = (!) > 0 the entrepreneur always
chooses Maximal Equity Participation(MEP) : n = n: 5 c)external nancing is never
optimal if the entrepreneurs wealth constraint does not bind. d)Under assumption
1,0(!) > 0:e)d!
dn
< 0 and d!
dCm
> 0: f)d!
d
< 0 as long as Cm is not too large:
Démonstration. see the appendix.
4Alternatively one can think of all the proofs in this section as applying only to those rms that
are not rationed.
5The strict optimality of MEP contracts relies on our limited liability assumption concerning
n   n. Gale and Hellwig[58]assume n   n can be used as collateral. In that case the optimal level
of equity participation is indeterminate, and the MEP contract only weakly dominates any other
contract.
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Due to the i.i.d nature of the productivity shock !jt; the only ex-ante heterogeneity
among entrepreneurs is due to di¤erent levels of net worth njt: There are several e¤ects
that determine the desirability of bank or bond nancing for a given level of net worth.
The model emphasizes the role of banks in reducing costs of nancial distress. Since
the default rate is decreasing in net worth (d!
dn
< 0) for a xed nancing type, it seems
natural then that holding y constant, smaller rms that are more likely to default
for a given nancing type will gravitate towards banks. At the same time a higher
net worth increases the projects expected output y, which increases expected default
costs (!)y for a given  and !: For a xed project size x; the extra cost per dollar
of bank loan (x   n) penalizes small rms with higher x   n. Things are less clear
cut when rms can adjust the size of their project. Higher net worth reduces the
desired leverage ratio x n
n
: 6 Decomposing the ex-ante cost of bank nancing (x n)
as 
 
x n
n

n; we see that it may actually decline in n; though this does not have to
be the case. We cannot theoretically rule out that the last two e¤ects overwhelms
the e¤ect of a lower ! and makes bank nancing more attractive for larger rms for
general values of n and  but, we will nd conditions for larger rms to prefer bond
nancing conditions on certain range of n0s and 0s: The numerical analysis in the
next section will examine the plausibility of those conditions.
Before proceeding with the analysis for the decreasing returns to scale, we can
verify that under the standard assumption in for example Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998)
[32] or Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) [19], of constant returns to scale and
no xed cost of market nance the choice of nancing type does not depend on net
worth. Therefore, all rms in our setup would choose the same nancial intermediary
if  = 1: The only possibility for a link between net worth and nancial intermediation
choice in the constant returns to scale case arises when there is a xed cost of market
nancig Cm > 0 in an environment in which market nancing would dominate when
Cm = 0 or when some rms would be rationed at x  n = 0 with market nancing :
Proposition 2. a)Suppose  = 1 and for each i M > Ri
1 (0) : If Cm = 0;then
the optimal choice of nancial intermediary is independent of n: Therefore, all rms
choose the same nancial intermediary type. All rms prefer bank nancing when
 <  and all rms prefer bond nancing when  >  ; for some  > 0: b) If Cm > 0,
any rm rationed at x  n by the bond contract will pick bank nancing. Among non-
rationed rms, If the optimal form of intermediation is bank nancing when Cm = 0
then this is also the optimal choice for all rms when Cm > 0: If the optimal nancial
intermediation is market nancing when Cm = 0 ; then in the economy with Cm > 0
there exists a threshold n^ such that all non rationed rms with n < n^ prefer bank
nancing while all non rationed rms with n  n^ prefer market nancing.
6For the leverage ratio, note that combining the foc for x and the break even constraint we have
(1   n=x + CRx )

f+m
m

= 1: The second term in brackets is decreasing in !: So x=n must be
increasing in ! if C = 0: The comparative statics with respect to n and M now follow from the
relation between ! and those parameters. With C > 0 its is possible for x=n to decrease in !; but
by continuity d(x n)=ndn < 0 should still hold for a small enough C:
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Démonstration. a) Consider rst the case when Cm = 0: Our assumption that M >
Ri
1 (0) ensures that x   n > 0 for all rms(see the appendix for the proof when
 < 1. The proof for  = 1 is similar). Using the break-even constraint of the nancial
intermediary to solve for x, the entrepreneurs expected prot with type i intermediary
is ei = f(!i)M
nRi
Ri m(!)M : 
e
b   em =Mn

(1+)f(!b)
(1+) m(!b)M  
f(!m)
1 m(!m)M

Mn > 0 i¤
 > 0: From the rst order conditions, d!
dn
= 0 when  = 1: Since n does not directly
a¤ect f(!) or m(!)  is independent of n, making the sign of eb   em independent
of n: Since d
e
d
< 0; eb   em > 0 when  = 0: d
e
d
< 0; and therefore eb   em is
decreasing in  . Finally, lim
!1
eb   em < 0: By the continuity of eb   em in  , there
exists a unique  such that eb   em > 0 whenever  <  and eb   em < 0 for  >  :
b) Next, consider the case when Cm > 0: Any rm that would be rationed by the
bond contract will obviously pick the bank contract, since by our assumption on M
the optimal bank contract dominates choosing x = n: Now consider rms that are
not rationed by the bond contract. The relative prot of bank nancing versus bond
nancing is eb em =M
h
n+ f(!m)Cm
1 m(!m)M
i
: If  > 0 (all rms prefer bank nancing
when Cm = 0), then bank nancing is preferred i¤ n >   1 f(!m)Cm1 m(!)M : Since the last
expression is negative and n  0; this constraint never binds and all rms pick bank
nancing in this case. If  = 0, then clearly all rms prefer bank nancing. If  < 0
(all rms prefer bond nancing when Cm = 0), then a rm prefers bank nancing i¤
n <   1

f(!m)Cm
1 m(!m)M  n^: All other rms prefer bond nancing. Note that ! remains
independent of n if x  n > 0 regardless of Cm: From the same rst order conditions,
! is also independent of Cm. As a result n^ can be computed as the product of Cm
and a term that depends only on M:
The empirical calibrations in the next section suggests that the extra intermedia-
tion fee of the bank  is quite low, casting doubt on the ability of the constant returns
to scale model to generate a negative relation between net worth and nancing choice,
except through the rationing of small rms by the bond contract due to the xed cost.
7
We would like to establish some conditions guaranteeing that the model with
 < 1 reproduces the pattern observed in the data where smaller rms prefer bank
nancing and larger rms prefer market nancing. In particular if the derivative of
the relative bank versus bond contract prot with respect to wealth d(
e
b em)
dn
< 0, and
rms choose both bank and bond nancing then it must be the case that for some n
rms with n < n prefer bank nancing while rms with n  n prefer bond nancing.
The following proposition gives a su¢ cient condition guaranteeing the existence
of an interval of values of  2 (0;  ) and an interval of n 2 (0; n) values for which
bond nancing becomes more attractive as n increases. The key requirement is that
bank nancing lowers the shadow cost of external nance  :
7We did a few quick tests of the constant returns to scale model in a partial equilibrium setting,
with the wage and interest rate xed by the steady state of an open economy where there are no
nancial frictions in the rest of the world. Bank nancing was optimal in those tests even for  = 0:08
which is much higher than the evidence presented in Erosa(2001)[53].
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Proposition 3. Suppose that dm
dm
> 0 at n = 0: Then there exists a neighbourhood
N"  R2+ of n = 0 =  such that d(
e
b em)
dn
< 0 whenever ( ; n) 2 N": Therefore there
exist a   and a n such that whenever  <   and n < n we have d(
e
b em)
dn
< 0:
Démonstration. By the envelope theorem d(
e
b em)
dn
= (1+)(!b( ; n)) (!m(0; n)) 
S( ; n)  m(0; n): Since b < m; dmdm > 0 at n = 0
d!
dC
> 0 and 0i(!) > 0; we have
S(0; 0)   m(0; 0) = b(0; 0)   m(0; 0) < 0: By the maximum theorem, for either
i = b or m, !i( ; n) is continuous on R2+ at  = n = 0: Therefore S( ; n)  m( ; n)
is continuous in ( ; n) at (0; 0). Together with S(0; 0)  m(0; 0) < 0 this implies the
existence of the required N" neighbourhood. The existence of   and n is immediate
by taking any rectangle contained in N":
d
d
= @
@
+ 0(!)d!
d
: Since @
@
> 0 and 0(!); d!
d
 0 is a su¢ cient condition for
d
d
> 0: d!
d
 0 holds for the standard costly state verication model with a xed
project size. It may still hold with a variable project size as long as x does not decline
too much when  increases. 8 Intuitively, increasing  raises the required repayments
for a given expenditure x. If x does not react too strongly , this requires an increase in
the coupon rate and hence an increase in the default rate. If we had constant returns
to scale ( = 1), the entrepreneur would react to a higher  by lowering x so much
that ! would decline. Intuition suggests that with su¢ ciently decreasing returns to
scale the reaction of x is small enough that ! may actually increase as in the model
with an exogeneously xed project size. At least, the decrease in ! in response to a
higher  would be small enough to allow the positive direct e¤ect on  of a higher 
to dominate. More formally, we have :
Lemma 4. Suppose that at n =  = 0; lim
!0
(!) > 0; lim
!0
! < 1; and lim
!0
m0(!) > 0:
Then lim
!0
d!m
d
 0; and there exists a  > 0 such that d
d
> 0 at  = n = 0 whenever
 < :
Démonstration. See the appendix.
The requirement that lim
!0
(!) > 0 may be problematic. Certainly this condition
holds for the uniform distribution. For the lognormal distribution the condition is
always satised if the standard deviation  of ln ! is high enough, but for typical
calibrations(as well for the calibration in section 3), lim
!0
(!) > 0 requires the presence
of a xed cost Cm > 0: The numerical calibration in section 3 shows that the model
with decreasing returns to scale can generate a realistic negative relation between
net worth and bank nancing even without the xed cost. This is in contrast to the
8x must be decreasing in  : Let A  Mx 1i f(!i)+im(!i)i . From the rst order condition for x;
dA(x();!();)
d =
@A
@x
dx
d +
@A
@!
d!
d +
@A
@ = 0:
@A
@x < 0 and
@A
@! < 0. Since
@(!;)
@ > 0 and
@m(!;)
@ < 0,
@A
@ < 0: This implies that
@A
@x
dx
d +
@A
@!
d!
d > 0: Let  > 0: Since
de
d < 0, x  0 implies that
! > 0: But then @A@x
dx
d +
@A
@!
d!
d < 0; which is impossible. Therefore,
dx
d < 0:
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constant returns to scale model which requires a xed cost in order to have a non
degenerate nancing choice. Also, the net worth-nancing choice link emerges in the
numerical analysis for  = 0:9; suggesting that the degree of decreasing returns to
scale required by the theoretical results above is plausible.
If we have the stronger condition that lim
!0
d!m
d
> 0; we can also derive an interesting
result about the e¤ect of a general improvement in the auditing technology for both
banks and bond funds. Let s  m=b > 1:We are interested in the consequences of a
reduction in the cost of auditing b for a xed ratio of market to bank debt auditing
e¢ ciency s: If a reduction in b leads more rms to prefer bond nancing, then
according to the model a general improvement in the cost of dealing with nancial
frictions causes a switch towards more market debt. Intuitively this should be the
case : if auditing technology in general improves the importance of banks as better
auditors should diminish. Thus the model also provides a potential explanation for the
shift towards more market debt nancing in the last 30 years(Samolyk,2004)[106]. 9We
can show that this is what happens if we have su¢ ciently strong decreasing returns
to scale(low ) :
Proposition 5. Suppose d!m
d
 0 and lim
!0
!m > 0: Then for a xed s > 1 , there
exists a  > 0 such that
d(eb em)
db
> 0 for  2 (0; ) :
Démonstration. See the appendix.
The su¢ cient condition in proposition 5 holds when Cm > 0 in a neighbourhood
of n = 0; as long as ! and d!
d
are continuous in  at 0 :
Lemma 6. Suppose that !, d!m
d
is right continous in  at  = n = 0 and Cm > 0.
Then lim
!0
!m > 0 and there exists a 
 > 0 such that d!m
d
> 0 at n = 0 for any  < :
Furthermore, these properties continue to hold for n 2 (0; n); where n is a positive
number:
Démonstration. See the appendix.
The Dynamic Behaviour of Entrepreneurs
We model entrepreneur savings in a similar way to Bernanke,Gertler and Gilchrist
[19]. There are overlapping generations of two-period lived entrepreneurs. There is a
measure 1 of old entrepreneurs in each period that can operate a project and then exit
the economy. Each period, they are replaced by a measure 1 of young entrepreneurs.
9Samolyk [106] nds that the proportion of short term nonnancial business lending done by
commercial banks in the US has declined from around 75% to about 50% between 1974 and 2004.
This gure may overestimate the decline of bank-like lending to the degree that many nance
company loans(that have increased signicantly during this period) may be very similar to bank
loans.
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Young entrepreneurs cannot produce or work, and they are born without any en-
dowment. Entrepreneurs are risk neutral and only care about consumption when old.
An old entrepreneur begins the period with a stock of capital kejt. The entrepreneur
can rent out his capital to obtain njt = kejt(1 + rt   ); where  is the depreciation
rate of capital. Then, the entrepreneur makes the nancing decision in order to maxi-
mise expected income Eyejt: Based on net worth njt and the aggregate state of the
economy; the entrepreneur decides whether to produce with a bank loan, produce
with a mutual fund loan or rely only on njt for funding. Next, if the entrepreneur
has decided to contract with a nancial intermediary the contract is signed for a
loan of rtkjt + wtljt   njt, and the entrepreneur rents capital and hires labour. If the
entrepreneur prefers autarky he uses part of his net worth to nance his production,
and he stores the remaining funds njt   njt till the end of the period.
Finally, the idiosyncratic shocks !jt are realised, entrepreneurs produce, pay for
capital and labour and deliver the loan repayment b(!jt): This leaves entrepreneurs
with income yejt. At this point old entrepreneurs get to consume all their income with
probability e: In this case they consume cjt = yejt, leaving the young without any
capital in the beginning of the next period. With a probability 1   e; the young
get all the income as a bequest from the old entrepreneurs. In this case the young
entrepreneur saves kej;t+1 = y
e
jt.
10In the case of constant returns to scale this structure
gives exactly the same saving function as the original Bernanke et al. [? ] model with
innitely lived entrepreneurs with a constant death probability of e: With constant
returns to scale, the risk neutrality of entrepreneurs would make it optimal for them
to maximise expected prots from production inside each period, despite the innite
horizon. Therefore, we can use the previously derived nancial contract to describe
entrepreneur production decisions. The decreasing returns to scale assumption com-
plicates matters. If the default rate were independent of net worth, then the value of
the rm would still be increasing in expected current prots, and the static contract
would still be optimal. Since the default rate is decreasing in net worth maximising
expected current prots is no longer optimal. In particular the entrepreneur may pre-
fer a lower project size relative to the static case in order to lower the default rate
and reduce the chances of entering the next period with zero net worth. In combi-
nation with the discrete nancing choice this makes the optimisation problem with
decreasing returns to scale considerably more challenging, particularly if the goal is
to eventually study nancing choices in general equilibrium with aggregate shocks.
The overlapping generations assumption sidesteps this issue. 11
10This outcome can be derived from a negotiation between old and young entrepreneurs over yej;t:
The old make a take it or leave it o¤er to the young with probability e; while the young make a
take it or leave it o¤er to the old with probability 1  e:
11Another assumption that would preserve the optimality of static expected prot maximisa-
tion would be allowing the entrepreneur to diversify away the risk of default by holding a conti-
nuum of projects, and generating di¤erences among entrepreneurs through ex-ante idiosyncratic
shocks(occuring before the nancial contracting decision is made).
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Workers
There is a measure 1 of risk averse workers. The representative worker chooses
sequences of consumption and saving to maximise E0
P1
t=0 
t ln ch;t subject to the
sequence of budget constraints
ch;t + kh;t+1 = kh;t(1 + rt   ) + wt (1.8)
where rt and wt are the rental rate and the real wage rate. Workers rent out
capital and work. They can then use their income to lend to nancial intermediaries
Lt  rtkht+wtlht. Both banks and bond mutual funds are completely diversied with
respect to entrepreneurs idiosyncratic risk.This, in addition to their intratemporal
nature, makes the gross rate of return on loans 1. At the end of the period all payments
are made and workers consume and save. From the workersoptimisation problem,
we get the standard Euler equation :
1
cht
= Et
1
ch;t+1
(1 + rt+1   ) (1.9)
In the steady state, this equation pins down the interest rate at r = 1

  1 + :
Timeline of the model during a period :
1. zt and the value of 1ed are known to everyone.
2 Based on njt = kejt(1 + rt   ) the entrepreneur picks contract type i 2 fa; b;mg
and the desired amount of loans, capital and labour.
3. Entrepreneurs rent out their capital. Workers rent out their capital and work.
Households extend the loans through nancial intermediaries
4. Entrepreneur output is realized and all payments are made.
5. Entrepreneurs and households consume and save for the next period.
1.2.2 The Competitive Equilibrium
We are now in a position to dene the steady state competitive equilibrium
for this economy. The state of each entrepreneur is described by Sjt =
 
!jt; k
e
jt; 1
e
d

;
where 1ed indicates entrepreneur death, with a joint probability measure Ft(S): Let
Ct = ch;t+
R
cjtdF , nt =
R
njtdF; xt =
R
xjtdF , lt =
R
ljtdF; and it = Kt+1 (1 )Kt
where Kt = kh;t +
R
kejtdF: Finally dene 1b, 1m, 1a and 1s as the indicator functions
respectively for bank nancing, market debt nancing, autarky and entrepreneur
default.
A steady state competitive equilibrium consists of capital rental rate and wage
rates (r; w) entrepreneur and worker consumption and saving policies
ce(Sjt); k
e
j;+1(Sjt); ch(k
h
t ); kh;+1(kh;t)
	
and decisions

1m(k
e
jt); 1b(k
e
jt); 1a(k
e
jt); 1s(k
e
jt; !jt)
	
such that
1. The capital market clears : kh +
R
kejtdF =
R
kjtdF:
2. The labour market clears : lt = 1:
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2. The output market clears : y = C + i +
R
1s1bbyjtdF +
R
1s1mmyjtdF +

R
1b(xjt   njt)dF + Cm
R
1mdF:
3. The loan market clears : rk + wl   n = x  n:
4. Financial contracts are optimal, entrepreneurs maximise their expected income
Eyejt and pick k
e
j;t+1 optimally.
5. Households pick consumption and saving optimally.
7. F is an invariant distribution : given the conditional probability functionQ(S;A)
and given any event A;
F (A) =
R
A
Q(S; S 0)F (dS
0
) .
1.3 Results
1.3.1 Calibration
The model period is one quarter. Following Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) [32],
we set  = 0:99;  = 0:02:We set aggregate productivity to z = 1: Following the
discussion in Restuccia and Rogerson (2003) [104] and Jaimovich and Rebelo(08) we
set  = 0:9 , implying a prot share of around 10%: A  of 0:9 is in the upper bound of
empirical estimates. If anything, choosing a relatively high value of  should make it
more di¢ cult for the model to generate a link between rm size and nancing choice.
We set the share of capital to one third, giving  = 0:3. The entrepreneursdeath
rate is 3%; based on Bernanke,Gertler and Gilchrist[19].
The calibration of m and b does not have any precedents in the litterature,
requiring us to make some extra assumptions. Let s = m
b
: We dene the average
audit cost;
  b
R
1s1byjtdFR
1syjtdF
+ m
R
1s1myjtdFR
1syjtdF
= bp^+ m (1  p^) ; where p^ 
R
1s1byjtdFR
1syjtdF
:
To simplify the calibration we approximate p^ by p 
R
1b(xjt njt)dFR
(1 1a)(xjt njt)dF and set  =
pb + (1   p)m = b[p + (1   p)s]: 12 Given  and p; we could solve for b and m
if we knew s: We approximate p by the average ratio of bank nance to total debt
nance over 1997-2003 in the US and in the Euro area, as reported in De Fiore and
Uhlig (2005) [55]. This gives us p = 0:425 for the US and p = 0:88 for the Euro
area. As there are several estimates of  in the litterature, we take an intermediate
estimate of  = 0:15 from Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998)[32]. This leaves s: In line with
our focus on bankslower cost of dealing with nancial distress, we use evidence from
Gilson,Kose and Lang (1990)[62] on the probability of private restructuring as opposed
to formal bankruptcy and on the relative costs of these procedures to determine s:
Let i be the probability of private restructuring for a debt of type i: Let m be the
proportional cost of private restructuring and m^ be the proportional cost of formal
12The approximation is exact if we have constant returns to scale:
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bankruptcy, where due to lack of evidence we assume these costs are the same for
both bank and non-bank debt. Since our model does not distinguish between these two
forms of nancial distress, we assume that i = m m+ (1  m)m^:This implies that
s = m
b
= m m+(1 m)m^
b m+(1 b)m^ =
mh+(1 m)
bh+(1 b) ; where h = m=m^: Gilson,Kose and Lang [62]
estimate b = 0:9 and m = 0:375: They also report that the average successful private
restructuring takes 15:4months, as opposed to 28:5months for the average unsuccesful
restructuring and formal bankruptcy. Assuming that the costs of these procedures is
proportional to their duration, we get an estimate of h = 15:4=28:5 = 0:54: With
these numbers we nd s = 1:412; b = 0:121 and m = 0:171 for the US. For the
Euro area, we assume the same s and the same , giving b = 0:143 and m = 0:202:
13
In the US calibration we assume that there are no xed costs of issuing bonds(Cm =
0). In this case, we pick the other parameters to roughly match the quarterly default
rate for the US of 0:974% reported in Carlstrom and Fuerst[32], the ratio of bank
nancing to market debt nancing from De Fiore and Uhlig[55] and the costs of bank
intermediation per dollar of loans in developed economies from Erosa (2001) [53]. 14
For the European calibration, we pick Cm to match the di¤erence between bond issue
costs in the US and Europe from Santos and Tsatsaronis (2003) [107].
We assume that ! follows a log-normal distribution where, ln! has a standard
deviation  and mean  2=2:
We set  = 0:185: We try several values of  ranging from 0:005% to 2%: The
most successful calibration has  = 0:25%: In combination with the costs of auditing
nancially distressed rms, this value leads to a reasonable estimate of total bank
intermediation costs.
1.3.2 General Equilibrium Results
For the US, the model provides a rough match to default rates, the ratio of bank to
market debt and the costs of nancial intermediation in the US with = 0:25% (table
1): The 2:8% (10:74% at an annual rate) default rate obtained in our simulations is
high relative to the 1% default rate used as a target. However, the 1% estimate is
biased downwards due to underrepresentation of small unincorporated rms in the
sample [56]. Such rms are included in our model, and they are potentially important
in explaining the prevalence of bank nancing. The higher default rate in the simu-
lations may be quite compatible with the behaviour of those rms, particularly once
one realises that default in our model does not just represent formal bankruptcy or
liquidation but any failure to fully repay the promised coupon !y:The models annual
capital to output ratio of approximately 2:5 is not too far from the average ratio for
13The idea that costs of nancial distress are higher in Europe is supported by Djankov et als
analysis of bankruptcy costs around the world[50]
14In the interpretation of the model where njt is partly used as collateral for loans that are not
subject to frictions instead of just being directly used for self nancing, we assume that lending
not subject to frictions is allocated between banks and markets in the same proportion as lending
subject to frictions.
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the US of 3 reported in Cagetti and de Nardi (2006) [27], even though this ratio was
not targetted in the calibration.
The model generates a negative correlation between rm size and bank nancing.
In particular, the correlation between the bank nancing indicator (1 if i = b; 0
otherwise) and n (our measure of the value of equity) is signicantly negative. As
discussed in the theoretical analysis of the nancial contract, the negative link between
n and the default threshhold ! is probably the key mechanism producing this e¤ect.
The smallest rms in our model use bank loans. Next, intermediate size rms use
market debt. Finally the largest rms are nancially unconstrained. Note that this
cross sectional pattern also holds for the time series evolution of a typical rm. So we
can also interpret the results as a model of the life-cycle of rm nancing choices. As
the rm becomes older it evolves from bank debt to market debt to a regime where
nancing choices do not matter very much.
Comparing the strength of this e¤ect in the model with actual data is di¢ cult due
to the limited availability of data on the division of debt between bank and market
sources. Nevertheless, this qualication we compare the models predicted correlation
between net worth and market debt issues with the one indicator available in Com-
pustat data- the existence of a bond rating. Cantillo and Wright (2000) [29] were able
to obtain more precise data on the decomposition of debt between banks and markets
for a subset of Compustat rms. For that subsample, they nd a nearly perfect corre-
lation between the existence of a debt rating and the existence of outstanding market
debt in a given year. On the assumption that this strong correlation continues to hold
in the general Compustat sample, as well as using the fact that rms in our model do
not issue bank and market debt simultaneously and that debt in our model lasts for
only one period, we can associate the existence of a bond rating in a given rm-year
with the issuance of market debt. Therefore, we compare the correlation between
using market debt and net worth in the model(calibrated at an annual frequency to
match Compustats ratings information) to the correlation between having a bond
rating and net worth in Compustat between 1997 and 2006. From this perspective,
our model is rejected : the models correlation between net worth and issuance of
market debt is around 0:77 while in Compustat the correlation is only around 0:25:
There are several possible explanations for this failure. One possibility is that Com-
pustat contains very large rms that are nancially unconstrained in our model. To
check this, we reexamined the correlation in the Compustat data excluding from the
analysis the top 31% of rms by net worth that would be nancially unconstrained
according to the model. The correlation in the restricted Compustat sample is around
0:21; again, far from the models prediction. 15
The model without xed bond issue costs cannot match the ratio of bank to
market debt in Europe without assuming an extremely low bank administration cost
15There are several measurement issues that could also explain this discrepancy. The assumption
of perfect correlation between having a bond rating and having outstanding market debt may be a
bad approximation in our sample. Also, Compustat data is biased biased towards larger rms that
can issue equity.
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parameter (table 2). Even with  = 0:005%; we can only get a ratio of bank nancing
to market nancing of 2:43 in comparison to a ratio of 7:33 in the data. The problem
is that lowering  in Europe even further leads to an implausibly low estimate of the
cost of bank intermediation per dollar of loan in Europe relative to the cost in the
US. It is certainly possible that bank monitoring is cheaper in Europe. For example,
we know that banks in many European countries can acquire equity stakes in rms
that they lend to more easily than in the US. This may lower the cost of monitoring
loans(showing up in reduced form in the model either as a lower b=m or as a lower
 for a given b=s).
16 An alternative interpretation of this result is that market
nancing is relatively more expensive in Europe. Santos and Tsatsaronis(2003)[107]
nd that until 2001 average bond underwriting fees in Europe exceeded American
average underwriting fees by approximately 0:05%  0:8%: 17 The introduction of the
Euro led to greater competition among investment banks in the Euro area, lowering
bond underwriting fees. We can model the di¤erence in underwriting fees by allowing
for positive bond issuance costs in Europe. To capture this we specify a xed cost of
issuing market debt Cm > 0 in Europe in addition to the expected costs of nancial
distress. We assume that  = 0:25% in Europe as in our preferred specication for
the US. Like Santos and Tsatsaronis, we use the loan size weighted average of issue
costs per dollar of lending as our measure of average issue costs.
The addition of a xed bond issue cost leads to a large increase in the relative
desirability of bank nancing (table 3). An average issue cost of 0:17%(Cm = 0:25%)
almost triples the relative proportion of bank loans to market loans in Europe. With
an average issue cost of 0:22%(Cm = 0:35%) we get a ratio of bank to bond nancing
of 5:54 in Europe. The cost of bank intermediation per dollar of loans in Europe
is still estimated to be signicantly lower than in the US (1:78% versus 2:72% in
the US), but the di¤erence is much more plausible than the one obtained trying to
match the relative amount of bank nancing in Europe without bond issue costs. This
estimate is signicantly lower than the estimates reported by Erosa[53] for European
countries. However, his estimates are for the year 1985. It is quite possible that due
to technological progress in the nancial sector, costs of bank intermediation have
declined signicantly since 1985.
Finding a lower cost of bank intermediation in Europe despite having the same
loan administration cost  ; a higher audit cost parameter  and the same average
default rate as in the US may seem counterintuitive at rst. The explanation lies in
the audit cost function used. Recall that the audit cost is Mx, which is concave
16In contrast American banks could not hold equity in rms that they lend to until 1999, with
the repeal of the Glass-Steagall act. Even with the repeal of the Glass-Steagall act, European banks
still have more freedom to own equity in borrowing rms(Barthet al 2000). Santos(97) argues that
in practice European banksequity holdings are small, though one cannot exclude the possibility
that even small equity holdings translate into signicant reductions in bank monitoring costs.
17Their sample covers only international bond issues, which includes almost all European corporate
bond issues, but excludes many American bonds issued only domestically. One should also bear
in mind that the market nance in our model is closer to commercial paper, while Santos and
Tsatsaronis cover longer term bonds.
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in x:The average x nanced by the bank in Europe is 1:91. The average x nanced
by the bank in the US is 1:34. This di¤erence occurs due to the larger number of
high n rms using bank nancing in Europe, reected in a lower magnitude of the
negative correlation between n and bank nancing choice in Europe. The cost of bank
intermediation per dollar of loans is  +
M
R
1bx

jdFR
1b(xj nj)dF : The amount of bank loans in
Europe is more than double the amount in the US(the denominator). At the same
time, while the total amount of expenditure by bank nanced rms is larger, due to
the diminishing marginal cost of auditing and the higher average expenditure nanced
by a bank loan in Europe, the total auditing costs in Europe are smaller relative to
the amount of loans. As a result, we get a lower cost of bank intermediation per dollar
of loans in Europe.
The model has more limited success in matching some other stylized facts about
the distribution of rms. The model predicts a negative relation between the debt to
equity ratio x n
n
and n; with a correlation of around  0:3 for the US, and  0:53 in
Europe. This prediction is at odds with the empirical evidence for Compustat data
reported in Frank and Goyal( 2005)[119]. In fact the negative correlation between the
leverage ratio(leverage is x
n
; that is the debt to equity ratio minus 1) and net worth
is so strong that it also leads to a negative correlation between loan sizes and n.
This prediction is again probably unrealistic. There are several possible reactions to
this problem. First, the evidence for a positive link between leverage and size is not
conclusive. Arellano,Bai and Zhang(2007) [11] examine data from the UK and nd a
negative correlation between leverage and size for the whole sample. They only nd
a positive leverage and size correlation for the largest rms in the UK. To the degree
that the compustat data oversamples the largest American rms, Frank and Goyals
conclusion on the correlation between size and leverage is consistent with Arellano et
al. 18 Second, these correlations emerge in the model when restricting the analysis to
rms that require external nancing. For higher net worth rms, the Modigliani-Miller
theorem applies in our model, and the nancing choice is indeterminate. Those rms
could for example prefer higher leverage due to unmodeled tax trade-o¤s between
debt and equity. Therefore, our model is not necessarily at odds with a positive size
and leverage relation for the largest rms. Third, the negative link between x n and
n does not necessarily mean that the model predicts a negative correlation between
n and overall lending. Recall the alternative interpretation of the model according
to which x   n is the part of lending subject to frictions, with the total amount of
lending relative to self-nancing being indeterminate. This interpretation is consistent
with an economy where rms with higher net worth borrow more, but the amount of
their borrowing subject to information frictions is lower than for low net worth rms.
Finally, like virtually all implementations of the CSV model, we have assumed that
the idiosyncratic shocks ! are i.i.d. Suppose instead that ! follows an AR(1) process.
In this caseM is increasing in E(!tj!t 1): A high sequence of !s would raiseM: Since
18Cooley and Quadrini(2001) also report that the leverage ratio is negatively correlated with rm
equity when the sample is not restricted to corporations.
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d(x n)=n
dM
> 0; the rms leverage ratio would also increase for a given n. At the same
time, the rms net worth n should increase due to the higher recent protability. In
this case we may see a rise in n accompanied by a rise in x n
n
; despite the negative
direct relation between these two variable for a xed M: 19 Finally, we have followed
the standard costly state verication framework in restricting entrepreneurs to using
only internal equity. Allowing rms in the model to issue external equity subject to
the typical quadratic issuance costs (see for example Henessy and Whited[68]) would
increase the cost of equity disproportionately for the largest rms and encourage them
to increase the proportion of debt nancing.
Only around 40% of rms in our calibrations actually borrow. The result that most
rms in our simulations are not nancially constrained is unrealistic. For example
Henessy and Whited (2006) [68] estimate a more quantitative model of investment
with nancial frictions and nd the presence of moderate nancing frictions even for
large US corporations, though as in our model they nd that nancial frictions are
considerably less important for larger rms. One result of the high proportion of self-
nancing rms in the model is the extremely low aggregate debt to equity ratio of
around 0:07 predicted in our simulations. The actual aggregate debt to equity ratio
for 1997-2003 was 0:41 in the US and 0:61 in Europe [55].The debt to equity ratio of
borrowing rms is actually around 1.36 for our US calibrations, but these rms only
hold around 20% of assets and even less of the aggregate equity. As a result, the total
amount of debt to equity for all rms is low.
The key factor explaining the large number of nancially unconstrained rms in
our simulations is the aggressive saving behaviour of the entrepreneurs. This allows
many rms to accumulate enough net worth to make nancial frictions irrelevant.
The largest rms in the model do not require any external nancing. The simplest
way to improve the models performance in this respect is to increase the bargaining
power of old entrepreneurs e: This would directly reduce the entrepreneur dynasties
ability to accumulate large net worth levels. For example, increasing e to 10% while
keeping all other parameters at their level in the preferred US calibration increases
the aggregate debt to equity ratio to 0:36, at the cost of an unrealistically high default
rate of 6:25%: A more realistic but more challenging approach would be to model risk
averse/consumption smoothing entrepreneurs as in Zha(2001)[120].
To summarize, the main factor explaining higher bank nancing in Europe in our
model is the higher cost of issuing market nancing in Europe. The higher audit costs
for a given loan size (higher ) do not seem to play a large role in explaining European
rmsstronger preference for bank nancing. To the degree that bond underwriting
costs have declined with the introduction of the Euro, our model predicts increased
reliance on market nancing in Europe. One should note though, that while the
introduction of the Euro has lowered international bond issue costs, it is not clear
19One potential question is how would nancing choice be a¤ected by a model with persistent
productivity shocks. Computing the derivative of eb  em at n = 0 and taking the limit as  ! 0, it
can be shown that if n and  are not too large and there is a xed cost of issuing bonds, then bank
nancing becomes less protable relative to bond nancing as M increases.
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that it had a similar e¤ect on the costs of issuing commercial paper (which is a better
description of the short term market debt in the model). If di¤erences in the cost
of issuing commercial papers persist, bank nancing should remain more popular in
Europe in the future.
Finally, we compare the model with bank versus market debt choice to the stan-
dard Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) [32] model with only one intermediary type(table
4). This is a special case of the benchmark model with b = m = 0:15 and  = 0:
The other parameter values are the same. We compare this model to our preferred
calibration for the US with two types of nancial intermediaries. The di¤erences in
the prediction of the two models for aggregate output and consumption are practi-
cally indistinguishable. Output and total consumption are higher by about 0:11% in
the model with bank and market debt. Worker consumption is slightly higher than in
the Carlstrom and Fuerst model, while entrepreneur consumption is slightly lower. In
the context of this model, allowing for two types of nancing does not seem to matter
very much for predicting aggregate quantities. An economist could have done just as
well in predicting aggregate output and consumption in this economy by assuming a
single type of intermediary with audit costs being an average of bank and bond audit
costs. This provides some evidence that, at least for some purposes, the usual practice
of modeling a single type of nancial intermediary may provide a good approxima-
tion as long as the lending technology of that nancial intermediary is appropriately
calibrated.
1.4 Conclusion
We have examined the ability of a simple extension of the standard costly state ve-
rication model of nancing, based on the idea of banks as better monitors, to account
for rmschoice between bank and market debt. The model successfuly captures the
tendency of larger rms to use more market debt. The intuition for this result is that
nancial distress is a smaller problem for these rms, and this makes the advantages
o¤ered by banks in dealing with default less valuable. In order to capture the higher
use of bank nancing in Europe relative to the US we depart from the benchmark
model by assuming higher xed costs of issuing market debt in Europe. The xed
cost model can generate a realistic bank to market nancing ratio in Europe.
There are several extensions of this paper that should be explored in future re-
search. First, we have only examined the steady state behaviour of the model. Once we
allow for aggregate shocks, we can study how nancing choices change over the busi-
ness cycle. Many authors(see for example Oliner and Rudebusch (1996), and Cantillo
and Wright (2000)[96][29]) have argued that the impact of di¤erent nancing types on
business cycle dynamics depends on the degree to which rms switch from one mode
of nancing to another in reaction to aggregate shocks. Beyond the usual productivity
and demand shocks, an interesting type of aggregate shock that may be worthwhile
to investigate within this model is a shock to the cost of monitoring b: At the end
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of section 2 we discussed the possibility of explaining the switch to more market ba-
sed nancing in the US as a decline in b in recent decades. Such an explanation
seems plausible. At the same time, it is sometimes argued that the switch away from
standard bank based loans in recent years has been excessive and may have even
contributed to the current nancial problems in the US. One way to formalize such
a story in this model is to model a news shock to b; where agents in the economy
overestimate the future declines in b:
Another interesting extension is to endogenize part of the ex-ante cost of bank
nancing  ; by introducing bank capital e¤ects. Reduced form empirical research has
found signicant e¤ects of the strength of the banks balance-sheet on interest rates
and lending[98][99][70]. An extension of this model with bank capital would allow
investigation of these e¤ects in a more structural framework.This could be done in
our model by limiting the ability of the bank to diversify part of the rmsrisk across
its loan portfolio. For example, we could introduce an industry level shock in an
environment where the bank must specialize in a specic industry. In this case, the
rate of return on bank deposits is no longer certain. Assuming that the realized return
on the banks loan portfolio is freely observable only to the banker, the depositors
will have to audit the bank in case of low returns, just as the bank has to audit the
entrepreneur when output is low. The nancial friction between banks and depositors
makes bank capital(the bankers net worth) valuable in this environment, just as the
entrepreneurs net worth reduces frictions in the current model.
Finally, while we focus on bank and market nancing in developped economies,
in principle the framework that we present can be used to study any situation in
which the nancing options available to rms di¤er by the degree of monitoring.
For example, we could also study the introduction of various intermediate forms of
nancing such as market debt backed by bank repayment guarantees to investors. Or
we could examine the choice of farmers and entrepreneurs in a developing country
between local lenders with better information on borrowers and outside nancial
intermediaries (for example foreign banks) with a more e¢ cient lending infrastructure
but less access to information on local borrowers.
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Table 1,
US, benchmark calibration
 Pr(default) bankcostratio btomf#rms btomoans Debt/Equity Pr(extn)
0.01 0.026 0.045 0.248 0.21 0.069 0.403
0.005 0.029 0.04 0.372 0.353 0.0697 0.401
0.0025 0.029 0.027 0.619 0.671 0.07 0.399
 corr(i=a,n) corr(i=b,n) Y K
0.01 0.592 -0.543 2.631 26.314
0.005 0.591 -0.639 2.633 26.336
0.0025 0.589 -0.754 2.634 26.347
Bankcostratio is  +
M
R
1bx

jdFR
1b(xj nj)dF : btomf#rms is the ratio of the number of rms
choosing bank to those choosing market debt.
btomoans is the ratio of bank loans to market loans. Debt/Equity is the aggregate
debt to equity ratio.
Table 2,
Europe, benchmark calibration
 Pr(default) bankcostratio btomf#rms btomoans Debt/Equity Pr(extn)
0.01 0.0263 0.052 0.247 0.188 0.067 0.404
0.005 0.0288 0.0481 0.386 0.337 0.068 0.404
0.0025 0.0288 0.03 0.643 0.656 0.068 0.403
0.0005 0.0288 0.021 1.221 1.624 0.069 0.403
 corr(i=a,n) corr(i=b,n) Y K
0.01 0.592 -0.539 2.629 26.286
0.005 0.593 -0.644 2.63 26.301
0.0025 0.592 -0.759 2.631 26.312
0.0005 0.592 -0.871 2.632 26.327
27
Table 3
Fixed bond issue cost in Europe ( = 0:0025)
Cm E(
1mCm
x n ) Pr(default) bankcostratio btomf#rms btomoans Debt/Equity
0.0025 0.174% 0.0288 0.022 2.602 1.855 0.068
0.003 0.199% 0.0288 0.019 4.466 3.138 0.068
0.0035 0.224% 0.0288 0.0178 7.81 5.544 0.068
Cm Pr(extn) corr(i=a,n) corr(i=b,n) Y K
0.0025 0.396 0.586 -0.196 2.6307 26.302
0.003 0.396 0.587 -0.122 2.6309 26.303
0.0035 0.396 0.586 -0.069 2.6306 26.299
Table 4,
Model with only 1 nancial intermediary type.
US calibration uses =0.25%, b=0.121,m=0.171
Single nancial intermediary model uses =0.15,=0
Y K Ch Ce
1FI 2.631 26.315 1.772 0.325
2FIs,US 2.634 26.347 1.775 0.326
1FI/2FIs 1.001 1.001 1.002 0.998
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Appendix A :
Su¢ cient conditions for x  n > 0 (no rationing) :
Consider rst the case when Cm = 0: Dene the relative prot between external
nancing and autarky as a function of x as (x)  e(x) ea(n):We will show that
0(n) > 0 when n <

M [1 (0)]
R
 1
1 
: Therefore, by continuity and the mean value
theorem, for small enough " = x n > 0 ,(n+") (n) = (n+") > 0: Taking on
some positive loan must lead to higher prots than those available with just x = n.
To establish this result, we go through the following steps :
1)m0(!) > 0: Otherwise, since f 0(!) < 0;for a given x one could always raise !
and raise ewhile satisfying the lenders break-even constraint
2) m(!)y = R(x   n): Otherwise, by 1) and f 0 (!) < 0 we could reduce ! and
tighten the lenders break even constraint without violating it, while increasing e for
any given x:
3)x = 0 is never optimal. If x = n = 0, then lim
x!0
(1   )Mx 1   R = 1:
This implies that we can always guarantee a positive loan surplus by picking a small
x0 > 0 = n: Continuity allows us to nd a nite ! > 0 such that m(!)Mx0  x0 and
e = f(!)Mx0 > 0: So x = n = 0 can never be optimal.
4) x   n = 0 if and only if ! = 0. The only if comes from realizing that f(!) =
1 m (!)  (!), and that 2) and 3) require that m(!) = 0: This can be achieved
without any monitoring by setting ! = 0: For any given x; picking any other ! > 0
such that m(!) = 0 (if it exists) would generate positive expected monitoring costs.
Therefore ! = 0 is optimal. For the if, setting ! = 0 when x   n > 0 would mean
that the borrower could make expected repayments arbitrarily small while evading
all auditing by always reporting that ! = " > 0 whenver !  " for some small " such
that "Mx < R(x  n): But this violates the lenders break-even constraint.
Since f(0) = 1, e(n) = ea and (n) = 0:
5) n = n. Therefore (n) = 0: See the proof of lemma 1b) to see that this is
optimal when x   n > 0: When x   n = 0, e = M n + n   n = ea:Since xa = n
whenever n  x^; it is also optimal for the nancial intermediary to set n = n:
6)Dene (x)  e   ea = f(!(x))Mx  Mn; where !(x) is implicitly de-
ned by the break even constraint m(!)Mx = R(x   n) (the function!(x) is well
dened since m0(!) > 0): Using the break-even constraint to nd d!
dx
; 0(x) =
f 0(!)d!
dx
Mx + f(!)Mx 1 =   [1  (!)] R m(!)Mx 1
m0(!) + f(!)Mx
 1 .Evaluating
this at n; 0(n) = Mn 1   R
1 (0) > 0 i¤ n <

M [1 (0)]
R
 1
1 
: Note that if
(0) = 0 and R = 1 then the right hand side of this inequality is the rst best level
of output with no nancial frictions x^: In this case, the condition holds for any n < x^
by the concavity of Mx 1 and the rst order condition dening x^:
Therefore, for any n <

M [1 (0)]
R
 1
1 
by the mean value theorem there exists an
" > 0 such that (n+ ") (n) = (n+ ") > 0: This implies that x  n = x n = 0
cannot be optimal when there are no xed costs.
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Furthermore, note that

M [1 (0)]
R
 1
1 
is decreasing in both  and  : As a conse-
quence for any value of n for which x   n > 0 with a given  and ; x   n > 0 still
holds for lower values of  and :
When Cm > 0;0(n) > 0 continues to hold if Cm is low enough. By the mean value
theorem, we can then once again nd x = n+ " > n such that (n+ ") (n) > 0:
Proof of lemma 1 :
1a) First note that f 0(!) =  [1   (!)] < 0 for any nite !:From the f.o.c for
!;we see that this requires that  > 0 and m0(!) > 0:
1b) If n = 0; we have  + lR = 1: Since R  1;  > 1 is su¢ cient for  = 0: If
0 < n < n; the f.o.c for n implies that  > 0 is equivalent to lR 1 > 0:Since R  1, a
su¢ cient condition for this is again that  > 1: By (1a) and the f.o.c for !;  =   f 0(!)
m0(!)
. Note that f(!) +m(!) = 1   (!); implying that f 0(!) +m0(!) =  (!) < 0:
Since m0(!) > 0; this is equivalent to  =   f 0(!)
m0(!) > 1:
1c) Using the MEP result and the lender rationality constraint, for any nancial
intermediary e = f(!)Mx = [1   (!)]Mx   R(x   n)   C, where starred
variables indicate optimal choices: By the MEP, when the entrepreneur uses external
nancing x  n: If the rst best level with no nancial frictions xnofrictions  n, then
Mx   (xnofrictions   n) Mx   (x   n)  [1  (!)]Mx  R(x   n)  C.
i.e, whenever external nancing may be optimal(x  n), internal nancing of
xa = xnofrictions is preferred.
1d)0(!) = m
00(!)f 0(!) f 00(!)m0(!)
m0(!)2 =
[0(!)(1 (!))+(!)2]
m0(!)2 : The denominator is clearly
positive. The numerator is positive whenever d
d!

(!)
1 (!)

= 
0(!)(1 (!))+(!)2
[1 (!)]2 > 0,
which is assumption 1. Therefore, 0(!) > 0:
e) The proof technique is from Covas and Den Haan[45]. From the rst order
conditions, Mx 1i
f(!i)+im(!i)
i
= Ri: Suppose Cm falls. Under assumption 1, ! 
0 =) f(!i)+im(!i)
i
 0 =) Mx 1i  0 =) x  0: !  0 and x  0 imply
that e  0; but this contradicts de
dC
< 0:Therefore, d!
dC
> 0: The proof that d!
dn
< 0
follows the same argument, except that now d!
dn
> 0 leads to a contradiction.
f) We will start by showing that dx
d
< 0: This will imply that d!
d
< 0: From the
rst order condition Mx 1i
f(!i)+im(!i)
i
= 1 +  ;  > 0 and x  0 imply that
f(!i)+im(!i)
i
> 0 and ! < 0: But this contradicts d
e
d
< 0: Therefore dx
d
< 0:When
Cm = 0; substituting the nancial intermediarys break-even constraint into the rst
order condition for x; we get (1   n
x
)( f
m
+ 1) = 1. Since dx
d
< 0; > 0 implies
that (1  n
x
) < 0 and ( f
m
+ 1) > 0. Since f
m
is decreasing in !; ! < 0 when 
increases. By continuity, the result continues to hold if Cm is close to 0:
Proof of lemma 4 :
d
d
= @
@
+ 0(!)d!
d
: @
@
= (!)1 (!)
m0(!)2 > 0: By our assumption that lim!0
! < 1
and lim
!0
(!) > 0 ; the limit of the numerator as  ! 0 is positive. lim
!0
m0(!) >
0 implies that the limit of the denominator is also positive as  ! 0 (note that since
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m0(!) > 0 for any  > 0; lim
!0
m0(!)  0: The only assumption is that the inequality
is strict.). Therefore lim
!0
@
@
> 0: Since 0(!) =
[0(!)(1 (!))+(!)2]
m0(!)2 > 0 whenever
 > 0; lim
!0
0(!)  0: Moreover, it is clear from examining the expression for 0(!)
that its limit is bounded. Totally di¤erentiating the rst order conditions with respect
to , we get d!
d
=  
(!)(!)
m0(!)  
(!)2
f(!)+(!)m(!)

(!)m(!)
m0(!)  (!)

0(!) f(!)
f(!)+(!)m(!)
+ 1 

(!)2
f(!)
m0(!)
   
(!)2
f(!)
(!)

1 
0(!) f(!)
f(!)+(!)m(!)
+
(!)2
f(!)
m0(!)

 A()   B(): lim
!0
A() = 0 and lim
!0
B()  0: Therefore lim
!0
d!
d
 0: Together with
our results for the limits of @
@
and 0(!); this implies that lim
!0
d
d
> 0. But then there
must be a  > 0 such that d
d
> 0 still holds when  < :
Proof of proposition 5 :
By the envelope theorem, ,d(
e
b em)
db
= s(!m; m)(!m)Mx

m (!b; b)(!b)Mxb :
Since d!m
d
 0; and d!
d
< 0 (from lemma 1f) !m > !b: This, together with
@(!;)
@
>
0 and 0(!) > 0 implies that (!m; m)(!m) > (!b; b)(!b) for any  > 0:
Since lim
!0
!m > 0 and s > 1; this implies that lim!0 s(!m; m)(!m) > lim!0 (!b; b)(!b):
But then since lim!0Mx =M; we have that lim!0
d(eb em)
db
> 0: Therefore, there
exists a  > 0 such that
d(eb em)
db
> 0 when  < :
Proof of lemma 6 :
Suppose  = n = 0; and consider the (suboptimal) pseudo-bond contract where
the xed cost is paid even when x = n = 0. The lenders break even constraint is now
m(!)y  Cm: Note that now y is xed and therefore the optimal x = 0: The optimal
contract with external nancing contract must have m0(!) > 0 and m(!m)y = Cm;
otherwise we could increase !m and improve the borrowers expected prots without
violating the lenders break-even constraint. Since m(0) = 0 and Cm > 0; !m > 0:
The right continuity of !m at  = 0 then implies that lim
!0
!m > 0: Since
@m(!m;)
@
< 0,
m0(!m) > 0 and y is xed, an increase in  implies an increase in !m : d!md > 0
when  = 0: The right continuity in  of d!m
d
at  = n = 0 imply the existence of a
 > 0 such that d!m
d
> 0 whenever  < : Since for any n > 0 and  > 0 d!m
d
is a
continuous function of n; we can nd a n > 0 such that d!m
d
> 0 and lim
!0
!m > 0
continue to hold whenever  <  and n < n:
Model Solution :
Partial Equilibrium :
We can solve the nancial contract recursively by rst solving a nonlinear equation
for ! and then nding x(!): We use the rst order conditions for x and ! to nd
x(!) =
h
M(f(!)+lm(!))
lR
i1=(1 )
: We then replace x with this equation in the lenders
break even constraint and solve for !: We solve for ! using Brents algorithm, which
is a renement of the standard bisection algorithm.
As for the uniqueness of the the solution found by this method we have the
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following result :
Proposition 7. 0(!) > 0 and m0(!)  0 imply a unique solution(if it exists).
Démonstration. Were looking for F (!) = m(!)Mx Rx+Rn C = 0: It is su¢ cient
to prove the strict monotonicity of F (!). F 0(!) =Mxm0(!) + x0(!)[Mm(!)x 1 
R]. The rst term is positive or zero ifm0(!)  0. As for the second term, after substi-
tuting our expression for x(!) and simplifying Mm(!)x 1 R = R( m(!)
f(!)+m(!)
 1) <
0. x0(!) =  RM
1  x
 
0
l(!)f(!)
(R)2
< 0 if 0(!) > 0: Therefore under our assumptions the
second term is also positive and F 0(!) > 0:
We know from lemma 1 that 0(!) > 0 i¤ the hazard rate h(!) satises h0(!) > 0:
For the lognormal distribution there exists a !0 such that the lognormal distributions
hazard rate is increasing for ! < !0 and is decreasing for ! > !0: Therefore we can
restrict our search for a solution to ! < !0:The other condition is that m0(!)  0:
This must be true at an optimum, but need not hold for all !: However, once again
restricting the search for a solution to the region where h0(!) > 0 helps. m0(!) =
(1 )(1 h)  0 i¤ 1 h  0: Since h0(!) > 0 there exists a unique !00 such that
for any ! < !00; 1 h(!)  0 and 1 h(!) < 0 for any ! > !00: Therefore there is a
unique region [0;min(!00; !0)] on which the conditions of the proposition are satised.
This implies that if our candidate solution satises 0(!) > 0 and m0(!)  0; then we
have found the optimal !:
General Equilibrium computation :
Our goal is to nd xed steady state values for capital stocks, prices, aggregate
consumption and an invariant distribution of entrepreneur net worth levels. Since the
workerseuler equation xes r = 1= 1+; solving the GE model amounts to nding
the labour market clearing wage w:
As long as for at least some positive measure of entrepreneurs xj is lower in the
presence of auditing costs relative to the frictionless economy(implying that labour
demand is lower with nancial frictions), we can bound the equilibrium wfrictions 
wnofrictions. In fact, dene l(w) to be the labour demand in the economy where
there are no nancial frictions: We have l(w)  l(w)20: Then, l(wnofrictions)   1 
l(wnofrictions)   1 = 0:Furthermore, if l(w)   1 is continuous; there exists a small
enough " > 0 such that l(") > 1: We can then guarantee that using ["; wnofrictions]
as the starting interval the bisection algorithm will converge to wfrictions. Absent
switches between external nancing types, rm and hence aggregate labour demands
are continuous. The possibility of switching nancing types makes showing continuity
di¢ cult. Even if the true l(w) function is continuous, we must approximate it with
20In our modelxjfrictions  xjno frictions whenever xjno frictions  n; since f(!)Mxj=(1  
Pr(sj < !j))Mjx

j R(xj nj) is concave in x; holding ! constant. In this case, by proposition 5 in
Gale and Hellwig[58] and the concavity of the revenue functionxjfrictions  xjno fricitons:ljfrictions 
ljno fricitons from the experssion for labour demand as a function of total expenditure.
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a nite number N of entrepreneurs, and this approximation may be discontinous. In
practice nding a market clearing wage was never a problem. In all of the model para-
metrisations tried the bisection algorithm did converge to a solution according to the
stopping criterion
zl =  1N PNt=1 ljt   1 < 10 4: As for uniqueness, we know that
for each entrepreneur labour supply is still downward sloping in w in the economy
with nancial frictions, as long as the change in w does not make him switch between
bank and bond nancing21. If there were no such switches, aggregate labour demand
would be clearly downward sloping in w, ensuring a unique equilibrium wfrictions. If
the entrepreneur switches between external nancing types, it is still clear that an
increase in the wage must reduce prots, but this may occur through an increase in
both x and !: In practice, partial equilibrium analysis for our calibrations suggested
that entrepreneur labour demand is still declining in the wage despite the possibility
of switching nancial contracts.
We start the algorithm with the initial interval [wlow; wnofrictions] for a small wlow >
0: We iterate on the following :
1. Given the interval [wil ; w
i
h] and w
i =
wil+w
i
h
2
approximate the invariant distri-
bution of fnj; kjtg: To do this we simulate a long time series of observations for a
single entrepreneur starting from an initial net worth of n0 and discard a subset of
the observations to reduce the impact of the initial n0: This leaves a sample of N
observations. Appealing to a law of large numbers we then take the sampe averages
of cejt, k
e
jt njt; ljt and kjt to approximate aggregate entrepreneur consumption capital
supply, net worth, labour demand and capital demand.
2. Use the capital,output and consumption markets clearing conditions and the
estimates of aggregatey; ce and ke from the previous step to solve for ch; c; kh:
3. If the labour excess demand function satises
zl =  1N PNt=1 ljt   1 < "l stop.
Otherwise, update the bisection interval and proceed to the next iteration.
21To see this it is su¢ cient to note that the labour demand function decreases in w as long as
x decreases in w: But raising w decreases M; which lowers x(see Covas and Den Haan[? ] for the
argument that @x=@M > 0).
Chapitre 2
Are There Any Spillovers between
Household and Firm Financing
Frictions ? A Dynamic General
Equilibrium Analysis
Abstract
Economic commentators frequently imply the existence of positive spillovers bet-
ween the nancing frictions a¤ecting households and rms, suggesting another way in
which credit constraints may amplify aggregate shocks and increase the persistence of
aggregate uctuations. To examine this possibility, I develop a new model that incor-
porates both rm and household external nance spreads while improving in several
dimensions on existing frameworks. Contrary to a common intuition, the baseline
Real Business Cycle model with credit constraints produces small negative spillovers
between the costs of external nancing for rms and households. A key factor in this
result is the income e¤ect of changes in the external nance premium on borrower
labour supply. The reduction in householdscost of borrowing in a boom decreases
labour supply, increases the risk free interest rate and crowds out investment, raising
borrowing costs for nancially constrained rms.
JEL classication : E3, E4, G3.
Key words : Financial frictions, external nance premium, business cycles.
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2.1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to examine possible feedback e¤ects between the
strength of credit constraints and external nance premia in the household and in the
production sectors of the economy, and the impact of such e¤ects on business cycles.
To do this, it proposes a new model of nancing frictions for rms and households
that explicitly models the external nance spread faced by both types of agents, while
improving in several other dimensions on existing models of credit constraints and
aggregate uctuations. Financing frictions are often suggested as a prime candidate
for endogenously amplifying and increasing the persistence of even small transitory
exogenous shocks. The basic idea, often called the nancial accelerator, is that in
the presence of credit constraints exogenous shocks can generate a positive feedback
e¤ect between the nancial health of borrowing rms or households and output (Ber-
nanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) [19]). The standard approach to analysing credit
constraints focuses either on households or on rms in isolation. Despite the conjec-
ture that credit constraints can signicantly amplify and increase the persistence of
small shocks, a frequent nding is that the ability of credit frictions to amplify uc-
tuations is small or modest and in many circumstances they dampen the e¤ect of
shocks on output.1
This raises the following question : can allowing for nancing frictions both for
households and rms simultaneously enhance the ability of nancing constraints to
amplify shocks and increase the persistence of uctuations ? If both household and
rm level nancing frictions create nancial accelerators which on their own amplify
output uctuations, then intuitively there should be positive a positive interaction
between them : if the household level nancial constraints increase the sensitivity of
output to shocks, then due to the rm level nancial accelerator they should am-
plify the procyclicality of nancially constrained rmscollateral values and further
relax(tighten) their nancing constraints in a boom(recession). Similarly, the rm
level nancial accelerator should increase the procyclicality of householdscollateral
values and increase(decrease) their borrowing ability in a boom (recession). To quote
Bernanke et al (1999) [19] :
" By enforcing the standard consumption Euler equation (in the rm nancial
accelerator model), we are e¤ectively assuming that nancial market frictions do not
impede household behavior... An interesting extension of this model would be to incor-
porate household borrowing and associated frictions. With some slight modication,
the nancial accelerator would then also apply to household spending, strengthening
the overall e¤ect."
The possibility of such an interaction is particularly relevant in the recession of
2007-2009. Mian and Su (2009) [94] rank US counties by the growth rate in house-
hold leverage (measured by debt to income) in 2002-2006. They nd that in 2006-2008
the unemployment rate increased by about 2.5% more in the top 10% leverage growth
1For example see Christiano, Motto and Rostagno(07)[42], and Iacoviello and Neri(08)[74]
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counties than in the bottom 10% leverage growth counties. This sort of evidence is
suggestive of a positive feedback from the leverage level of households to a decline
in aggregate economic activity, which can then a¤ect the tightness of rmsborro-
wing constraint through a nancial accelerator e¤ect. The following scenario roughly
matches the mechanism underlying many popular and business press reports. A nega-
tive aggregate shock reduces the net worth of credit constrained households, raising
the cost of borrowing and decreasing spending. The decline in spending lowers the net
worth of nancially constrained rms, increasing their nancing costs and decreasing
their demand for labour and capital. This feeds back into further declines in house-
holdsnet worth and spending, again reducing the net worth of credit constrained
rms. In a world with perfect competition and no nancing frictions this situation
would be impossible : for a given level of productivity the lower salaries of workers in
the scenario above would stimulate rmslabour demand and output. The presence
of rm level nancing frictions that depend in part on aggregate demand makes this
a plausible chain of events even with perfect competition and price exibility in all
markets.
There are several related questions for which understanding the interaction bet-
ween household and rm credit constraints matters. For example, should we expect
a liberalisation in household borrowing conditions to create a general boom inclu-
ding output and investment increases ? Can uctuations in housing prices that a¤ect
householdsborrowing capacity amplify GDP uctuations ? The joint examination of
credit constraints a¤ecting households and rms may also matter for analysing policy
responses to nancial crises. Recent initiatives by many central banks have focused
on quantitative easing operations aimed at reducing private sector nancing spreads
relative to the risk free rate. For example the US Federal Reserve Board launched the
Mortgage Backed Securities Purchase Programme in November 2008 with a mandate
to purchase up to 1.25 trillion USD of mortgage backed securities during 2009. In
parallel, the Fed also launched a commercial paper purchase program with 350 bil-
lion USD of purchases by January 2009. 2 This leads to the following question : is it
more important to target the spreads on household debt such as mortgages or rm
level debt such as commercial paper ? The answer may depend signicantly on the
macroeconomic interaction of the two types of credit constraints.
To examine these issues, I develop a new model of nancing frictions with aggre-
gate uctuations. The model has a subset of rms that are nancially constrained
and can only borrow by using revenue and capital as collateral, and a subset of -
nancially constrained households that use debt collateralised by housing and part of
their wage income. Both rms and households are a¤ected by idiosyncratic shocks
to their collateral values. Firms and households default on their loans when the va-
lue of their collateral is below the repayment promised to the lender. I follow other
2See http ://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/mbs_faq.html and the
supplemental report on the Commercial Paper Funding Facility
athttp ://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/annualreports.html.
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DSGE models of nancial frictions in using di¤erences in the level of impatience of
agents to generate equilibrium borrowing and lending(e.g. Iacoviello (2005) [72]). In
equilibrium more impatient agents (borrowers and entrepreneurs) will borrow from
patient savers. In order to keep the model tractable, I assume that borrowers of each
type (households and rms) have access to full insurance contracts against the idio-
syncratic shocks a¤ecting the value of their collateral. This allows them to diversify
their idiosyncratic risk each period after all debt contracts are settled. The bank can-
not seize the proceeds of the insurance payments when the borrower defaults. The
combination of insurance and limited liability partially preserves the e¤ects of risk
averse/consumption-smoothing behaviour of agents despite the ex-ante heterogeneity
among agents and the nonlinear default decision. 3 To isolate the e¤ect of nancing
frictions, I focus on a real business cycle model with exible wages and prices.
The model generates countercyclical external nance premia for both households
and rms, a key feature observed in the data. If these external nance premia are lin-
ked, the nancing frictions in both the production and household sectors may jointly
amplify each other. My analysis shows that this outcome is far from obvious. While
household level nancial frictions can amplify the e¤ect of shocks on consumption
and housing investment, this does not necessarily translate into amplifying the res-
ponse of output unless the response of investment also becomes more procyclical or
its procyclicality is not signicantly reduced.
Consider an economic boom (the same logic in reverse can be applied to a reces-
sion). Borrowing households see a relaxation of their credit constraints that stimulates
their consumption to a greater extent than for savers. But the relaxation of the borro-
wing constraints also reduces the incentives of borrowers to work, both because with
diminishing marginal utility the higher consumption of borrowers reduces the margi-
nal value of labour income (the standard income e¤ect on leisure) and because lower
nancing costs diminish the importance of wage income as collateral. The less procy-
clical labour supply of borrowers makes it harder to have a simultaneous expansion
of consumption and investment. The reduction in nancial frictions for households
also raises their loan demand, which because of the link between household and rm
debt markets raises interest rates for entrepreneurs. Overall, the reduction in labour
supply and the increase in loan demand of borrowers depress investment and the
price of capital and raise the risk free interest rate. These changes reduce the value
of entrepreneur collateral and make entrepreneur borrowing more expensive. There-
fore, a relaxation of householdsborrowing constraints leads to a tightening of rms
borrowing constraints.
There is another e¤ect going in the opposite direction. The higher interest rate en-
courages savers to reduce their current consumption relative to their future consump-
tion and increase their labour supply. To a rst order approximation the labour supply
3These insurance contracts are mathematically equivalent to the the large family insurance scheme
assumed in Shi (1997) [109] and other monetary search models.
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of savers is more sensitive to changes in consumption. It seems possible that the higher
labour supply of savers dominates the lower labour supply of borrowers. In that case,
we could get positive spillovers between the tightness of household and rm borrowing
constraints. However, I show that for plausible assumptions on agentspreferences this
cannot happen as long as household borrowing constraints make aggregate consump-
tion more procyclical and the ability to use wage income as collateral is low. As a
result, while householdscredit constraints make their consumption more sensitive to
shocks, there are no positive spillovers between the strength of household and rm
credit constraints. I discuss several features that can reverse this result. These include
limited production factor mobility across sectors and wage rigidities. Finally, because
changes in household borrowing costs have opposing e¤ects on the consumption and
labour supply of nancially unconstrained and nancially constrained households, the
overall interaction of household and rm nancing frictions tends to be quantitatively
insignicant unless capital adjustment costs are very low.
2.1.1 Litterature Review
Most existing models of household borrowing in a DSGE framework follow Ia-
coviello (2005) [72] and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) [83] in using a hard borrowing
constraint and assuming it always binds. The Kiyotaki and Moore model of credit
constraints can be seen as a special case of the current model in which there is no
uncertainty about the future value of the collateral when the loan is made. The as-
sumption that the constraint always binds makes the leverage ratio in their model
constant. Furthermore, they ignore any di¤erence between borrowing rates and the
risk free rate. The model proposed here can at least qualitatively match the counter-
cyclical leverage ratio of households found in the US by Adrian and Shin (2008) [1].
The assumption of an always binding borrowing constraint is questionable for large
shocks that may be of particular interest to policymakers, and it may severely dis-
tort the dynamics of borrowers and the rest of the economy in those circumstances.
The soft borrowing constraint in my model(with interest rates rising smoothly as a
function of borrowing) will always bind as long as it can be satised.
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist(henceforth BGG) (1999) [19] as well as Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997) [31] introduced equilibrium default of rms into DSGE models. To
facilitate aggregation, they assumed risk neutral entrepreneurs, and constant returns
to scale production. Using a setup with equilibrium default as in those models allows
me to examine the impact of endogenous time varying interest rate spreads and
leverage ratios. Equilibrium default also increases the realism of the debt contract
by creating a trade-o¤ between the equity downpayment on the loan and the in-
terest rate charged by the lender. At the same time my model of rmsnancial
constraints allows me to consider a more standard formulation of entrepreneur ba-
lance sheets than the less conventional balance sheets used by BGG or Carlstrom and
Fuerst to make their models tractable. In particular, entrepreneurs in my model own
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their capital stock, as in more sophisticated heterogeneous agent models of nancing
constraints, and do not have to repurchase it or rent it each period as in BGG or
Carlstrom and Fuerst. Furthermore, entrepreneurs are risk averse and make a mea-
ningful consumption-saving choice. In contrast, BGG assume an exogenously xed
constant saving rate for entrepreneurs,while Carlstrom and Fuerst assume that they
are risk neutral. The risk-aversion of borrowers in my model of equilibrium default
also makes it more applicable to households, for which assuming risk neutrality or
an exogenously xed saving rate is undesirable. Finally, my model of rms allows
the researcher to consider other nonlinearities in the budget constraint of nancially
constrained entrepreneurs, such as decreasing returns to scale, imperfect competition
or labour adjustment costs.
To the best of my knowledge, the only other papers with aggregate uctuations
that have allowed for nancing frictions a¤ecting both households and rms are Iaco-
viello (2005) [72] and Gerali et al (2009) [60]. Both of these papers rely on hard bor-
rowing constraints as in Kiyotaki and Moore[83] to model credit frictions and assume
the borrowing constraints always bind. The analysis in this paper of an environment
with default costs and actual lending spreads provides an alternative perspective.
These papers do not explicitly examine the e¤ect of modeling both types of nancing
frictions as opposed to just one type, choosing to focus on other issues. Finally, they
only analyse models with nominal rigidities which mix real e¤ects of nancing frictions
with other channels such as imperfect indexation of debt to ination. In contrast, this
papers main goal is to isolate and understand the feedback between household and
rm nancing frictions in the exible price equilibrium of the economy. This exible
price equilibrium denes an output gap relative to the equilibrium with sticky prices
or wages that is often important in monetary policy models. Therefore, the analysis
should also be relevant to models with nominal rigidities.
2.2 The Model
The model has two types of households distinguished by their discount factors.
Patient households with a relatively high discount factor lend to other households
and rms, as well as owning some of the rms in the economy. Impatient households
with a lower discount factor borrow from the patient households to nance housing
and consumption subject to nancing frictions. Financially constrained entrepreneurs
produce nal output. They can borrow from patient households to nance consump-
tion , investment and wages subject to credit constraints. These entrepreneurs are
also more impatient than the lenders. Capital producers transform nal output into
capital subject to capital adjustment costs, and are owned by the patient households.
Housing producers transform nal output into housing subject to housing adjustment
costs, and are owned by the patient households.4
4For other models using discount factor di¤erences to generate equilibrium borrowing,
see Iacoviello(2005)[72] and Krusell and Smith(1998)[88] for households, Carlstrom and
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2.2.1 The Household Sector
Patient Households (savers)
There is a measure s of patient households that have a relatively high dis-
count factor, and access to complete nancial markets without any nancing constraints.
They provide loans through banks to rms and households. Following BGG(1999) [19]
and Iacoviello(2005) [72] I assume that the deposits are risk free in aggregate. The
representative saver picks sequences of consumption, working hours, housing and de-
posits at the bank fcs;t; ns;t; hs;t; dtg to maximise
E0
1
t=0
tus;t;
where
us;t =
(c
c
s;th
h
s;t (1  ns;t)n)1 
1   ; for  6= 1;
us;t = c ln cs;t + h lnhs;t + (1  c   h) ln(1  ns;t), for  = 1;
n = 1  c   h:
subject to a sequence of constraints
cs;t + qt[h
s
t   (1  h)hs;t 1] + dt = Rtdt 1 + wtns;t +s;t;
where st are prots from housing and capital producers.
Impatient Households (borrowers)
There is a measure bo  1  s of impatient households. They have the same
intra-period preferences over housing,consumption and leisure as patient households,
but they have a lower discount factor than lenders(patient households) : bo < :
The lower discount factor means that impatient households will be borrowers in a
neighborhood of the steady state. In fact, absent any frictions their borrowing would
be unbounded in the steady state. Financing frictions make borrowing lbo;t bounded.
Borrowers incomes and housing stock values are subject to common idiosyncratic
shocks "bo;t that are i.i.d across borrowers and across time. "bo;t has a CDF F ("bo;t)
with F 0("bo;t) = f("bo;t); and a mean E("bo) = 1: As in Bernanke, Gertler and Gil-
christ(1999) [19], I assume that the derivative of "f(")
1 F (") is positive. This will be true
Fuerst(1997,1998[31][32]) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) [83] for rms. Estimation of structu-
ral consumption models supports this heterogeneity in impatience levels (Cagetti(2003)[26]). Hi-
gher impatience is also a reduced form proxy for higher expected income growth (see Browning
and Tobacmans(2007)[24]) , or Carroll (2000)[34]). Under this interpretation, the impatient agents
roughly correspond to young homeowners with an upward sloping expected wage prole that use
borrowing to enjoy some of their higher future salaries in terms of consumption today. The patient
households can be thought of as middle aged couples with relatively low expected salary growth.
The entrepreneurs relative impatience can also be interpreted as reecting a higher expected future
prot growth relative to more mature but nancially unconstrained rms, or a higher death rate of
entrepreneurial rms relative to households.
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over the range that is relevant for the optimal debt contract when " follows a lognor-
mal distribution. It will also be useful to dene the sum of the value of the borrowers
house and his wage income
Abo;t = "bo;t[qt(1  h)hbo;t 1 + nbo;twt] = "bo;t Abo;t:
Lending in this economy is only possible through 1-period debt contracts that
require a constant repayment Rltlbo;t 1 independent of "bo;t if the borrower is to avoid
costly loan monitoring or enforcement, where Rlt is the loan rate. The borrower can
default and refuse to repay the debt: Savers cannot force borrowers to repay. Instead
lending must be intermediated by banks that have a loan enforcement technology
allowing them to seize collateral
"bo;t ~Abo;t = "bo;t[(1  sh)qt(1  h)hbo;t 1 + (1  sw)nbo;twt]
at a proportional cost bo"bo;t ~Abo;t when the borrower defaults. bo 2 (0; 1) determines
the deadweight cost of default, 0 < sw  1 and 0 < sh  1 represent dene the
maximum loan to collateral ratio (often called the Loan to Value ratio) that the bank is
willing to grant against each component of the collateral (as in Iacoviello (2005) [72]).
Conditional on enforcement, the law cannot prevent the bank from seizing "bo;t ~Abo;t:
Suppose rst that the borrower does not have access to any insurance against the "bo;t
shock. Whenever "bo;t < "bo;t the borrower prefers to default and lose
"bo;t ~Abo;t < R
l
tlbo;t 1 = "bo;t ~Abo;t
when the bank enforces the contract:On the other hand when "bo;t  "bo;t the borrower
prefers to pay Rltlbo;t 1 rather than lose "bo;t ~Abo;t  Rltlbo;t 1: The net worth of the
borrower after any loan repayment or default is Abo;t  min["bo;t; "bo;t] ~Abo;t:5
To be able to use a representative agent framework while maintaining the intuition
of the default rule above, I make two assumptions. First, borrowerslabour supply is
predetermined with respect to the idiosyncratic shock. Second, borrowers have access
to insurance contracts providing them with payments conditional on the realisation
of "bo;t;
pbo[ Abo;t   Abo;t + (H("bo;t) + min["bo;t; "bo;t]) ~Abo;t]; where
5We could allow for separate shock processes a¤ecting housing and wages while preserving trac-
tability as long there are two types of loans : one loan collateralised by housing and another collate-
ralised by income. This would force us to keep track of two types of debt and two external nance
premia, and at least as a start it isnt clear that this extra complication is important for aggregate
dynamics.
My derivation of the default rule also assumes that deposits are not seizable by the bank. This is
without loss of generality : Suppose borrowersdeposits dbo;t 1(or another safe asset such as money)
can be seized by lenders to repay debt at a cost dRtdbo;t 1 with d  0: If d > 0; a borrower
would never want to hold deposits and loans simultaneously. In the special case of d = 0 and
Rt = Rt(deposits are a perfect collateral), lbo;t   dbo;t is indeterminate, and we can set dbot = 0
without loss of generality.
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H("bo;t) =  [(1  F ("bo;t))"bo;t +
Z "bo;t
0
"dF ]:
with 0  pbo  1: The insurer o¤ers only complete insurance with pbo = 1. Since they
are risk averse, borrowers willingly buy this insurance, which completely diversies
the risk related to "bo;t. The payments from the insurance scheme cannot be seized
by the bank. As a result, despite the insurance the bank cannot force the borrower
to repay Rltlbo;t 1 when "bo;t < "bo;t: The borrower cannot commit to always repay the
loan (or make up for any lack of payment by an individual borrower), even though
from an ex-ante perspective it is optimal to do so. For any given Rlt, this makes
the borrower default when "t < "t and repay Rltlbo;t 1 when "bo;t  "bo;t : With the
insurance, the borrower is guaranteed total resources of
Abo;t +H("bo;t) ~Abo;t:
While this level of insurance is clearly exaggerated, it provides a signicant gain
in tractability. 6 The fs = 1 case of full insurance can also be used as a point around
which to approximate more realistic partial insurance or the uninsurable risk case
with pbo = 0 through perturbation methods. 7 For these reasons, the full insurance
assumption can be seen as a useful benchmark for starting the analysis. Even with
full insurance, we can still have a nondegenerate distribution of default rates and
loan positions for arbitrary initial resource distributions among borrowers. To further
simplify the model, I assume a symmetric initial distribution of housing among bor-
rowers. This leads to a symmetric distribution of assets and income across borrowers,
and allows us to discuss their choices using a representative borrower (henceforth also
called the borrower). Dene the rate of return required on loans made at t  1 as Rt
(to be distinguished from the loan rate Rlt): Since "bo;t is idiosyncratic the bank can
diversify it by lending to a large number of borrowers. Therefore it only requires that
the loan is protable in expectation. Loan rates depend on the aggregate state of the
economy as in BGG[19]. 8 In order to participate in the loan, the bank requires that
[1  F ("bo;t)] "bo;t ~Abo;t + (1  bo)
Z "bo;t
0
~Abo;t"bodF  Rtlbo;t 1:
The bank participation constraint will act as a borrowing constraint in this model.
The bank o¤ers the borrower each period a sequence of default rates contingent
on the aggregate state. Competition among banks will make the bank participation
constraint bind. Dening
G("
bo;t) = [1  F ("bo;t)]"bo;t + (1  bo)
Z "bo;t
0
"bodF;
6The insurance arrangement is mathematically identical to an economy where each borrower
belongs to a large family with a continuum of members that treats all its members symmetrically,
as in Shi (1997) [109] and other models of monetary and credit frictions.
7See Den Haan et al (2009)[5] for an example of using a model without idiosyncratic shocks or
with insurance against idiosyncratic shocks to approximate a model without insurance.
8See appendix C for a more realistic model with loan rates that are predetermined with respect
to the aggregate state.
42
we can rewrite the participation constraint as
G("bo;t) ~Abo;t = Rtlbo;t 1:
Since deposits are required to be risk-free, Rt = Rt; the risk free rate. Noting that
G0("bo;t) > 0 at an optimum, we can solve for a function "bo(
Rtlbo;t 1
~Abo;t
); with the default
threshold "bo;t increasing in the ratio of debt repayment to collateral. For a given
idiosyncratic risk distribution the default rate is increasing in the default threshold,
so that a higher debt to collateral ratio also increases the probability of default. 9
With the assumption of perfectly competitive banks we can represent the problem
of borrowers as if they choose default thresholds as a function of the aggregate states
directly, subject to the banks participation constraints. The representative borrower
picks sequences of consumption,housing, loans, deposit , labour supply and default
threshold functions fcbo;t; hbo;t; lbo;t; dbo;t; nbo;t; "bo;tg1t=0
to maximise
E0
1
t=0
botubo;t
where
ubo;t =
(c
c
bo;th
h
bo;t(1  nbo;t)n)1 
1   for  6= 1
ubo;t = c ln cbo;t + h lnhbo;t + n ln(1  nbo;t) for  = 1;
subject to a sequence of budget constraints
cbo;t + qthbo;t + dbo;t = qt(1  h)hbo;t 1 + nbo;twt
+H("bo;t)[(1  sh)qt(1  h)hbo;t 1
+(1  sw)nbo;twt] + lbo:t + dbo;t 1Rt
and the participation constraints of the bank
G("bo;t) ~Abo;t = G("bo;t)[(1  sh)qt(1  h)hbo;t 1 + (1  sw)nbo;twt] = Rtlbo;t 1 :
In a neighbourhood of the steady state impatient households will set dbo;t = 0 and
lbo;t 1 > 0 for all t:10
9The caveat is that if a new unexpected shock signicantly lowers the value of ~Abo;t it may be
impossible to nd a default threshold that allows the bank to break even on the loan with the risk free
rate. This should not be a major concern except for very low aggregate shock values. This problem
can be completely eliminated in the version of the model in which loan rates are predetermined with
respect to the aggregate state (see appendix C).See the appendix in BGG(1999)[19] for a discussion
of the same issue in their model. This issue also occurs in the Kiyotaki and Moore [83] model if a
shock is unexpected (i.e it is not a news shock). Iacoviello (2005) [72] gets around this by assuming
that lenders can seize borrower resources up to a fraction of the expected value of collateral assets.
10It is true in general that one cannot simultaneously have lbo;t > 0 dbo;t > 0. What cannot
be excluded completely is that impatient households may wish to become savers for large enough
positive shocks. This would be particularly troublesome in a model with a xed borrowing limit as
in Carroll(2001).[35]Here, we have a procyclical borrowing limit, and an impatient household would
want to increase its borrowing in response to a higher limit.
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2.2.2 Production
Financially Constrained Entrepreneurs
There is a measure 1 continuum of risk averse entrepreneurs that use capital
and labour to produce nal output. Just like borrowing households, I assume that their
discount factor is below that of savers to guarantee that they borrow in equilibrium
in a neighborhood of the steady state. Entrepreneurscapital and output are subject
to common multiplicative idiosyncratic shocks "et. These shocks are independent and
identically distributed across time and across entrepreneurs with E("e;t) = 1; and a
CDF F ("e;t). Production is also subject to an aggregate TFP shock ze;t. ze;t = Gtz;e~ze;t;
where
ln ~ze;t+1 =  ln ~ze;t + "z;t+1:
It will be useful to dene expected output conditional on the aggregate shock
ye;t = ze;t((ue;tke;t)
n1 e;t )
; 0 <  < 1 and
Ae;t = (1  e;t)qkt ke;t + ye;t:
11 The entrepreneursnancial contract is similar to that of borrowers. Entrepreneurs
are restricted to using one-period debt contracts in which the loan rates can be made
contingent on aggregate shocks zt but not on the idiosyncratic shock "e;t:They have
access to insurance contracts that completely diversify the idiosyncratic risk after loan
contracts are settled, but cannot commit to sharing the proceeds of this insurance
with banks. Banks can seize collateral "e;t ~Ae;t when the entrepreneur refuses to pay
at a cost of e"e;t ~Ae;t: As in other models of nancial frictions such as CMR(2007)
[42] and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) [32], a fraction a of the wage bill must be paid
before production occurs, requiring an intratemporal loan from the bank. This sort
of working capital nancing friction has been found to play a potentially important
role in helping to explain the e¤ect of credit frictions in response to news and credit
shocks(see Inaba and Kobayashi (2007) [85] and Jermann and Quadrini (2008) [76]).
The wages in advance of production requirement implies that the entrepreneur must
choose the amount of labour before knowing the value of "e;t. The new intratemporal
11We need  < 1 to get a solution to the non stochastic balanced growth path when trying to
match data on the rm default rate, foreclosure costs and long run external nance premium. With
 = 1, we would have an Euler equation for capital which is only a function of the volatility eof "e
and the entrepreneur default threshold "e: Together, with the Euler equation for entrepreneur loans,
for any given e we would have two equations in one unknown "e; a problem which (generically)
has no solution: We could allow for  = 1 if we give up on trying to match either the entrepreneur
default rate target or foreclosure cost proportion, and use the Euler equation for loans and capital
to jointly determine (e;"e) or (e;"e) :Still, wihout  < 1, the models BGP does not exist for
arbitrary exogeneous (e; e): The assumption that  is below 1, but close to 1 is consistent with
empirical evidence and can be interpreted as a reection of limited span of control for entrepreneurs.
A similar issue occurs in BGGs[19] model. Their steady state system of equations is overidentied
unless the marginal return on the entpreneurs project is endogenous.
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loan modies the default rule : the entrepreneur defaults if and only if
"e;t ~Ae;t < R
l
e;tle;t 1 +R
w
t awtne;t = "e;t
~Ae;t; where
~Ae;t = (1  sk)(1  e;t)qkt ke;t + (1  sy)ye;t:
I assume that the capital utilisation rate is predetermined with respect to the idio-
syncratic shock to facilitate aggregation. sk and sy reect di¤erences in the ability
to collateralise capital and revenue. This specication nests two cases that are fre-
quently examined in the literature : a model where only capital serves as collateral
as in Gerali et al (2009) [60] or Kobayashi et al (2007) [85] , and a model where only
revenue serves as collateral as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) [32] or in BGG (1999)
[19]. For now I will focus on the case with sk = sy = 0: Also, I will focus on the case
in which all of wages must be paid in advance,a = 1 as in Carlstrom and Fuersts
model. This case ts most naturally with the assumption that the lender can seize all
the entrepreneurs revenue. 12 As for borrowers, I dene
H("e;t) =  [(1  Fe("e;t))"e;t +
Z "e;t
0
"dFe] and
G("e;t) = [1  Fe("e;t)]"e;t + (1  e;t)
Z "e;t
0
"dFe:
the representative entrepreneur picks sequences of consumption, capital, utilisa-
tion rates, labour demand, default thresholds, loans and deposits
fce;t; ke;t+1; ue;t; ne;t; "e;t; le;t; de;tg to maximise
E0
1
t=0
et ln ce;t
subject to a sequence of constraints
ce;t + (1  a)wtne;t + qkt ket+1 + de;t = Ae;t +H("e;t) ~Ae;t + le;t +Rtde;t 1
and the banks break-even constraints
G("e;t) ~Ae;t = Rtle;t 1 + awtne;t
In a neighbourhood of a balanced growth path de;t = 0 and le;t > 0 for all t:
12A more realistic assumption is that lenders can seize prots rather than revenue, with remaining
wages owed to workers paid out before debt repayments. However, this would force me to keep track
of 2 default thresshold : one default thresshold when the value of collateral is below the required
loan repayment, and another one when prots turn negative and the lender can only seize capital.
The importance of this complication isnt obvious. In the meantime, one can try to approximate the
model where workers are paid rst in default by calibrating a lower sy to match the proportion of
the remaining wage bill (1   a)wtne;t out of revenue absent nancing constraints. I have examined
more realistic cases such as sy = 0:5 and a = 0:5: The results were similar.
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Financially Unconstrained Firms
Latter, I will compare the model where rms are nancially constrained with a
model where rms are nancially unconstrained. In this case, there is a representative
rm owned by savers that picks sequences of capital, utilisation rates and labour
fku;t+1; uu;t; nu;tg to maximise its value
E0
1
t=0
tst [zu;t(uu;tku;t)
n1 u;t   wtnu;t   qkt (ku;t+1   (1  u;t)ku;t)];
where 0 <  < 1; and u;t = uu
u
u;t:
zu;t = G
t
z;u~zu;t; ~zu;t = ~ze;t:
13
2.2.3 Housing Production
I use a standard convex adjustment cost model of housing. This is the simplest
model that generates procyclical house prices. A representative rm owned by the
savers produces housing. The rm purchases Iht units of the consumption good from
savers and turns it into
Iht = ht   (1  h)ht 1
units of housing while paying an adjustment cost of
h
2
(
Iht
ht 1
  Ih
h
))2ht 1:
Note that the rm takes the aggregate housing stock ht 1 as given when choosing Iht :
With these assumptions, the housing producers problem reduces to picking Iht each
period to maximise prots
sht = (qt   1)Iht  
h
2
(
Iht
ht 1
  Ih
h
)2ht 1;
where Ih
h
is the investment in housing to housing ratio in the balanced growth path:
The resulting housing supply curve is
qt = 1  h I
h
h
+ h
Iht
ht 1
: (2.1)
Along the balanced growth path, q = 1 and the housing producer makes no prots:
13Gz;u 6= Gz;e due the di¤erence in returns to scale between uconstrained rms and entrepreneurs.
For our calibration of  = 0:95 the di¤erence is small.
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2.2.4 Capital Production
Capital producers face the same problem as housing producers. Savers own
the capital producing rm. Prot maximisation yields the supply curve
qkt = 1  
I
k
+ 
It
kt
: (2.2)
2.2.5 Equilibrium
Combining the budget constraints of the models agents gives us the GDP
identity (output market clearing condition) for the model :
Yt = Ct + It + I
h
t + ACt + FFt (2.3)
where Ct; It; Iht are aggregate consumption, investment in capital and investment
in housing, ACt are non nancial adjustment costs of capital and housing and FFt
are the costs of default on nancial contracts, and Yt is aggregate nal output.
In addition labour and credit market clearing require
N st = sns;t + bonbo;t = ne;t = N
d
t ; (2.4)
sdt = bolbo;t + ele;t (2.5)
Equilibrium consists of a set of prices and interest rates fqt; qkt ; Rt+1; wtg for all
possible states and for all t  0 such that all markets clear when households and rms
maximise while taking prices as given.
2.2.6 Financial frictions in partial Equilibrium
Borrowers
Using the relation between the Lagrange multiplier on the bank participation
constraint  bo;t and the marginal utility of consumption bo;t, the rst order conditions
for the borrowers problem are :
cbo;t : bo;t = c
(c
c
bo;th
h
bo;t(1  nbo;t)n)1 
cbo;t
; (2.6)
"bo;t :  bo;t = bo;t
 H 0("bo;t)
G0("bo;t)

 bo;tefpbo;t; (2.7)
lbot : bo;t = 
boRt+1Etbo;t+1efpbo;t+1 (2.8)
hbo;t : qtbo;t =
h
c
cbo;t
hbo;t
bo;t + 
bo(1  h)Etbo;t+1qt+1Ahh("bo;t+1): (2.9)
nbot :
n
1  nbo;t = c
wt
cbo;t
Anw("bo;t); (2.10)
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where
Anw("bo;t) = 1 + (1  sw)[(H("bo;t) + efpbo;tG("bo;t)] and
Ahh("bo;t) = 1 + (1  sh)[(H("bo;t) + efpbo;tG("bo;t)]:
14 The loan Euler equation has the same form as that of the saver except that
the e¤ective gross interest rate is now Rt+1efp("bo;t+1)bo;t+1. efpbo;t =  H
0("bo;t)
G0("bo;t)
> 1
is the external nance premium faced by borrowers on loans relative to the risk free
interest rate Rt. dd"bo (
"f("bo)
1 F ("bo)) > 0 at an optimum implies that efpbo;t is increasing
in "bo;t; and therefore in the default rate as well: The result that the external nance
premium is increasing in the default rate is quite intuitive. It implies, that if we can
reproduce the countercyclical default rates found in the data, the model will generate
a countercyclical external nance premium. This result will also allow us to interchan-
geably interpret any result obtained for the e¤ect of an increase in the default rate in
terms of an increase in the external nance premium (as long as the distribution of
idiosyncratic shock and the loan enforcement technology bo are xed across time).
For simplicity, I will focus on the case with separable utility ( = 1). An increase in
the expected future external nance premium reduces current consumption relative
to future consumption, just like an increase in the risk free interest rate. From the
banks participation constraint we know that the default rate is increasing in the debt
to collateral ratio (a measure of leverage) : "0t(
Rtlt 1
Abo;t
) > 0. On impact, with lbo;t 1 and
hbo;t 1 predetermined, any positive shock which increases wages, labour supply and
house prices reduces the loan to collateral ratio. This decreases the default rate, and
lowers the external nance premium. The e¤ect of the positive shock in the next per-
iods depends on how borrowers adjust loan demand and housing in response to the
shock. In a model with risk neutral households, loan demand may increase so much
that a positive shock would ultimately lead to a higher loan to collateral ratio and
a higher default rate. But with a diminishing marginal utility of consumption, this
does not have to be the case. The existence of a soft borrowing constraint makes the
impatient household behave more like the consumption smoothing patient household
with a bias towards debt nanced consumption instead of saving. For a xed level
of nancial frictions and desired housing, a consumption smoothing borrower reacts
to an increase in wealth by increasing savings. This increase in saving can be ac-
complished through a combination of reduced borrowing and increased accumulation
of collateral in the form of housing. At the same time an increase in the value of
collateral encourages higher borrowing. If the rst e¤ect dominates, then the loan to
collateral ratio
Rtlbo;t 1
~Abo;t
is countercyclical and therefore the external nance premium
is also countercyclical beyond the initial impact of a shock.
To gain further insight into the e¤ect of nancial frictions on consumption it
will be useful to derive a consumption function for the log-utility case under perfect
foresight for exogenous housing investment and labour supply. By combining the bank
14Here and throughout the paper, optimality also requires the transversality conditions to hold.
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loan participation constraint with the budget constraint, and iterating forward on the
resulting expression for lbo;t 1; we obtain
cbo;t =
Rbo;t
1 +
P1
j=1 
bojjk=1
Rt+kefpbo;t+k
Rbo;t+k
X
j=0
nbo;t+jwt+j   qt+jIhbo;t+j
jk=0Rbo;t+k
  Rbo;tlbo;t 1
1 +
P1
j=1 
bojjk=1
Rt+kefpbo;t+k
Rbo;t+k
; where
Rbo;t+k =  H("bo;t+k)
G("bo;t+k)
Rt+k =
 
1 +
bo ~Abo;t+k
R "bo;t+k
0
"dFbo
Rt+klbo;t+k 1
!
Rt+k > Rt+k:
Financial frictions a¤ect consumption by modifying the e¤ective interest rates
facing the household through factors that depend on default thresholds "bo;t+k (or
equivalently on default rates for xed idiosyncratic risk distributions and enforcement
cost parameter bo). In fact the consumption function without nancial frictions can
be obtained by setting efpbo;t+k = 1 and Rbo;t+k = Rt+k for all periods. We have
already established that efpbo;t+k is increasing in "bo;t+k: Rbo;t+k is expected rate of
return on the loan including the compensation for the expected default costs per
dollar of loan bo
~Abo;t+k
R "bo;t+k
0 "dFbo
Rt+klbo;t+k 1
: This "credit risk" spread is clearly increasing in
the default rate for a xed leverage ratio. Allowing for the positive relation between the
default rate and leverage complicates matters, but Rbo;t+k is still increasing in "bo;t+k
as long as the gross spread 1 + bo
~Abo;t+k
R "bo;t+k
0 "dFbo
Rt+klbo;t+k 1
is smaller than efpbo;t+k:15. This
condition holds in a neighbourhood of the steady state in all plausible calibrations
(see the discussion in the calibration section). The e¤ect of increasing external nance
premia efpbo;t+k is clearly to reduce the present value of the households wealth net of
housing investments, which leads to a reduction in consumption. The e¤ect of changes
in future Rbo;t+k is more ambiguous. On one hand higher Rbo;t+k reduce the present
value of future income net of housing investment. On the other hand they reduce the
e¤ect of higher efpbo;t+k on the present value of that future income. Finally an increase
in Rbo;t reduces consumption by raising the households debt burden. Of course, in
order to get a denite answer about the e¤ect of expected default rates on non-durable
consumption, we need to also solve for the behaviour of housing investment and labour
supply. Doing this does not allow us to denitively sign the relation between nancial
frictions and consumption, but in all the calibrations I tried declining default rates
led to an increase in borrowersconsumption.
15Omitting time subscripts,
d
d"bo

Rbo
R

=  H
0("bo)G("bo) H("bo)G0("bo)
G("bo)2
> 0
i¤ RboR =
 H("bo)
G("bo)
<  H
0("bo)
G0("bo)
= efpbo:
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The Euler equation for housing shows how nancial frictions distort the usual
housing investment equation. In a neighbourhood of the steady state, Ahh("bo;t+1)
is greater than 1, meaning that the marginal value of investing in housing is more
sensitive to the future expected value of housing than in the model without nancing
frictions. The e¤ect of a change in the expected future external nance premium is
less clear-cut. For a given expected house price appreciation an increase in the ex-
pected future default rate (and hence in the external nance premium) increases the
marginal value of housing as collateral : d
d"bo
( "f("bo)
1 F ("bo)) > 0 implies that Ahh("bo;t+1)
is increasing in "bo;t+1:16 Fixing consumption across time, this would make the bor-
rowers housing investment increasing in the expected external nance premium. At
the same time, there is an indirect e¤ect of nancing frictions on housing investment
through the e¤ect of these frictions on non durable consumption. From the Euler
equation for loans, a reduction in the future external nance premium increases 
bo
t+1
bot
;
which reduces the marginal cost relative to the marginal value of housing investment
for borrowers. This e¤ect may cause housing investment to be decreasing in the
expected external nance premium. In the presence of aggregate uncertainty, we can-
not determine analytically which e¤ect dominates. However, the e¤ect of the future
default rate on the non durable consumption to housing ratio cbo;t
hbo;t
can be easily de-
termined in the special case when agents have perfect foresight. Combining the loan
and housing Euler equations under perfect foresight we obtain :
Proposition 8. With perfect foresight, @(cbo;t=hbo;t)
@"bo;t+1
> 0:
Démonstration. See appendix A.
This proposition implies that the borrowers housing investment must increase as
long as consumption increases when the external nance premium falls, and vice versa
if the external nance premium rises. Due to certainty equivalence, the proposition
also holds in a linear approximation of the dynamics. For small levels of uncertainty,
the e¤ects of changes in the expected future default rates should be similar in a
nonlinear approximation as well.
The labour supply equation shows how the nancial friction distorts the borro-
wers labour supply decision. The level of nancing frictions has a direct impact on
labour supply through its e¤ect on Anw("bo;t) for a given wtcbot
: Anw("bo;t) is increasing
in the default rate, and therefore a similar analysis as for housing applies here as
well : the direct impact of higher nancing frictions is to increase the work e¤ort of
borrowers due to the higher value of wage income as loan collateral. A reduction in -
nancing frictions will therefore lower borrowerslabour supply, holding everything else
constant. This e¤ect disappears when labour income is fully exempt. In that case, la-
bour supply is determined by the same equation as patient householdslabour supply.
In addition, the e¤ect of the external nance premium on cbo;t changes the strength
of the income e¤ect on labour supply. For example if the external nance premium
16 d(Ahh("bo;t))
d"bo;t
= [H 0("bo;t) +G0("bo;t)efp("bo;t) +G("bo;t)efp0("bo;t)] = G("bo;t)efp0("bo;t) > 0:
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is countercyclical, then borrowersnondurable consumption is more procyclical than
saversdue to the relaxation in the nancing constraint. In this case the income e¤ect
on labour supply is stronger for borrowers than for savers. As a result, even when
wages cannot be seized by lenders, borrowers work hours will be less procyclical than
saverswork hours in the model.
Entrepreneurs
As for the borrowers, we can use the relation between the Lagrange multiplier on
the bank participation constraint and the marginal utility of consumption to obtain
the following rst order conditions for the entrepreneurs :
ce;t :
1
ce;t
= e;t (2.11)
"e;t :  e;t = e;t
 H 0("e;t)
G0("e;t)
 e;tefpet: (2.12)
le;t : e;t = 
eRt+1Ete;t+1efpe;t+1: (2.13)
ke;t+1 : e;tq
k
t = 
eEte;t+1[Akk("e;t+1)q
k
t+1(1  e;t+1) + Aky("e;t+1)
ye;t+1
ke;t+1
]: (2.14)
ne;t : Aky("e;t)(1  ) ye;t
ne;t
= (1  a+ aefpe;t)wt (2.15)
ue;t : Aky("e;t)
ye;t
ke;t
= eAkk("e;t)e;tq
k
t ; (2.16)
where
Akk("e;t) = 1 + (1  sk)[(H("e;t) + efpe;tG("e;t)] and
Aky("e;t) = 1 + (1  sy)[(H("e;t) + efpe;tG("e;t)]:
The analysis of these equations parallels in many respects the previous analysis
for borrowing households. The key modication of entrepreneur behaviour relative to
a standard nancially unconstrained rm comes through the evolution of the external
nance premium on the bank loan, efpe;t+1 which is increasing in the default threshold
"e;t+1: The Euler equation for loans implies that an increase in the expected future
external nance premium reduces current consumption relative to future consumption
for the entrepreneur. In response to an exogenous increase in the value of collateral, on
one hand the entrepreneur wants to expand his loan. This tends to raise efpe;t+1. On
the other hand the entrepreneur will smooth changes in his non-durable consumption
by moderating the increase in the loan and by raising investment in the collateral
asset, capital. To analyse the impact of nancing frictions on investment and labour
demand, start by assuming a xed capital utilisation rate. Consider an increase in the
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expected future nance premium. Due to diminishing marginal utility of consumption,
this is equivalent to a reduction in the marginal value of transferring resources into
the future relative to the current cost. In combination with diminishing marginal
productivity of capital, this reduces the entrepreneurs desired capital investment.
At the same time, an increase in the expected future external nance premium also
increases the marginal value of capital as collateral (Akk("e;t) is increasing in "e;t+1; and
"e;t+1 is increasing in efpe;t+1). As a result, for a given ratio of marginal utilities
e;t+1
e;t
and prices qkt ; q
k
t+1; an increase in "e;t+1 will increase ke;t+1: The sign of the relation
between the expected future external nance premium and investment is ambiguous
with uncertainty, but we can obtain a sharper result under perfect foresight or linear
approximation dynamics, using a similar proof to that for the housing to nondurable
consumption ratio of borrowing households :
Proposition 9. With perfect foresight, @ke;t+1
@"e;t+1
< 0 for xed employment. With va-
riable employment @ne;t
d"e;t
< 0 is a su¢ cient condition for @ke;t+1
@"e;t+1
< 0 :
Démonstration. See appendix A.
The labour demand decision of entrepreneurs is directly distorted by nancing
frictions as long as sy < 1 or a > 0: In the presence of working capital requirements on
wages (a > 0), a higher external nance premium acts as a tax on hiring and lowers
labour demand. At the same time, if revenue can be used as collateral (sy < 1), then
an increase in the external nance premium raises the value of labour as an input into
the collateral that can be o¤ered by the entrepreneur. This would tend to stimulate
labour demand in response to a higher external nance premium. If a = 0; labour
demand is increasing in the default rate since Aky("e;t) is increasing in "e;t: When
a > 0 the overall e¤ect of "e;t on labour demand is ambiguous, but it is possible to
give a su¢ cient condition on a guaranteeing that an increase in the default rate (and
hence in the external nance premium) reduces entrepreneur labour demand :
Proposition 10. a  1  sy implies that @ne;t@"e;t < 0:
Démonstration. See appendix A.
The proposition says quite intuitively that labour demand is guaranteed to be
decreasing in the level of nancing frictions if the wages in advance requirement is
strong enough or if revenue is hard to collateralize. Finally, given our benchmark
of sy = sk; the capacity utilisation rate decision is identical to that of a nancially
unconstrained rm. However, the nancing frictions will a¤ect the entrepreneurs
utilisation rate decision indirectly. For example, if a decline in the external nance
premium stimulates labour demand, this will increase the marginal product of capital
which will in turn increase the desired capital utilisation rate.
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2.3 General Equilibrium Results
I solve the model at a quarterly frequency using loglinear and second
order perturbations around the deterministic Balanced Growth Path (henceforth the
BGP). After detrending all variables by their deterministic growth rates, I use Kleins
(2000) [84] QZ decomposition method to solve for the linear approximation and
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribes (2004) algorithm to solve for the second order approxima-
tion [67]. In the nonlinear case I examine the e¤ect of a single initial shock, starting
from the ergodic means of the variables. When performing simulations using second
order approximations, there is always the possibility that the approximated dynamics
are explosive even though the true dynamics are stable. I apply the standard solution
of using pruned dynamics as in Kim et al (2008) [80].
2.3.1 Calibration
I calibrate the model to the balanced growth path of the US economy at a
quarterly frequency. Some of the calibrations follow standard practice in other models
without nancial frictions (see table 1). The coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion  is
set to 1.5, which is in line with the empirical upper bounds established in Chetty
(2006) [39] and the evidence of consumption-labour complementarity in Basu and
Kimball (2002) [16]. The results are similar for the separable log-utility case. The
patient householdsdiscount factor  is set to match an average annual real risk-free
rate of 4%: This implies  = 0:995 for the nonseparable utility case. The housing and
consumption share parameters in the utility function h and c are set to deliver an
annual housing stock to output ratio of around 1.3 as in Davis and Heathcote (2005)
[47] and an hours of work share of 0.32. This leads to a share of consumption in the
utility function of c = 0:3044 and a share of housing of h = 0:0375:
The trend growth rate of output is set to an annual rate of 1.6%. The capital
share  is set to 0.3. This is a common choice in other studies distinguishing housing
from other forms of capital, and delivers an annual capital to output ratio of around
2.31. For the depreciation rates on housing and capital (excluding housing) I rely on
the estimates in Davis and Heathcote (2005)[47]. Therefore, I set h = 0:016=4 and
 = 0:056=4: The elasticity of the price of capital to the investment to capital ratio
I=K is set at 1, based on the estimates reported in Christiano and Fisher (1998)
[41] . The elasticity of the housing price to investment is set to 1 as in Carlstrom and
Fuerst (2006) [33]. 17 The entrepreneur returns to scale parameter  is set to 0.95. This
is in line with several estimates that report a degree of returns to scale close to but
below 1 (see the discussion in Atkeson and Kehoe (2007)[14]). The benchmark model
assumes a contemporaneous TFP shock as the only source of aggregate uncertainty.
I assume z = 0:95 and z = 0:007 as in Cooley and Prescott (1995) [43].
17We should note that they use the ow formulation of investment adjustment costs.
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We now come to the parameters related to the nancial frictions. I set the share
of impatient households at 40%, in line with estimates reported in Scoccianti (2009)
[108]of the proportion of US households in debt in the early 2000s. This number
is somewhat higher than that used in models with rule of thumb households that
consume all their income or in models using the Iacoviello framework, but our de-
nition of being credit constrained is weaker than the quantity rationing imposed in
those models.
The exemption levels control the maximum loan to value allowed by the bank
against di¤erent types of collateral. As a baseline, I interpret the households debt
contract in the model as a mortgage in which the bank can seize the whole value of
the house before the foreclosure costs captured by bo > 0: Therefore, I set sh = 1 and
sw = 1. Allowing for plausibly low wage garnishment rates to account for informal
bankruptcy (see Ausubel and Dawsey (2004) [15]) does not have a quantitatively
signicant impact on the results. For the entrepreneurs I start by assuming sy = sk = 0
and a = 1: More realistic combinations such as sy = 0:5 and a = 0:5 do not lead to
quantitatively signicant changes.
I calibrate the borrowersand entrepreneursdiscount factors and the idiosyncratic
shock volatilities to match aggregate leverage ratios of rm and household sectors
and default rates while maintaining plausible di¤erences in discount factors. Covas
and Den Haan (2007) [45] report an average debt to assets ratio for nonnancial
Compustat corporations of 0.587 over 1971-2004. This target leads to setting efpe =
1:015, leading to a discount factor e of around 0:98. For the household sector, there
is less information. 18 Campbell and Hercowitz (2006) [28]report an average ratio
of aggregate mortgage debt to housing of around 0.32 over 1954-1982 and 0.42 over
1995-2005. If we interpret all debt to be literally held by the borrowers in the model,
any attempt to match such a ratio would require implausibly high di¤erences in
discount factors between households. Instead, I assume in the baseline calibration a
discount factor for borrowers of bo = 0:97 (efpbo = 1:025); which is in the middle of
plausible estimates ( see Iacoviello (2005)[72] and Iacoviello and Neri (2008) [74] ).
This discount factor leads to a BGP loan to collateral value ratio for the borrowing
households of 0:77; which is close to the average loan to value ratio on mortgages of
0:76 over 1973-2006 (Iacoviell and Neri (2008) [74]). 19 The results are quantitatively
similar for moderate changes in bo; and qualitatively the same for very high or very
low bo: The calibration generates a credit spread for the household loan of 0:3%
per year and a credit spread for the rm loan of 0:42% per year. These numbers are
considerably lower than the credit spreads of 2  3% between for example prime loan
rates or commercial paper and government T-bills used to calibrate other models with
18Other authors such as Frank and Goyal [119] compute signicantly lower leverage ratios based
on the market values of rms. Using the book value of assets as in Covas and Den Haan [45] is closer
to the denition of leverage in my model.
19We could match a long-run household leverage ratios above, if we allow for the possibility
that savers also owe some debt, but because they can be better monitored by the banks they
are not subject to the same nancial frictions as borrowers (in which case their debt holdings are
indeterminate).
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default such as BGG (1999) [19] or Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) [32]. 20 Trying to
generate higher and more realistic credit spreads requires implausibly high discount
factor di¤erences among agents, or a mixture of implausibly high steady states default
rates and low recovery rates on collateral by lenders (very high bo; e). Bankruptcy
costs in the model seem insu¢ cient to explain the observed credit spreads between
government and private debt. Other unmodelled factors such as loan processing and
screening costs or ex-ante asymmetric information may be required to explain these
spreads.
The monitoring parameter i is a measure of the loss su¤ered by the bank in
default. There are many estimates of the costs of default for rms, though they di¤er
signicantly in whether or not they include direct or indirect bankruptcy costs and
the representativeness of the sample of rms they use. I set the loss given default
parameter for entrepreneurs e = 0:15 as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) [32]. This is
in the middle of empirical estimates of this parameter. Information on bo is scarce.
Jeske and Krueger (2006) [77] use an estimate bo = 0:22 based on comparing the price
of foreclosed homes to comparable non foreclosed homes: Both "bo and "e are assumed
to follow a lognormal distribution with a standard deviation i of ln "i, i 2 fe; bog: I
calibrate the the volatility of the idiosyncratic shocks i to match estimates of default
rates for borrowers and rms. For rms, I use a quarterly default rate of 0.75% as
in BGG [19]. This is in the middle of the range used by most authors(e.g. Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1998) [32] use an estimate for US corporations of 0.974% per quarter,
while Mankart and Rodano (2008) [90] report a bankruptcy rate for entrepreneurs of
0.5% per quarter). For households, I interpret default in the model to be similar to
foreclosure on a mortgage in the data. I use the average annual foreclosure rate of
1:4% in 1990-2004 from Garriga and Shlagenhauf (2009) [59] to calibrate the BGP
default rate households.
20In BGGs model, the external nance premium dened as the e¤ective discount rate on borrowing
relative to the risk free rate (efpi   1 in my model) is equal to the expected cost of default per
dollar of loans (e.g bo
~Abo
R "bo;t
0 "dFbo
lbo;t 1
for the borrowing household in my model). This is not the case
in my model, where the external nance premium measured by the loan Euler equation efpbo is
much higher than bo
~Abo
R "bo;t
0 "dFbo
lbo;t 1
: The expected cost of default per dollar of loans is closer to the
observed interest rate spread due to default risk.Using the spread based on the loan rate Rli;t yields
a similarly low number(0.34% annually for borrowers and 0.62% annually for entrepreneurs in the
baseline calibration).
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2.3.2 Business Cycle Dynamics Using the Loglinear Approxi-
mation
I compare the responses of variables in four models to a positive 1 standard devia-
tion 0:7% Total Factor Productivity (henceforth TFP) shock (gures 1-3). 21Model
1 (light green IRFs) is the frictionless Real Business Cycle (henceforth RBC) mo-
del. Model 2 (green IRFs) is a classical nancial accelerator model with nancially
constrained entrepreneurs. Model 3 (red IRFs) assumes only households are credit
constrained and drops the entrepreneur sector. Model 4 (blue) is the full model with
all nancing frictions. I start the analysis with model 1, then examine the e¤ect of
adding one nancial friction at a time. Finally, I analyse the e¤ect of having both
nancing frictions in model 4. A key result in this section is that household borro-
wing frictions reduce the procyclicality of labour supply as long as they increase the
procyclicality of aggregate household consumption. This result will play an important
role in understanding the interaction between household and entrepreneur borrowing
frictions.
Model 1 is a standard complete markets Real Business Cycle model with capital
and housing adjustment costs. The increase in current and future TFP raises invest-
ment and labour demand, though by less than in a model without adjustment costs.
The price of capital qkt increases because of the adjustment costs, especially in early
periods when TFP is higher and investment is more protable. Combining the savers
deposit Euler equation with the unconstrained rmscapital Euler equation under
the simplifying assumptions of xed capacity utilisation and perfect foresight, we get
Rt+1 =
(1  u)qkt+1 +  yu;t+1ku;t+1
qkt
: (2.17)
From this equation, the increase in the marginal product of capital  yu;t+1
ku;t+1
increases
Rt+1 and investment demand; but the front loaded rise in qkt reduces the capital gain
qkt+1
qkt
(and possibly also the return on capital per unit of consumption  yu;t+1
qkt ku;t+1
): By
the standard no-arbitrage argument, Rt+1 declines: Because of the fall in Rt+1 and the
smaller increase in labour demand relative to a model without adjustment costs the
income e¤ect dominates the behaviour of labour supply in the short run, and hours
of work decline.
Financially Unconstrained Household Sector With Financially Constrai-
ned Entrepreneurs
Model 2 is a classical rm level nancial accelerator model, comparable to BGGs[19]
or Kiyotaki and Moores[83] models. The entrepreneurs external nance premium
21Since this is a loglinear approximation, the responses in percentage deviations from the balanced
growth path to a negative shock are approximately the same with all signs reversed.
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declines strongly on impact because the loan is predetermined and the improvement
in productivity raises the value of the entrepreneurs collateral both by increasing
revenue and by pushing up the value of the entrepreneurs capital stock (gure 3).
In subsequent periods the external nance premium returns gradually to its long run
value as the entrepreneur increases his borrowing and the price of capital starts de-
clining. As highlighted in the partial equilibrium analysis, the entrepreneur uses the
boom and the reduction in nancing costs to build up his collateral through higher
investment. On impact the entrepreneur nancing frictions amplify the response of
investment by 45% relative to the frictionless model, and by over 30% for several per-
iods after the shock (gure 1). Finally, the entrepreneur also signicantly increases
his consumption. 22 Overall the entrepreneur nancing frictions amplify the response
of output relative to the frictionless model by 12.5-10% in the rst 10 periods after
a shock. The e¤ect on output is modest because in general equilibrium entrepreneur
nancing frictions lead to a more procyclical risk free interest rate and price of ca-
pital. These moderate the increase in investment and make capacity utilisation more
countercyclical. 23
The e¤ect of entrepreneur nancing frictions on uctuations depends signicantly
on the level of capital adjustment costs and the steady state strength of the nancing
frictions. For example setting the elasticity of the price of capital with respect to in-
vestment at 106 leads to output amplication relative to the frictionless benchmark of
20.2%-18.5% (gure 4). In contrast, setting this elasticity to 10 6 results in entrepre-
neur nancing frictions dampening the response of output by about 23% during the
rst 10 periods (gure 5). The reason is that the lower capital adjustment costs re-
duce the volatility of the entrepreneurs collateral value and make the entrepreneurs
external nance premium procyclical.
Increasing the steady state external nance premium of the entrepreneur streng-
thens the e¤ect of the nancing frictions on dynamics. For example setting efpe =
1:035 (e = 0:9605) leads to an output amplication of 35% on impact relative to the
frictionless model, while setting efpe = 1:005 (
e = 0:989) reduces amplication to
less than 1% on impact for all periods.
22The strong reaction of entrepreneur consumption is in line with micro evidence that consumption
of the wealthiest households in the US is much more procyclical than that of other households (Parker
and Vissing Jorgensen (2009) [97]).
23capital utilisation is slightly countercyclical because higher capital prices make depreciation more
costly. One way to make capacity utilisation procyclical while allowing for procyclical variations in
the price of capital is by using the investment adjustment costs model in Christiano and Fisher
(2003) [40]. Another way to see the strength of general equilibrium e¤ects in moderating the output
response of the entrepreneur to shocks is to examine a model where some production is done by
nancially unconstrained rms. In this version, entrepreneurs have a signicantly smaller e¤ect on
prices, and their output response is amplied by around 10-100% during the rst 10 periods relative
to the frictionless model. However, this version of the model has the counterfactual implication that
nancially unconstrained rmsoutput is highly countercyclical.
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Adding Financially Constrained Households
We now come to model 3, adding household borrowing frictions to the frictionless
RBC model. Figure 2 shows the responses of borrowers and savers to the TFP shock.
First, in response to the benchmark positive TFP shock, borrowers expand their
loans, but by less than the increase in the value of their collateral. As a result, we get
a countercyclical external nance premium efpbo;t+1 even beyond the initial period
when the loan is predetermined. A reduction in efpbo;t+1 makes borrowing households
expand their nondurable consumption and housing investment by more than savers
or the representative household of the frictionless RBC model. For a given wage
rate, borrowers will reduce their work hours, because the increase in nondurable
consumption reduces the marginal value of working. 24 Unless saverswork hours
expand su¢ ciently, the result is a decline in current and future labour supply. This
reduces the marginal product of capital for rms and lowers desired investment.
Clearly, if saversconsumption also increases relative to their model 1 consump-
tion, their labour supply curve also shifts to the left, and aggregate labour supply
declines (for a given wage) relative to model 1. However, saversconsumption res-
ponse decreases relative to the frictionless RBC model response. The higher future
interest rates in model 3 encourage them to save more. 25The reduction in savers
consumption relative to model 1 increases the marginal value of work through the
standard income e¤ect and encourages them to work more than in model 1. It would
appear that the more procyclical nature of saverslabour supply could dominate the
response of aggregate labour supply. In the BGP, nancing frictions reduce borro-
wersconsumption relative to that of savers and increase their work e¤ort relative to
that of savers. As a result the absolute value of the elasticity of saverslabour supply
to changes in their consumption 1 ns
ns
> 1 nbo
nbo
, the absolute value of the elasticity
of borrowers labour supply to changes in their consumption. The higher elasticity
means that a given change in the consumption of savers relative to the BGP has
more impact on aggregate labour supply than the a change in borrowersconsump-
tion. Nevertheless, as long as household nancing frictions increase the procyclicality
of aggregate consumption and as long as the direct e¤ect of the nancing frictions on
borrower labour supply through Anw("bo;t) is not too large, the presence of borrowers
will reduce the procyclicality of aggregate labour supply. In our baseline calibration
sw = 1: In this case, we can combine the rst order conditions for labour supply of
savers and borrowers to obtain
24With sw > 0 the reduction in the external nance premium reduces the value of wages as
collateral, which would further reduce the borrowers labour supply for a given wage.
25This conclusion may not seem so obvious in the model with low capital adjustment costs (gure
6) where interest rates are initially lower with household borrowing constraints. However, after a few
periods interest rates with borrowing constraints are higher than in the frictionless RBC model. This
reduces the present value of saversfuture income su¢ ciently to encourage higher saving relative to
the frictionless RBC model.
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1 N st = s(1  ns;t) + bo(1  nbo;t) = s
ncs;t
cwt
+ bo
ncbo;t
cwt
=
n
cwt
Chholdst ; where
Chholdst = scs;t + bocbo;t:
This equation shows that labour supply will decline for a given wage if and only if
aggregate consumption increases in model 3, unless sw is large enough. For plausible
calibrations, household borrowing frictions increase the procyclicality of aggregate
household consumption. As a result, in response to a positive TFP shock model 3
labour supply declines relative to labour supply in the frictionless RBC model.
Without adjustment costs there are two opposing e¤ects on the risk-free interest
rate relative to the frictionless model (gure 5). First, the reduction in external -
nancing frictions stimulates the demand for loans by borrowing households and raises
the risk free interest rate. At the same time, the persistent decline in labour supply
reduces the future marginal product of capital. By the Euler equation for capital
(which is the same in this model as in model 1), this puts downwards pressure on
interest rates. The overall result is that the risk-free interest rate is lower in model
3 relative to model 1 in the initial periods after the shock, but becomes higher than
in model 1 afterwards. With adjustment costs, the addition of household borrowing
constraints makes the risk free interest rate Rt+1 more procyclical in all periods after
a shock. The decline in future labour supply relative to the frictionless model reduces
the future marginal product of capital  yu;t+1
ku;t+1
for xed ku;t+1 as in the economy wi-
thout adjustment costs. At the same time, the falling demand for investment caused
by the lower labour supply reduces the price of capital. This e¤ect is stronger in
the initial periods due to the stronger initial reduction in efpbo;t+1. As a result, the
addition of household borrowing frictions increases
qkt+1
qkt
; (and possibly also  yu;t+1
qkt ku;t+1
):
By no-arbitrage under perfect foresight or low uncertainty, Rt+1 will have to increase
relative to the model without household borrowing frictions if the change in qkt is large
enough. For my calibrations, the e¤ect of changes in qkt dominates and Rt+1 becomes
more procyclical when we add household borrowing constraints in the presence of
capital adjustment costs.
After discussing models 1 to 3, it is straightforward to understand the e¤ect of
combining household and rm credit frictions in model 4. The dynamics of all agents
are qualitatively the same. However, we now have a small negative interaction bet-
ween the tightness of householdscredit constraints to that of entrepreneurscredit
constraints measure by the external nance premium (gure 3). There are two key
channels for this e¤ect. First the higher loan demand by borrowers for a given Rt+1
raises the risk free interest rate, making rm nancing more expensive. Second, there
is a negative e¤ect of the improvement in household nancing conditions on labour
supply. The reduction in labour supply relative to the entrepreneur model without
borrowers raises wages, depresses the price of capital and further contributes to a
59
higher risk free interest rate. Recall the banks break even constraint for the entre-
preneurs
G("e;t)[(1  sk)(1  e;t)qkt ke;t + (1  sy)ye;t] = Rtle;t 1 + awtne;t:
Using G0("e;t) > 0; a higher risk free rate, higher wages and lower capital prices all
reduce the ability of entrepreneurs to borrow and discourage entrepreneur production.
As a result, adding household nancing frictions does not enhance the amplication
e¤ect of the rm level nancing frictions on output. On the contrary, the model with
both household and rm frictions has lower amplication.
For the baseline calibration, the opposing e¤ects of household borrowing constraints
on the consumption responses of borrowers and savers make aggregate household
consumption only slightly more procyclical relative to the models without nancially
constrained households. This makes the e¤ect on aggregate labour supply and the
indirect e¤ect on entrepreneursexternal nancing costs small. As a result, adding
household nancing frictions to the model with entrepreneurs reduces the response
of output to shocks by only around 2.5-4%. Household nancing constraints make
aggregate consumption and labour supply signicantly more sensitive to shocks when
capital adjustment costs are very low (gure 5). Intuitively, this occurs for two rea-
sons. First, lower capital adjustment costs increase movements in output and housing
demand that lead to more procyclical resources and collateral values of borrowers.
This amplies the movements in borrower consumption and labour supply that Ive
emphasized before. Second, eliminating the movements in the price of capital makes
the risk-free interest rate less procyclical relative to the model without household
borrowing constraints. This reduces the tendency of saver consumption and labour
supply to move in the opposite direction to that of borrowers in response to changes
in household external nance costs. The combination of these two factors means that
the responses of borrower consumption and labour supply to changes in the household
external nance premium dominate the responses of aggregate consumption and la-
bour supply. Now, the change in aggregate consumption is amplied by almost 32.5%
on impact relative to the model with only rm nancing frictions and aggregate la-
bour supply declines more signicantly in response to a relaxation of borrowerscredit
constraints.
2.3.3 Discussion
The labour market plays an important role in the results. The model predicts
that if household borrowing constraints make aggregate consumption more respon-
sive to shocks, they will make labour supply less responsive to shocks. This result
should hold more generally for utility functions compatible with a balanced growth
path (King, Plosser, Rebelo preferences [82]), if the constant elasticity of substitution
between consumption and leisure of the models Cobb-Douglas aggregator is a good
approximation. A more robust conclusion is that household borrowing constraints
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decrease borrowerslabour supply procyclicality and increase savers labour supply
procyclicality. Further research is required to understand which e¤ect dominates un-
der what conditions. The model assumes a perfectly competitive labour market, di-
visible labour and insurance of households against the idiosyncratic shocks. However,
the conclusion that countercyclical nancing frictions may make the labour supply
of more credit constrained agents less procyclical, which seems critical to our results,
also holds in an incomplete markets model with matching frictions and endogenous
separations (see Bils et al 2007) [21] : in that model, workers with a lower level of net
nancial assets are more willing to accept lower wages in order to avoid losing their job
in a recession, and vice versa in a boom. Krusell et al (2007) [87] examine a model that
combines the standard uninsured idiosyncratic income risk model of Aiyagari with the
standard labour market matching framework of Mortensen and Pissarides. They also
nd that low wealth households negotiate higher (lower) wages as their asset position
improves (deteriorates). 26These models also feature indivisible hours (one can work
in a full time job or not at all), suggesting that the e¤ects highlighted in a divisible
labour model are also relevant in the presence of indivisibilities through their e¤ect
on the reservation wages of workers. 27 However, the strength of the income e¤ect
from nancing frictions on labour supply may be attenuated in more realistic labour
market models than the perfectly competitive model. Also, in models with uninsured
income risk, aggregation is more complicated even with the utility function that I
have used. As a result, the relation between changes in aggregate consumption and
aggregate labour supply with household borrowing constraints is more ambiguous.
It is also instructive to contrast the model of household borrowing here with
currently popular models using hard borrowing constraints based on Iacoviello (2005)
[72]. Due to the assumption of an always binding collateral constraint, that model has
a xed leverage ratio equal to the maximum Loan to Value ratio, but the borrowers
decisions still a¤ect the tightness of the collateral constraint through his choice of
housing (the collateral in the model). In Iacoviellos model an increase in house prices
relaxes the borrowing constraint for a given loan size and reduces the shadow cost of
borrowing. This shadow cost is similar to the external nance premium in my model.
To the degree that the shadow cost of borrowing in the hard borrowing constraint
model is countercyclical, its borrower dynamics should be qualitatively similar to
those in my analysis, while missing the endogenous adjustment in borrower leverage
in a model with default risk.
26See Domeij and Floden(2006)[51] for a similar e¤ect in the precautionnary saving model with va-
riable labour supply and perfectly competitive labour markets. See Alexopoulous and Gladden(2006)
[4] for evidence from an estimated search model of unemployment of signicant e¤ects of nancial
wealth on reservation wages and probabilities of transitioning into employment which are in line
with the outcomes of my model. [4]
27Alternatively we can interpret nbo;t as including worker e¤ort, following Bils and Chang
(2003)[20]. In this case, the model says quite intuitively that even if a worker cannot smoothly
adjust his working hours, a relaxation of his familys borrowing constraint reduces his e¤ort at work
and forces employers to pay more for a given amount of e¤ort.
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There are several modications that may change the current results of household -
nancing frictions dampening uctuations(household nancial decelerator) and having
negative spillovers on the strength of rm nancing frictions. One element deserving
closer examination is limited production factor mobility between the consumption
and investment goods sectors. Consider a decline in consumer borrowing and spen-
ding due to an increase in household nancial frictions. Without any limits to moving
production resources between consumption and investment goods production, the
worse credit conditions for households increase labour supply, reduce the wage rate
and stimulate investment (holding other factors constant). However, higher invest-
ment may not occur in the short run if it takes time for workers to nd new jobs
in the investment goods sector. As a result, a slump in the consumption sector due
to tighter credit conditions for households may be not compensated for by relatively
higher investment in the short run, leading to a bigger decline in output. If the rms
revenue is part of its loan collateral, this stronger output decline reduces the nancial
strength of rms and raises the external nance premia that they face, which through
the nancial accelerator mechanism can lead to a longer lasting decline in investment
as well as consumption. The baseline model already includes some limited factor mo-
bility through capital adjustment costs. These can be viewed as a reduced form for
di¢ culties in moving workers and other production factors between the investment
and consumption sectors. 28 In the scenario of a recession Ive just described, the mo-
del predicts that worsening nancial conditions for households increases labour supply
relative to a model without household nancing frictions, and makes investment rela-
tively more attractive. Because of the adjustment costs, this puts upwards pressure on
the price of capital and downwards pressure on the risk free interest rate, which im-
proves the entrepreneurs nancial position (relative to the model without household
borrowing constraints) and increases entrepreneur output. The overall result is that
higher adjustment costs of capital do not generate positive spillovers between the cost
of external nance for households and rms, even in an environment with an almost
xed capital stock (see gure 4). There is another problem with the argument that
limited factor mobility between the consumption and the investment goods sectors
can generate a positive interaction between household and rm nancing constraints.
Once one takes into account the consumption of entrepreneurs is isnt clear that
household credit constraints actually make aggregate consumption more sensitive to
shocks. The nancing constraints of borrowers increase the procyclicality of total
(non entrepreneur) household consumption, but they reduce the procyclicality of en-
trepreneur consumption. As a result, aggregate consumption dynamics in the baseline
calibration are virtually identical in the model with all nancing frictions and in the
model where only rms are nancially constrained.
In light of the importance of income e¤ects on labour supply for the results, we
28Kim(2003) [79]shows an equivalence between intertemporal and intratemporal adjustment costs
in the standard real business cycle model under some conditions. This suggests that the results with
convex capital adjustment costs are relevant more generally, though investigation of more realistic
models of limited factor mobility such as Phelan and Trejos (2000)[100] may still be worthwhile.
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could also examine modications to households preferences. First, if housing and
consumption are complements (as suggested by micro estimates in Flavin and Na-
kagawa (2008)[57]) then more procyclical housing investment by borrowers makes
their marginal utility of consumption more procyclical for a given amount of (non-
durable)consumption, which weakens or may even reverse the countercyclical impact
of the income e¤ect on borrower labour supply. Similar e¤ects may be achieved by
habit formation(though the housing based mechanism gets much stronger empirical
supports from micro data estimates in Flavin and Nakagawa (2008) [57]). As for the
income e¤ect on labour supply, the standard way of eliminating it is to replace the
King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988) [82] preferences used here with the preferences in
Greenwood Hercowitz and Hu¤man (GHH1988) [66] of the form
uit =
[v(ci;t; hi;t)  nnnit ]1 
1   :
These preferences are quite important in generating comovement and strong ampli-
cation in many recent RBC models(e.g. [75]), though the microfoundations of just
assuming these preferences is debatable. In particular these preferences are incompa-
tible with the evidence both across time and the cross section that the income and
substitution e¤ects approximately cancel each other out and that income e¤ects are
non negligible at least for large changes in income (unless one assumes unrealistically
that the productivity of home production and market production of households is al-
most perfectly correlated in the time series, cross section and across countries(Kimball
and Shapiro (2003) [81],Basu and Kimball (2002) [16]). 29 As long as the wealth e¤ect
on labor supply is present, we should get dampening of uctuations in the baseline mo-
del due to countercyclical household credit frictions, though the e¤ect may be smaller
if labour and consumption complementarity are strong ( > 1 is high enough).
Wage rigidities of various types also weaken the link between borrower consump-
tion and labour supply and tend to enhance comovement across sectors (see for
example Di Ceccio (2009) [48]). However, the evidence suggests that wage rigidity
may not be important for new hires, and for workers with relatively rigid wages
contract hours also tend to be more rigid(see Pissarides(2008) [101] and Amano et al
(2008) [7]). To the degree that younger more recently hired workers with high wage
growth expectations are more like the impatient borrowers in our model, while older
workers with tenure are more like the patient savers, wage rigidity need not lead to
positive spillovers between household and rm borrowing constraints.
2.3.4 Analysis of Second Order Approximation
As a robustness, check I also examine results from a second order approxima-
tion of the models dynamics. I study the impulse response functions from the ergodic
29Jaimovich and Rebelo(2008)[75] develop a new class of preferences that allows for weak income
e¤ects in the short run while preserving the approximate cancellation of income and substitution
e¤ects in the long run, but with this new preference class leisure is an inferior good for several
periods after an aggregate shock.
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mean of the 2nd order approximation (gures 6-9). Overall, the impulse response func-
tions are qualitatively the same as those emerging from the linear approximation. In
particular, nancial frictions do not seem to have signicantly bigger impact on ag-
gregate dynamics than was found with the loglinear approximation. The magnitudes
of the amplication of output and investment responses to shocks through rm -
nancing frictions is about the same as in the loglinear approximation, but there is
slightly more persistence in the dynamics. The nding that adding household nan-
cing frictions dampens the e¤ect of rm level nancing frictions on aggregate dynamics
continues to hold.
There is some evidence of moderate nonlinearity. For example, in the model with
all nancing frictions moving from a one to a two standard deviation shock increases
the response of output by a factor of 1.79-1.89 for negative shocks and by a factor of
2.135- 2.35 for positive shocks. There is also some assymetry in the dynamics, with
the response of output being larger by a factor of 1.24-1.7 (1.095-1.29) for negative
shocks relative to positive shocks for a one (two) standard deviations shock. Similar
patterns hold for other aggregates such as consumption and investment.
2.3.5 A Comparison of Model and US Statistics
For the sake of completeness, I also compare model based time series statistics
with some time series statistics for the US from 1955 to 2004 (see table 2). While the
t is not very good, we should note that the current version only has TFP shocks.
A model with more shocks (e.g investment shocks or nancial shocks) should have a
better t. The model with household and rm nancing frictions can match around
63% of the volatility of output and 89:5% of the volatility of consumption. At the
same time, it can only match 7% of the volatility of housing investment and 23% of
the volatility of investment. It clearly misses the ranking of the relative volatilities
of output components, with investment being far too smooth relative to output and
consumption being too volatile relative to output. Another major discrepancy between
the model and the data is excessively low volatility of hours worked. Note that these
discrepancies relative to the data are also a problem for the frictionless real business
cycle model From the analysis of the IRFs, it is clear that the key culprits in these
empirical failures of the model are the adjustment costs of housing and capital. These
costs make it di¢ cult for rms and households in the model to smooth consumption
by adjusting investment. They also strengthen the importance of the income e¤ect
for labour supply relative to the substitution e¤ect, reducing the overall movement
of hours of work in response to shocks. The low volatility of investment and hours of
work are problematic for any model of nancing frictions relying on convex capital
adjustment costs (or the special case of a xed capital stock) to generate volatility
in collateral values and costs of external nancing, including the Kiyotaki and Moore
model. To the degree that nancing frictions are considered important this suggests
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that models where the whole value of the rm is part of collateral (because default
involves the entrepreneur losing the rm as opposed to just the current capital) as in
Jermann and Quadrini (2008) [76] are more promising. 30 A simpler way to improve
the performance of the model in these dimensions is to use the investment adjustment
costs in Christiano and Fisher (2003) [40], which penalises changes in the growth rate
of investment. 31 Other extensions that may lead to an important role for rm nan-
cing frictions in business cycles with high investment volatility include investment
specic technology shocks as in Christiano and Fisher [40], allowing for an almost
xed factor of production such as structures or land to be part of rm collateral as
in Iacoviello (2005) [72] and Liu et al (2009) [89], or relying on nancial shocks that
directly a¤ect the tightness of the borrowing constraint as in Christiano et al. (2007)
[42]. 32Finally, the low volatility in our measure of the labour input may not be such
a concern if we interpret it as including time varying e¤ort along the lines of Bils and
Chang (2003) [20]. In that case low volatility in the aggregate labour input is perfectly
compatible with stronger procyclicality of hours as long as e¤ort per hour is counter-
cyclical . Since labour hour choices are usually discrete, while e¤ort or e¢ ciency per
hour is a continuous variable, this is arguably a more plausible interpretation of the
divisible labour supply model in many standard DSGE models such as Cooley and
Prescott (1995) [43].
All models also overestimate the contemporaneous correlation between output and
its components and the correlation between the wage rate and output. In contrast
to RBC models with home production or housing but without adjustment costs,
the model with housing adjustment costs can generate a positive correlation between
business and housing investment. However this correlation is far too high in the model.
Finally, as one would expect from the IRFs analysis, the e¤ect of nancing frictions on
volatilities and correlations is modest for output, but more signicant for investment.
Adding rm nancing frictions to the basic RBC model increases the volatility of
output by 12%; and investment by 44%: Adding household borrowing frictions to the
model with rm nancing frictions leads to a 3% reduction in the volatility of output
and a 13% reduction in the volatility of investment. Adding rm nancing frictions
does generate a signicant improvement the correlation between output and hours
worked. This correlation is signicantly negative in the frictionless RBC model, in
contrast to the data, while with nancing frictions it becomes signicantly positive.
30Default never occurs in Jermann and Quadrinis model. A version of their model with equilibrium
default may be tractable as long as the value of the rm is increasing in the idiosyncratic shock.
31Christiano and Fishers specication of adjustment costs is also more realistic in allowing the
elasticity of investment with respect to the price of capital to be larger for more persistent chnages
in qkt than for transitory changes in q
k
t : It should be noted that their specication still su¤ers from
a volatility of investment that is too low relative to the data.
32Iacoviello (2005) [72], and Liu et al (2009) [89] rely on a xed supply of housing and structures
to generate volatile house prices. This leads to the same problem we have with investment under
TFP shocks : in the data housing investment is very volatile, not xed. This criticism does not
apply to nancial shocks, which at least in theory can generate volatility in both collateral prices
and investment in new collateral.
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2.4 Conclusion
This paper has examined the possibility of spillovers between household and
rm nancing frictions in an otherwise standard Real Business Cycle model with
housing. In the absence of other frictions, I nd a small negative interaction between
the external nance premia of households and rms. Workers in the model use a re-
laxation of their nancing constraint in a boom to increase their leisure. This crowds
out investment, raises the risk-free interest rate and reduces the value of capital. The
higher loan demand by borrowers in a boom also pushes up the interest rates faced by
entrepreneurs. All these elements tighten the nancing constraints of rms in a boom,
in comparison to a model where households are nancially unconstrained. The oppo-
site movements occur in a recession, as nancially constrained households respond to
higher costs of external nancing by raising their labour supply and reducing their
demand for loans. While household nancing frictions increase the procyclicality of
savers labour supply, this is not enough to counter the e¤ects of less procyclical
borrower labour supply.
I have discussed several factors that may change the results. These include limi-
ted production factor mobility across sectors and labour market imperfections. In
the context of limited factor mobility it would be interesting to explore the nancing
frictions in this paper in a more detailed multisector model which goes beyond the
convex adjustment cost model of housing and capital supply. In the current model
entrepreneurs produce nal output which is then converted without other nancing
frictions into housing and capital. This implicitly assumes that entrepreneurs produ-
cing consumption goods can automatically switch to producing capital goods if tighter
household nancing constraints depress consumption. A more realistic assumption for
most rms is that in the short run entrepreneurs cannot switch between producing
consumption or investment goods, leading to separate external nance premia for
di¤erent sectors. To the degree that tighter nancing constraints for households lead
to a slump in consumption, allowing for these separate external nance premia may
matter. Other features that may be worth exploring include a separate role for com-
mercial property in the entrepreneurs production function and collateral constraint
as in Liu et al (2009) [89], a relatively xed supply of land and di¤erences in factor
intensities across sectors as in Davis and Heathcote (2005) [47]. In particular, explicit
modeling of the role of commercial property creates a potentially important channel
for interaction between household and rm nancing constraints to the degree that
prices of commercial and residential property are linked.
Several other extensions or modications of the current model deserve further
consideration. To simplify the solution of the model and analysis, I have assumed
that households and rms have access to insurance arrangements allowing them to
diversify their idiosyncratic risk after settling debt contracts. This raises the question
of the robustness of the results to a more realistic setup with uninsured idiosyncratic,
where both households and rms engage in precautionary saving. Aggregating the
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labour supply of borrowers and savers is no longer so straightforward with uninsured
idiosyncratic risk. This opens up the possibility that household nancing frictions
make aggregate labour supply more procyclical due to the behaviour of savers. The
interaction in debt markets between household and rm loan demand is also more
complex in an economy where the proportion of borrowing households and rms can
change across the business cycle. In the current model all rms have negative net
nancial assets in each period, so that an increase in loan demand by households in a
boom makes things worse for rms by raising their borrowing costs. In a model with
heterogeneous entrepreneurs, in each period some entrepreneurs will have positive
net nancial assets. For these entrepreneurs, an increase in the risk-free interest rate
due to higher loan demand by borrowers makes it easier to cumulate assets that may
relax their future borrowing constraints. Clearly, in such an environment the inter-
action between the strength of nancing frictions a¤ecting households and rms is
more subtle. Solving a model where both rms and households are a¤ected by unin-
surable idiosyncratic shocks is di¢ cult (if not impossible) using the standard Krusell
and Smith [88] algorithm for heterogenous agent models with aggregate uncertainty.
However, this objective may be feasible with recent techniques that obtain aggregate
laws of motion by explicitly aggregating individual policy functions (Den Haan et
al. (2009) [5]). These techniques reduce the use of simulation in solving the model
to a minimum, promising large improvements in solution speed or the complexity of
models that can be handled. 33 Finally, I have followed the common practice of using
di¤erences in discount factors to generate equilibrium borrowing and lending. This
is often justied as a shortcut for modeling di¤erences in expected income growth
between younger and older households (see Carroll (2000) [34]). It may be worthw-
hile to investigate the validity of this shortcut using a more explicit model of lifecycle
e¤ects. This may be tractable using the Blanchard-Yaari perpetual youth framework
(e.g Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) [27]), generalised to take into account the distinc-
tion between young workers and middle aged workers.
33Krusell and Smith[88] nd that idiosyncratic risk does not have quantitatively signicant e¤ects
on macroeconomic aggregates. Key to this result is the high ability and incentives for households to
self insure through holding capital (equity) in their baseline model. But this model cannot match
the US wealth distribution and it cannot reproduce the riskiness of equity in the data. In models
that match the wealth distribution and the riskiness of equity such as those in Carroll (2000) [34] or
Favilukis (2007)[54], households do not have such strong incentives to self insure and the insurance
that can be provided by equity or bonds is more limited. In these models, idiosyncratic risk matters
for aggregate consumption dynamics.
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2.5 Appendix A, proofs of propositions
Proposition1 : With perfect foresight, @(cbo;t=hbo;t)
@"bo;t+1
> 0:
Proof : With perfect foresight we can combine the loan and the housing Euler
equations to obtain
qt =
h
c
cbo;t
hbo;t
+ (1  h)qt+1 Ahh("bo;t+1)
Rt+1efp("bo;t+1)
:
d

Ahh("bo;t+1)
efp("bo;t+1)

d"bo;t+1
=
 efp0(ebo;t+1)
efp2bo;t+1
+ (1  sh)[H
0("bo;t+1)
efpbo;t+1
+G0("bo;t+1) H("bo;t+1)efp
0("bo;t+1)
efp2bo;t+1
]
=  efp
0("bo;t+1)
efp2bo;t+1
[1 + (1  sh)H("bo;t+1)] < 0;
where the last inequality follows from efp0("bo;t+1) > 0 and H("bo;t+1) >  1: There-
fore, an increase in "bo;t+1 must lead to a rise in
cbo;t
hbo;t
for given house prices.
Proposition 2 :With perfect foresight, @ke;t+1
@"e;t+1
< 0:
Proof : The proof is similar to that of proposition 1. Combining the loan and
capital Euler equations, we have
qkt =
1
Rt+1efpe;t+1
[Akk("e;t+1)q
k
t+1(1  e) + Aky("e;t+1)
ye;t+1
ke;t+1
]:
Using the fact that Aky("e;t+1)=efp("e;t+1) and Akk("e;t+1)=efp("e;t+1) are both decrea-
sing in "e;t+1 and the diminishing marginal productivity of capital we nd
@ke;t+1
@"e;t+1
< 0
for xed ne;t+1: Now allow for variable labour supply with
@ne;t
@"e;t
< 0: Rewrite the rst
order condition for ne;t as
1 + (1  sy)[H("e;t) + efpe;tG("e;t)]
(1  a+ aefpe;t) (1  )
ye;t
ne;t
= wt = Bne("e;t)(1  )
ye;t
ne;t
= wt:
By diminishing marginal productivity of labour, @ne;t
@"e;t
< 0 if and only if dBne ("e;t)
d"e;t
< 0:
Solving for net as a function of capital and substituting the result into the Euler
equation for capital,
qkt =
1
Rt+1efpe;t+1
Akk("e;t+1)q
k
t+1(1  e)
+
1
Rt+1efpe;t+1
Aky("e;t+1)

(1  )ze;t+1
wt+1
Bn;e("e;t+1)
 (1 )
1 (1 )
k

1 (1 ) 1
e;t+1
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dBne ("e;t)
d"e;t
< 0 implies that as before the right hand side of this equation is decrea-
sing in "e;t+1: Since k

1 (1 ) 1
e;t+1 is decreasing in ke;t+1; a higher "e;t+1 must lead to a
lower ke;t+1:
Proposition 3 : a  1  sy implies that @ne;t@"e;t < 0:
Proof : From the previous proof, we know that @ne;t
@"e;t
< 0 if and only if dBne ("e;t)
d"e;t
< 0;
where
1 + (1  sy)[H("e;t) + efpe;tG("e;t)]
(1  a+ aefpe;t) = Bne("e;t):
:
dBne("e;t)
d"e;t
=
efp0("e;t)
(1  a+ aefpe;t)2 (1  sy)[(1  a+ aefpe;t)G("e;t)
  efp
0("e;t)
(1  a+ aefpe;t)2a(H("e;t) + efpe;tG("e;t))]  a
=
efp0("e;t)
(1  a+ aefpe;t)2f(1  sy)[G("e;t)(1  a)  a(H("e;t)]  ag
=
efp0("e;t)
(1  a+ aefpe;t)2f(1  sy)[G("e;t) + ae;t
Z "e;t
0
"dF ]  ag
where the last equality uses H("e;t) + G("e;t) =  e;t
R "e;t
0
"dF: efp
0("e;t)
(1 a+aefpe;t)2 > 0;
since efp0("e;t) > 0: Therefore,
dBne ("e;t)
d"e;t
< 0 if and only if
(1  sy)[G("e;t) + ae;t
Z "e;t
0
"dF ]  a < 0
; that is G("e;t) + ae;t
R "e;t
0
"dF < a
1 sy : Since G("e;t) + ae;t
R "e;t
0
"dF < 1; a  1  sy
is a su¢ cient condition for (1  sy)[G("e;t) + ae;t
R "e;t
0
"dF ]  a < 0:
2.6 Appendix B, the Balanced Growth Path :
I approximate the model around a Balanced Growth Path (BGP) where
ku;t; ke;t; Iu;t; Ie;t;
yu;t; ye;t; hs;t; hbo;t; cs;t; cbo;t; dt,let ; lbo;t and wt all grow at the same gross rate Gy:
hours of work, capacity utilisation rates, default thresholds and the real interest rate
on deposits are all constant in the BGP. This implies that the growth rates of total
factor productivity in the BGP are Gze = G
1 
y and Gzu = G
1 
y : Let ~xt =
xt
Gtx
; where
Gx is the gross growth rate of x in the BGP. x^t = xt xx where x is the BGP value of
~xt: I normalize zu = ze = 1: To nd the BGP, rst detrend all focs and constraints.
1)We start by computing the default thresholds and idiosyncratic shock volatilities
to match BGP default rates.
For i = e; bo "i solves
1 = iGiefpi("i)R:
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Note that this solution ignores the constraint that entrepreneur loans le  0
which may in theory be violated due to the wages in advance constraint a¤ecting
part of the wage bill. I solve the model conjencturing that this constraint does not
bind. Afterwards, I can compute le and check that this is indeed the case. For my
calibrations, this was never a problem with Rle
Ge ~A
> 0 by a large margin.
There are two solutions to each of the above equations. The monotone hazard rate
assumption implies that the optimal solution is the lower "i solution(this is just like
in the BGG model- see Christiano et als[42] appendix for a discussion of this). After
picking the lower solution interval, a simple bisection nds each "i:
We can then solve for various other expressions that are functions of "i such as
Hi; Gi; efpi;:
2) We need to compute the market clearing wage. This can be done by a bisection,
in which we solve for the model quantities conditional on a given wage, check if the
labour market equilibrium has converged and iterate if required. Since entrepreneurial
nancing frictions tend to lower the demand for labour relative to that of nancially
unconstrained rms, the wage in a model with nancially unconstrained rms is a
reliable upper bound for the solution of the model where all rms are nancially
constrained.
2.1) Conditional on the guess for the wage rate we compute entrepreneur variables :
We already have "e from 1). ue = 1:
Next we use the labour demand foc to express ne as a function of ke :
ne =
h
(1 )ze(ueke)
Anew
i 1
1 (1 )
, where Ane =
1 a+aefpe
1+(1 sy)(He+Geefpe) :
This allows us to use the euler equation for entrepreneur capital to solve for ke:
ke =
1
Gy
"
Gy
e
 (1 e)Akk
Ayk(Gzeze)
1
1 (1 ) ( (1 )ue
GywAne
)
(1 )
1 ((1 )
# 1 (1 )
 1
, whereAyk = 1+(1 sy)(He+
efpeGe) and Akk = 1 + (1  sk)(He + efpeGe):
It can be shown that the expressions above are always positive.
Next, we can nd e from ue = 1 and the rst order condition for ue :
e =
Au
e

Gy
e
 (1 e)Akk
Ayk

; where Au =
Ayk
Akk
:
Given the variables above it is easy to nd ye; ~Ae; Ae, le = ( ~AeGe   awne)=R and
ce = Ae +He ~Ae   (1  a)wne + leGy   keGy:
2.2) Now we compute the borrower variables.
We already have the default threshold "bo and functions of this threshold from 1).
Using the rst order conditions for housing and labour supply we can solve for
hbo = Ahbocbo where Ahbo =
h
cGy(1 boG(1 h)[1+(1 sh)(Hbo+efpboGbo)]) ; and
nbo = 1  Anbo cbow where Anbo = nc[1+(1 sw)(Hbo+efpboGbo)] :
We can then also solve for Abo = (1   h)hbo + wnbo; ~Abo and lbo = Gbo ~Abo=R as
functions of cbo:
To compute cbo we plug the expressions above into the budget constraint and solve
for cbo :
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cbo =
Xnbo
1+AhboXhbo+AnboXnbo
w where Xnbo = 1 + (1   sw)( ~Hbo + GyR Gbo) and Xhbo =
Gy   (1  h)[1 + (1  sh)(Hbo +Gbo GyR )]
Again, it can be shown that the expressions for cbo and hbo are always positive.
nbo > 0 for any calibration in which ns > 0 since nbo > ns:
Given cbo; we can now go back and solve for the other borrower variables using
the expressions derived earlier.
2.3) Next we compute the variables for the savers.
For the savers, the solution is similar to that for the borrowers. We use the rst
order conditions for housing and labour supply to express hs = Ahscs; where Ahs =
h
cGy [1 G(1 h)] and ns = 1  
n
c
cs
w
: We also determine deposits from the market
clearing condition d = ele+bolbo
s
:
We can then substitute the expressions above, using the results from all the pre-
vious steps, into the saversbudget constraint to solve for cs =
(R Gy)d+w
1+(Gy (1 h))Ahs+ nc
:
3) We now check if the excess demand jne   sns   bonboj < "n; and update the
wage guess if necessary.
This concludes the solution of the BGP.
Alternatively, we can solve for the equilibrium wage analytically if we know the
targeted proportion of hours worked in the BGP. Suppose we have a target in mind
for ne: The rst order condition for capital can be solved for the equilibrium
ye
ke
ratio as a function of "e:
ye
ke
= ze

ke
ne
 1
n 1e allows us to solve for
ke
ne
: The labour
demand function can be written as (1   ) ye
ne
= (1   )

ke
ne

n 1e = Ane("e)w:
Since we know ke
ne
; ne and "e we can solve for w analytically. To make the labour
market clear we adjust the labour supply through the ratio n
c
for a given h until
jsns + bonbo   nej < "N for a small "N : A good upper bound for the labour market
clearing n
c
can be found by solving the economy where only borrowers work, while
savers just earn income from deposits (this bound can be computed analytically for
Gy = 1; and it is usually also an upper bound for Gy > 1 but close to 1).
2.7 Appendix C, the model with a predetermined
loan rate with respect to aggregate shocks
For concreteness, I focus on the borrowing household. Similar derivations
apply to the entrepreneur.
Suppose that now Rlt must be determined before knowing the aggregate state
of the economy at t: Since lbo;t 1 is predetermined at t; This makes the repayment
without default Rltlbo;t 1 = "bo;t ~Abo;t predetermined.
As before, the bank can still diversify its exposure to the borrowersidiosyncratic
shocks. We can still write the banks expected repayments asG("bo;t) ~Abo;t = Rbo;tlbo;t 1
for some Rbo;t  0; where G("bo;t) = [1   F ("bo;t)]"bo;t + (1   bo;t)
R "bo;t
0
"bodF: "bo;t
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must satisfy two conditions : "bo;t =
Rltlbo;t 1
~Abo;t
and G("bo;t) =
Rbo;tlbo;t 1
~Abo;t
: Before we
assumed that Rbo;t = Rt and allowed Rltlbo;t 1 to adjust as a function of aggregate
conditions to make the rst condition trivially hold. But now Rltlbo;t 1 is independent
of the aggregate state. As a result, if Rbo;t is independent of the aggregate state we
have a system of 2 equations in one unknown "bo;t that (generically) has no solution.
Therefore, Rbo;t must adjust as a function of the aggregate state. The contract can
no longer be reduced to picking a schedule of default thresholds "bo;t: Instead, the
representative borrower now picks

cbo;t; hbo;t; lbo;t; dbo;t; R
l
bo;t+1; nbo;t; "bo;t
	1
t=0
to maximise
E0
1
t=0
botubo;t
subject to a sequence of budget constraints
cbo;t+ qthbo;t+dbo;t = qt(1  h)hbo;t 1+nbo;twt+H("bo;t)[(1  sh)qt(1  h)hbo;t 1+
(1  sw)nbo;twt] + lbo:t + dbo;t 1Rt
,the participation constraints of the bank G("bo;t) [(1  sh)qt(1  h)hbo;t 1 + (1 
sw)nbo;twt] = Rbo;tlbo;t 1
and "bo;t =
Rlbo;tlbo;t 1
~Abo;t
:
The expected rates of return conditional on the aggregate state Rbo;t must now
satisfy
s;t = Ets;t+1 Rbo;t+1:
This can be shown using either a decentralisation where savers are assumed to
directly make risky loans to borrowers, or an equivalent (by the Modigliani-Miller
theorem) but more realistic decentralisation where savers provide banks that they
own with risk free deposits and the banks lend out those funds at the risky rate
Rbo;t+1; ,repay the borrowersdeposits and distribute all prots(negative if they su¤er
a loss) to the savers.
Note that the deterministic balanced growth path solution, around which we ap-
proximate the dynamics, is the same as for the model where Rlt is conditional on the
aggregate state.
For the entrepreneur, we get the same results if a = 0; otherwise we need to think
more carefully about the joint modeling of the intratemporal working capital loan
and the intertemporal loan. The most direct generalisation of the previous setup is
to assume that the predetermined loan rate Rle;t is the same on both types of loans.
That is "e;t ~Ae;t = Rle;t(le;t 1 + awtne;t): With this assumption, the analysis for the
entrepreneur nancial contract is similar to that of the of the borrowers contract.
Otherwise, we will need to model these two types of loans separately.
2.8 Data Appendix
I use US aggregate data from the rst quarter of 1955 to the 4th quarter of
2004. All time series are from the Federal Reserve Economic Data at http ://re-
search.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ :
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1) Yt : Real GDP in chained 2005 dollars divided by civilian population over the
age of 16.
2) Ct : Real Personal Consumption Expenditures in chained 2005 dollars divided
by civilian population over the age of 16.
3) Iht : Real Private Residential Fixed Investment in chained 2005 dollars divided
by civilian population over the age of 16.
4) It : Real Private Non Residential Fixed Investment in chained 2005 dollars
divided by civilian population over the age of 16.
5) Nt : Non Farm Business Sector Hours all Persons divided by civilian population
over the age of 16.
6) Wt : Non Farm Business Sector Real Compensation per Hour.
7) Rt+1   1 : I construct the real risk-free interest rate by taking the arithmetic
average of nominal annualised monthly 3 month T-bill rates and subtracting the
quarterly annualised ination rate. I calculate the ination rate as the growth rate in
the Implicit GDP deator.
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Table 1
Calibration
Parameter Description Value/Target
 Patient householdsdiscount factor R  1 = 0:01
e Entrepreneursdiscount factor e = 0:98 leverage' 0:58
bo Borrowerd discount factor bo = 0:97
 relative risk aversion coe¢ cient 1; 1:5
Gy   1 trend growth rate of GDP 0:4%
 capital share 0:3
e = u capital depreciation rate 1:4%
h housing depreciation rate 0:4%
I=K elasticity of qkt to It=kt 1
hIh=h elasticity of qt to I
h
t =ht 1 1
 persistence of TFP shock 0:95
z standard deviation of TFP innovation 0:007
 entrepreneur span of control 0:95
c;n; h u(:) weights of consumption, leisure, housing housing/GDP' 1:3; N s ' 0:32
bo proportion of borrowers 0:4
bo monitoring cost, borrowers 0:22
e monitoring cost, entrepreneurs 0:15
bo idiosyncratic shock std. dev, borrowers bo = 0:0951; 1:4% default rate
e idiosyncratic shock std. dev, entrepreneurs e = 0:2118; 3% default rate
sw wage exemption 1
sh housing exemption 0
sy output exemption 0
sk capital exemption 0
a wages in advance proportion 1
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Table 2
Comparison of US time series statistics with model generated statistics
Statistic US data All frictions Firm frictions Household frictions No frictions
y 1.54 0.9747 1.0065 0.8881 0.8971
c 1.21 1.0834 1.0914 0.9532 0.9026
Ih 9.63 0.6565 0.7338 0.8204 0.9339
I 4.75 1.0839 1.2518 0.7471 0.8709
N 1.74 0.1417 0.2169 0.052 0.006
w 0.91 0.9023 0.8724 0.933 0.9009
Rt+1 2.36 0.2340 0.2983 0.3361 0.449
(c; y) 0.87 0.9993 0.9995 0.9991 0.9999
(Ih; y) 0.64 0.9885 0.9981 0.9917 0.9999
(I; y) 0.77 0.9991 0.9985 0.9967 0.9998
(N; y) 0.87 0.9938 0.9874 -0.8558 -0.6126
(w; y) 0.24 0.9999 0.9997 0.9996 0.9999
(Rt+1; y) 0.03 -0.2435 -0.496 -0.4084 -0.5931
(Ih; I) 0.25 0.9878 0.9951 0.9947 0.9998
US data is from the rst quarter of 1955, to the 4th quarter of 2004. x is the
standard deviation of x in percentages: (x; y) is the correlation of x and y: The
second column reports statistics for the model with all nancing frictions, the third
column for the model with only rm frictions, the fourth column for the model with
only household frictions and the last column for the frictionless model. All series
except the interest rate were logged, linearly detrended and then HP ltered with
 = 1600. Interest rates are annualised. Model statistics are based on averages of 500
simulations of 1000 periods using the 2nd order approximation, with the rst 800
periods of each simulation discarded to reduce the e¤ect of initial conditions. Model
time series were ltered in the same way as the data.
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Fig. 2.1 Baseline calibration, aggregates. All IRFs are in percentage deviations from
the deterministic BGP.
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Fig. 2.5 Low K adjustment costs calibration, aggregates. All IRFs are in percentage
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Fig. 2.6 Baseline calibration, 2nd order approximation +1 standard deviation tfp
shock. All IRFs are in percentage deviations from the ergodic means.
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Fig. 2.7 Baseline calibration, 2nd order approximation -1 standard deviation tfp
shock. All IRFs are in percentage deviations from the ergodic means.
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Fig. 2.8 Baseline calibration, 2nd order approximation +2 standard deviation tfp
shock. All IRFs are in percentage deviations from the ergodic means
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Chapitre 3
Bank Capital, Housing and Credit
Constraints
abstract
This paper integrates household nancing frictions with bank nancing frictions
and housing price uctuations in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model.
We use a two-sided debt contract framework in which the bank cannot fully diversify
shocks to its borrowers to study the link between household and bank sectorsdefault
risks. The cyclical behaviour of the cost of the bank-depositors nancing friction is
determined by two main factors. On one hand, booms improve the nancial health of
the banksborrowers which tends to reduce the cost of bank funding. On the other
hand, consumption smoothing by savers and borrowers during booms increases the
proportion of external nancing in the banksbalance sheet which tends to increase
the cost of bank funding. As a result of these opposing e¤ects, the model matches
procyclical prots and leverage in the nancial sector, as observed in the data, but for
non nancial shocks the banking frictions in the model have an insignicant impact
on the main macroeconomic aggregates such as output, consumption and investment.
JEL classication : E3, E4
Keywords : Financial frictions, bank capital, business cycles
co-author : Jing Yang
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3.1 Introduction
This paper develops a DSGE model of the interaction between nancing frictions
facing households and nancial intermediaries. The 2008 nancial crisis in the US
and the UK as well as earlier nancial crisis in Scandinavia and Japan in the early
1990s suggest the potential usefulness of building a quantitative framework to study
the links between the nancial sector, real estate and household balance sheets. The
usefulness of such a model is also supported by reduced form empirical evidence that
loan rates may depend on the health of nancial intermediariesbalance sheets and
that housing wealth has a signicant impact on consumption and debt levels1. Of
course reduced form evidence may easily confound correlation and causality due to
omitted variables bias. Because the nancial health of banks and borrowers tends to
be positively correlated, it is hard to tell for example if loans from banks in poor
nancial health are more expensive due to the state of the banksbalance sheets or
the nancial weakness of its borrowers. This makes it desirable to complement the
existing evidence and ultimately base the analysis on a structural economic model.
The main question is : what is the quantitative importance of the interaction between
household and bank balance sheets ?
Following several recent DSGEmodels (starting with Kiyotaki and Moore 1997[83]
and Iacoviello 2005[72]) our model has borrowers and savers distinguished by di¤e-
rences in their degree of impatience and limited enforcement frictions. This hetero-
geneity generates equilibrium lending with collateral. Our model adds bankers as the
only agents in the economy capable of evaluating and monitoring loans to households.
Banks nance impatient borrowers through debt contracts collateralised by borrower
housing and wage income. We make two key assumptions. First, a borrowers col-
lateral is subject to shocks. This provides borrowers with incentives to default on
their loan repayments in bad states, requiring costly loan enforcement by the bank.
Second, banks cannot fully diversify the shocks to their loan portfolios resulting from
the shocks to borrower collateral, due to the need to specialize in a segment of bor-
rowers. As a result they cannot guarantee depositors a safe rate of return. Because
of asymmetric information about the realisation of bank loan revenues, the banks
themselves would have an incentive to misreport their revenues and not repay depo-
sitors without some form of monitoring. Depositors can monitor and enforce deposit
repayments. However these monitoring costs make deposits a relatively costly source
of loan nancing in comparison to the banksown net worth (bank capital in the
model). These assumptions create a positive link between the nancing frictions af-
fecting borrowers and banks. In combination with countercyclical borrower default
rates, this can in theory amplify the e¤ect of nancial constraints on business cycles.
1For examples of evidence on the e¤ect of bank capital on loans see Hubbard et al (2002)[71],
Peek and Rosengren(2000)[98] and Carlson et al (2008)[30]. For empirical evidence suggesting a
strong e¤ect of house prices on consumption and debt see Dynan and Kohn(2007)[52], Iacoviello and
Minetti(2008)[73] and Case et al (2005)[36].
86
At the same time the desire to smooth consumption by borrowers and savers tends to
make the deposits to loans ratio procyclical. This raises (lowers) the banks leverage
in a boom (recession), which increases (decreases) the nancing frictions between
the bank and depositors and tends to dampen the e¤ect of nancial constraints on
business cycles 2.
We solve the model and nd that the e¤ect of consumption smoothing by borro-
wers and savers dominates, and that in response to non-nancial shocks the overall
e¤ect on the extra cost of bank funding is small. This allows us to reproduce the
empirical evidence of a procyclical bank leverage ratio and procyclical bank prots,
but the impact of bank capital uctuations on non-bank aggregates is insignicant.
Thus, the nancial friction modeled in this paper cannot rationalise claims that pro-
cyclical nancial sector leverage amplies uctuations or that bank capital matters
in response to shocks that are exogenous to the banking sector. This does not ex-
clude the possibility that bank nancing frictions may matter for model dynamics
in response to nancial shocks directly a¤ecting costs of monitoring banks or other
nancial parameters as in Christiano et al (2007) [42], but the exogeneity of such
shocks is unclear.
There are several caveats to our results. First, this version of the paper only exa-
mines linear approximations to the models dynamics. It is quite possible that the
e¤ect of banking on output uctuations is nonlinear, with stronger e¤ects occurring
for bigger shocks. Given the tractability of the model, this should be easy to ex-
plore using higher order perturbation approximations as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2004)[67]. We intend to pursue this direction in a future version of the paper. Second,
in keeping with most of the litterature on nancing frictions in DSGE models we do
not have any maturity mismatch in banksbalance sheets. Third, while we allow for
asymmetric information about the outcome of loans, we assume perfect information
on the stochastic process of the shocks a¤ecting the loans. Both these omissions pro-
bably bias our estimate of the impact of bank nancing frictions on business cycle
uctuations downwards. Finally, we assume that nancing frictions only a¤ect hou-
sehold sector borrowing. Meh and Moran (2008)[92] nd signicant e¤ects of bank
capital dynamics on output responses in a model where nancing frictions a¤ect ca-
pital producing rms. This suggests that results may be di¤erent in a version of the
model where both rms and households face similar credit constraints.
As in Solomon (2009) [111], the paper uses a highly tractable alternative frame-
work to study the e¤ects of household credit frictions in DSGE models that allows
for equilibrium default while preserving the assumption of risk averse/consumption
2This e¤ect is similar to the banking attenuator e¤ect found by Goodfriend and
McCallum(2007)[63] in a DSGE model of banking with a reduced form loan production function.
There, the attenuation e¤ect of banking on aggregate uctuations was produced by a deposits in
advance constraint on consumption that increased demand for deposits in booms. The e¤ect that
we nd does not rely on modeling the inside money role of bank deposits.
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smoothing households and banks, in contrast to the risk neutral borrowers in Ber-
nanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (henceforth BGG1999)[19] and in the Holmstrom and
Tirole model (1997)[69]. This should make the analysis easier to compare to standard
business cycle models, as well as providing potentially more realistic and less extreme
borrower dynamics than those obtained in previous models with risk neutral agents.
Furthermore, it may eventually allow us to examine the e¤ects of precautionary sa-
vings on borrowers and banks by using higher order approximations of the models
dynamics. Naturally this tractability comes at a cost : we allow agents to insure them-
sevles against the idiosyncratic shocks that lead to default, to facilitate aggregation
both at the level of borrowers and of banks. We see this as a useful assumption at
least as a rst step, while acknowledging the value of eventually studying these issues
in a heterogenous agent model with a richer distribution of assets. At the same time,
the idea that defaulting agents may benet from some intra family nancial or in kind
support that is hard to track and seize by the banks, or that bank managers may be
able insure part of their earnings against the risk that their bank defaults has some
plausibility (though the insurance is likely to be much less comprehensive than assu-
med in this paper). By preserving the assumption of risk averse borrowers, the model
provides a new mechanism for explaining the countercyclicality of external nance
premia. Consumption smoothing by borrowers reduces uctuations in their desired
loan size relative to uctuations in the value of collateral. The resulting countercy-
clicality in leverage translates into countercyclical default rates and external nance
premia. 3
Our model of banks is inspired by several theoretical papers that emphasize
the e¤ect of limited bank loan diversication and the ability of bank capital to re-
duce asymmetric information frictions between banks and depositors(See for example
Williamson (1986) [117],Winton (1995)[118], Krasa and Villamil (1992)[86], Valencia
(2006)[115]). Williamson (1986) shows how an intermediated lending arrangement
using banks can reduce loan monitoring costs if the bank can diversify away idio-
syncratic loan risks. Krasa and Villamil (1992) show that even with imperfect loan
diversication and monitoring costs that are increasing in the size of the bank in-
termediated lending can be more e¢ cient in terms of overall monitoring costs than
direct lending. Winton (1995)[118] shows how in the presence of imperfect loan risk
diversication, bank capital can reduce information frictions between the bank and
depositors. The main competitor to the asymmetric information framework is Holm-
strom and Tiroles bank capital model (1997)[69] and its extensions to a DSGE fra-
mework (Meh and Moran 2007[91],2008[92] and Aikman and Paustian 2006[3]), where
bank capital plays a role of giving the bank incentives to monitor rms before their
returns are realised. The Holmstrom and Tirole story may be relevant for rm level
credit frictions but it is hard to apply to households : it is plausible that banks indi-
rectly monitor the e¤orts of businesses to ensure they can repay the loans through the
3Note that a similar argument could be made for nancially constrained rms : the desire to
smooth dividends or entrepreneur consumption can help generate a countercyclical rm level external
nance premium (see Solomon (2009) [111]).
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terms of the loan for example or through monitoring of rmstransactions accounts
held at the banks. However, one does not observe nancial intermediaries monitoring
the e¤ort of households to improve their probability of repaying the loan. Instead, it
seems more realistic to focus on borrower monitoring and contract enforcement when
the borrower is in nancial distress and cannot fully repay the loan. Models of bank
capital that use the Holmstrom-Tirole model nd that bank capital movements can
amplify uctuations, though the quantitative importance of the e¤ect is sensitive to
other features of the model4. These models also assume risk neutral banks and borro-
wers, which eliminates some of the consumption smoothing considerations that help
determine the cost of bank loans in our model and may potentially bias the results
on the e¤ect of bank capital on uctuations.
Our paper is also related to the literature on household nancing frictions in
DSGE models. Most of the literature follows Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)[83] and
Iacoviello (2005)[72] in using a combination of di¤erences in household impatience
rates in combination with hard borrowing constraints using housing as collateral.
These models have found an important role of household borrowing constraints in
business cycle dynamics(see for example Iacoviello and Neri (2008)[74] and Monacelli
(2008)[95]). In contrast to our framework, these papers assume an always binding hard
borrowing constraints in their analysis of shocks. The soft borrowing constraint that
we use, where interest rates increase smoothly in the size of the loan, is more likely to
bind even for larger shocks than the hard borrowing constraint. In addition, it allows
us to realistically incorporate time varying leverage ratios for households. 5Recent
extensions of Iacoviellos model such as Gerali et al(2009)[60] and Andres and Arce
(2008)[9] include a non trivial role for banks, but they focus on imperfect competition
in banking or model bank capital dynamics using a reduced form convex bank capital
adjustment cost. Gerali et al (2009) [60] also nd that the quantitative role of bank
capital frictions is minor for non-nancial shocks. This paper attempts to take a
more micro-founded approach based on a well dened notion of nancial distress. One
advantage of this approach is that it allows for feedback in both directions between
4Aikman and Vlieghe(2004) [2]nd a small contribution of bank capital movements to output
uctuations, while Meh and Moran (2008)[92] nd a larger contriubtion.
5The only other framework allowing for equilibrium default of households in a DSGE model with
aggregate shocks is the model of Aoki et al(2004)[10]. They adapt the BGG framework to housing by
positing the existence of a special class of risk neutral home owners that rent housing to households.
The nancing frictions in their model apply to these risk neutral home owners (the equivalent of
entrepreneurs in BGG) as opposed to the risk averse households. In order to model an e¤ect of
housing wealth on household consumption they are forced to adopt an ad-hoc dividend payment
rule between home owners and households as well as assuming rule of thumb consumers that simply
consume all their wealth each period.
Finally there is an emerging heterogeneous agent litterature modeling housing collateralised loans
in general equilibrium(see for example Silos(2005)[110] and Iacoviello and Pavan(2008)[? ]) using
hard borrowing constraints. These models provide a much richer picture of the interaction of ag-
gregate shocks and credit constraints by allowing for a non-degenerate distribution of assets, but
theyre much harder to solve and it may be di¢ cult to extend them to allow for other modeling
features.
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external nance premia for borrowers and for banks. In contrast, the reduced form
approach of Gerali et al (2009) [60]does not take into account that a higher default
rate on the banks loans usually also raises the banks external nance premium.
3.2 The model
The model consists of the following agents. Patient households with a relatively
high discount factor lend to banks and own all non nancial rms in the economy. Im-
patient households with a lower discount factor borrow from banks to nance housing
and consumption subject to nancing frictions. Bankers take the deposits from pa-
tient households and lend to impatient households subject to nancing frictions with
respect to depositors. Finally, we close the model with a standard production sector
without nancing frictions. Perfectly competitive producers use labour and capital to
produce nal output, and are owned by the patient households. Housing producers
transform nal output into housing subject to housing investment adjustment costs,
and are also owned by the patient households.
3.2.1 Household Sector
There is a measure 1 of households, with s patient savers and bo = 1   s
impatient borrowers.
Patient Agents (savers)
Patient households have a relatively high discount factor, and they have access
to complete nancial markets without any nancing constraints. They provide depo-
sits to banks. These savers have access to a deposit insurer that can diversify any
repayment risk from an individual banks deposits at no cost to the savers. In ad-
dition they own all rms in the economy. The representative saver picks sequences
of consumption, working hours, housing and deposits at the bank fcst ; nst ; hst ; dtg to
maximise
E0
1
t=0
t [ln cst + h lnh
s
t + n ln(1  nst)]
subject to a sequence of constraints
cst + qt[h
s
t   (1  h)hst 1] + dt = Rtdt 1 + wtnst +ht +t:
where ht are prots from the housing producers and t are prots from the nal
output producers.
The rst order conditions for the saver are standard :
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dt :
1
cst
= Et
1
cst+1
Rt+1
hst : qt
1
cst
=
h
hst
+ Et
1
cst+1
qt+1(1  h)
nst :
n
1  nst
=
1
cst
wt:
Impatient Agent (borrowers)
Our model of the nancial frictions a¤ecting households is almost identical to
the model in Solomon (2009) [111], except that we now also introduce bank fun-
ding frictions. Impatient households have the same intra-period preferences over hou-
sing,consumption and leisure as patient households. They are risk averse, and have
a lower discount factor than lenders(patient households) : bo < : The higher dis-
count rate will imply that in equilibrium impatient households will be borrowers in a
neighbourhood of the steady state. In fact, absent any frictions their borrowing would
be unbounded in the steady state. Financing frictions make borrowing lt bounded.
Borrowers belong to one of a measure 1 continuum of population segments, each of
measure bo  1  s: Each segment is served by a continuum of banks. Each bank is
specialized and can only lend to one segment.
Borrowers incomes and housing stock values are subject to common segment
specic shocks "t that are i.i.d across segments and across time. 6 Clearly, nancial
intermediaries are not so specialized in the real world. However, the assumption used
here is a tractable starting point for capturing the fact that bank loan portfolios are
imperfectly diversied-an assumption that will be essential in motivating nancial
frictions on the funding side of banks and linking them to borrower-bank nancing
frictions7.We assume that "t has a CDF F ("t) with F 0("t) = f("t):As in BGG (1999)
[19], we assume that the derivative of "f(")
1 F (") is positive. This will be true over the range
that is relevant for the optimal " when " follows a lognormal distriubtion. Dening
the total borrower resources relevant to the nancial contract At as the sum of the
6The assumption that the shock is common to both the housing stock and and wage income
simplies the model substantially. See Jeske and Krueger(2005)[77] for evidence on regional shocks
to the value of housing and another model where the stock of housing of borrowers is subject to
shocks.
7To justify the use of banks in order to process loans to borrowers,we can assume that borrowers
are also subject to idiosyncratic borrower specic shocks !t, but these shocks can be diversied
across each segment, and banks have the ability to costlessly enforce a constant loan repayment
regardless of the realisation of !t. Since borrowers inside the segment can in fact diversify away the
di¤erences in !t they will be able to make a xed payment despite a low realisation of !t: The
reduction in loan monitoring costs obtained by the diversication of this borrower specic shock can
justify the use of banks instead of direct lending between savers and borrowers.
In contrast we assume that banks cannot force borrowers to make a constant repayment regardless
of the value of the segment specic "t:
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value of the borrowers house and his wage income; we have
At = "t[qt(1  h)hbot 1 + nbot wt] = "t At:
Lending in this economy is only possible through 1-period debt contracts that require
a constant repayment Rltlt 1 independent of "t. The borrower can default and refuse
to repay the debt: Savers cannot force borrowers to repay. Instead lending must be
intermediated by banks that have an enforcement technology allowing them to seize
collateral
"t[(1  sh)qt(1  h)hbot 1 + (1  sw)nbot wt] = "t ~At
at a cost "t ~At when the borrower defaults. 0 <  < 1 determines the deadweight
cost of default, 0 < sw  1 and 0 < sh  1 represent wage income and housing
exemptions respectively. Realistic exemptions for housing are discontinuous and can-
not be handled by standard perturbation methods, and it isnt clear yet how to set sh
to take them into account. Therefore, all the results that we report assume sh = 0:In
contrast we will vary sw to reect various wage garnishment rates. Conditional on en-
forcement, the law cannot prevent the bank from seizing all of "t ~At: Suppose rst that
the borrower does not have access to any insurance against the "t shock. Whenever
"t < "t the borrower prefers to default and lose
"t ~At < R
l
tlt 1 = "t ~At
when the bank enforces the contract: On the other hand when "t  "t the borrower
prefers to pay Rltlt rather than lose "t ~At  Rltlt: This implies that the net worth of
the borrower after any loan repayment or default is At  min["t; "t] ~At:
To be able to use a representative agent framework while maintaining the intui-
tion of the default rule above, we make two assumptions. First, borrowers labour
supply is predetermined with respect to the "t shock. Second, borrowers have access
to insurance contracts providing them with payments conditional on the realisation
of "bo;t;
fs[ At   At + (H("t) + min["t; "t]) ~At]; where
H("bo;t) =  [(1  F ("t))"t +
Z "t
0
"dF ] ~At]:
with 0  fs  1: The insurer o¤ers only complete insurance : fs = 1. The risk
averse borrowers buy this insurance, which completely diversies the risk related to
"t. The payments from the insurance scheme cannot be seized by the bank. As a
result, despite the insurance the bank cannot force the borrower to repay Rltlt 1 when
"t < "t: The borrower cannot commit to always repay the loan, even though from
an ex-ante perspective it is optimal to do so. Therefore, for a given Rlt the borrower
defaults when "t < "t and repays Rltlt 1 when "t  "t : With the insurance, the
borrower is guaranteed total resources of
At +H("t) ~At:
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Finally we assume a symmetric initial distribution of housing among borrowers.
This leads to a symmetric distribution of assets and income across borrowers, allo-
wing us to reduce the model to a representative borrower (henceforth also called the
borrower). Dene the rate of return required by the bank on loans made at t 1 as Rt:
Banks have access to an inter-bank insurance scheme that allows them to diversify
the segment specic shock "t among themselves. Therefore, each bank only requires
that the loan is protable in expectation. In order to participate in the loan, the bank
requires that
[1  F ("t)]Rltlt 1+(1 )
Z "t
0
~At"dF = [1  F ("t)] "t ~At+(1 )
Z "t
0
~At"dF  Rtlt 1:8
Competition among banks will make this constraint bind. The banks break-even
constraint will act as the borrowing constraint in this model. Dening
G("t) = [1  F ("t)]"t + (1  )
Z "t
0
"dF;
we can rewrite the bank participation constraint as
G("t) ~At = Rtlt 1:
The representative borrower picks sequences of consumption,housing, loans, de-
posits, labour supply and default threshold functions

cbot ; h
bo
t ; lt; dbo;t; n
bo
t ; "t
	1
t=0
to
maximise
E0
1
t=0
bot

ln cbot + h lnh
bo
t + n ln(1  nbot )

subject to a sequence of budget constraints
cbot + qth
bo
t + d
bo
t = qt(1  h)hbot 1 + nbot wt
+H("t)[(1  sh)qt(1  h)hbot 1 + (1  sw)nbot wt] + lt +Rtdbo;t 1
and the participation constraints of the bank
G("t)[(1  sh)qt(1  h)hbot 1 + (1  sw)nbot wt] = Rtlt 1
At an optimum G0("t) > 0. As a result, one can solve for a function "t(
Rtlt 1
At
)
with "0t(
Rtlt 1
At
) > 0: Therefore, the default rate is increasing in the beginning of period
household leverage ratio. In a neighbourhood of the steady state, impatient households
8With aggregate shocks, the borrower would prefer to get some insurance by having a lower Rt
in a recession, in exchange for accepting a higher Rt in a boom. Computing the optimal risk sharing
between risk averse depositors, bankers and borrowers is a di¢ cult task. We follow the standard
assumption in the litterature by ignoring these optimal risk sharing considerations and assuming
that Rt is only a function of the risk free rate and the additional marginal cost of loans due to
frictions between bankers and depositors.
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will set dbot = 0 and lt > 0: We can use the relation between the Lagrange multiplier
on the bank participation constraint  bo;t and the marginal utility of consumption
bo;t to derive the following rst order conditions for borrowers :
1
cbot
= boEt
1
cbot+1
efp("t+1) Rt+1 ,
1
cbot
qt =
h
hbot
+ boEt
1
cbot+1
[1 + (1  sh)[H("t+1) +G("t+1)efp("t+1)]] qt+1(1  h) and
n
1  nbot
= [1 + (1  sw)[H("t) + efp("t)tG("t)]] wt
cbot
:
"t :  t =
1
cbot

 H
0("t)
G0("t)

=
1
cbot
efp("t)
efpt =  H0("t)G0("t) > 1 can be interpreted as the the external nance premium faced by
borrowers on loans. The monotone hazard rate d
d"
( "f(")
1 F (")) > 0means that efp
0("t) > 0,
which makes it countercyclical as long as the default threshold "t is countercyclical.
The response of the default threshold to a shock is governed by "0t(
Rtlt 1
At
) > 0. On
impact, with lt 1 and hbot 1 predetermined, any positive shock which increases the va-
lue of borrower collateral will reduce the default rate and lower the external nance
premium. The e¤ect of the positive shock in the next periods depends on how borro-
wers adjust loan demand and housing in response to the shock. In a neighbourhood
of the steady state the existence of a soft borrowing constraint makes the impatient
household behave more like the consumption smoothing patient household with a
bias towards debt nanced consumption instead of saving. For a xed level of nan-
cial frictions and desired housing, a consumption smoothing borrower reacts to an
increase in wealth by increasing savings. Since nancial asset savings are negative, he
reduces borrowing and increases his housing stock (the collateral asset). At the same
time an increase in the value of collateral encourages higher borrowing. For plausible
calibrations the rst e¤ect dominates, and the loan to assets ratio
Rtlt 1
At
=
Rtlt 1
qtht 1+nbot wt
is countercyclical. This makes the external nance premium countercyclical beyond
the initial impact of a shock 9.
The Euler equation for housing shows how nancial frictions distort the usual
housing investment equation. On one hand for a given expected house price appre-
ciation an increase in the default rate (and hence in the external nance premium)
increases the marginal value of housing as collateral : d
d"
( "f(")
1 F (")) > 0 implies that
H("t+1) + efpt+1G("t+1) is increasing in "t+1: On the other hand, there is an indirect
e¤ect of nancing frictions on housing investment through the e¤ect of these frictions
9With uncertainty, one also has to take into account precautionnary saving which generates
movements in saving in the opposite direction to those motivated by consumption smoothing. But
for the typical level of aggregate ucutations, the consumption smoothing motive should dominate(in
fact the linear approximation of the model omits any precautionnary savings e¤ect).
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on non durable consumption. From the Euler equation for loans, a reduction in the
external nance premium increases c
bo
t
cbot+1
which lowers the e¤ective discount rate ap-
plied to housing investment. In the special case of perfect foresight about aggregate
shocks, we can combine the loan and housing Euler equations to conclude (holding
house prices and the risk-free interest rate constant) that @(hbo;t=cbo;t)
@"bo;t+1
< 0 (see Solomon
(2009) [111] for the proof) : This result should also hold for small levels of uncertainty,
as well as in a certainty-equivalent linear approximation. Finally, in a neighbourhood
of the steady state,
1 + (1  sh)[H("t) + efptG("t)]
is greater than 1, meaning that the marginal value of investing in housing is more
sensitive to the future expected value of housing than in the model without nancing
frictions. The labour supply equation shows how the nancial friction distorts the
borrowers labour supply decision. For a given default rate, the nancing friction
a¤ects labour supply indirectly by changing the sensitivity of labour supply to wt
cbot
and
by a¤ecting cbot : The level of nancing frictions has a direct impact on labour supply
through its e¤ect onH("t)+efptG("t) for a given wtcbot
: The same analysis as for housing
applies here as well : the direct impact of higher nancing frictions is to increase the
work e¤ort of borrowers, essentially in order to maintain their living standards with
higher nancing costs. A reduction in nancing frictions will therefore lower borrowers
labour supply, holding everything else constant. This e¤ect disappears when labour
income is fully exempt. In that case, labour supply is determined by the same equation
as patient householdslabour supply. The other e¤ects are again similar to the ones
for housing. Financial frictions increase the sensitivity of borrower labour supply to
the wage rate and non durable consumption(as long as wages are not fully exempt),
and the stronger reaction of cbot to shocks results in a larger income e¤ect on labour
supply.
3.2.2 Banks
We introduce bankers separately from households, since one cannot really have -
nancing frictions between identical depositors and banks if those very same depositors
own the banks. We restrict nancial arrangements between banks and depositors to
1 period contracts. Our model of the nancing friction between banks and depositors
is similar to Townsends (1979)[114] and Krasa and Villamils (1992)[86] costly state
verication framework. Without loss of generality, assume that there is a measure
1 of ex-ante identical banks at the beginning of period t. Bankers pick loan supply,
deposit demand and consumption to maximise their lifetime expected utility. They
take the expected rate of return on loans and the risk free rate earned on deposits as
given and maximise expected life time utility by picking consumption(the dividend),
loan supply and deposit demand in each period. We assume that deposits take the
form of 1 period debt contracts that guarantee depositors a repayment of Rt
sdt:
In order be able to enforce loan contracts against borrowers, a bank must specialize
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in a specic segment of borrower, exposing it to a common shock to borrowers "t:
Therefore, it cannot guarantee depositors a constant deposit repayment. The segment
specic shock "t is the private information of banks serving the segment. Without
any monitoring mechanism banks would have an incentive ex-post to claim that their
revenues were too low and that they cannot repay deposits. Depositors can diversify
the deposit repayment risk across many banks. They have access to a monitoring
technology that allows them to verify a banks assets Abt at a cost bA
b
t and seize
Abt . While endowing depositors with such a monitoring ability sounds implausible,
it is equivalent to a more realistic but complicated model in which the risky banks
in our model are nanced by a large number of safe banks nanced by depositors.
The safe banks lend to the risky banks that have the capability to monitor household
loans, and monitor the risky banks when they are nancially distressed. We make
similar assumptions regarding banks ability to diversify the risk of default as for
borrowers. Banks belong to an inter-bank insurance arrangement that can diversify
the shocks to their prots and guarantee each bank the same ex-post prot at no
cost. Banks can hide any gains from this insurance arrangement from the depositors.
Dene st  min["t; "t] . The banks revenue is bost ~At: In non audited states incentive
compatibility requires the bank to make a xed repayment to depositors
Rdt 
sdt 1  s^tbo ~At 1:
Our assumption of an inter-bank insurance arrangement whose benets cannot be
committed to repay depositors implies that, as in the standard costly state verication
framework of Townsend (1979)[114], it is optimal to minimize the expected monitoring
costs. To achieve this, the contract establishes a default threshold s^t; such that the
bank makes the xed deposit repayment if st > s^t and repays stbo ~At otherwise: In
order for banks to make money on the loans and be willing to serve as intermediaries,
s^t must be lower than "t. As a result the contract can also be seen as specifying a
threshold "^t such that the bank defaults whenever "t < "^t < "t:
With the insurance scheme, and using G("t) ~At = Rtlt 1 each bank gets prots
from loans(net of deposit repayments) of
bo[G("t) +H("^t)] ~At = 
bo

1 +
H("^t)
G("t)

Rtlt 1  boHb("^t; "t) Rtlt 1
Finally, depositors expect to break even on deposits :
bo
G("^t)
G("t)
Rtlt 1  boGb("^t; "t) Rtlt 1  sRtdt 1
,which is binding at an optimum. Dening the banks capital as bolt   sdt this
constraint is the models version of a market determined bank capital adequacy re-
quirement.
The representative banker picks sequences of consumption cbt ; loans lt , deposits
dt and "^t to maximise
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E0
1
t=0
bt ln cbt
subject to a sequence of constraints
cbt + 
bolt  boHb("^t; "t) Rtlt 1 + sdt and
boGb("^t; "t) Rtlt 1  sRtdt 1
The rst order conditions of the representative banker are :
dt :
1
cbt
= bRt+1Eefp
b
t+1
lt :
1
cbt
= b Rt+1Et

1
cbt+1
Hb("^t+1; "t+1) +  
b
t+1G
b("^t+1; "t+1)

"^t :  
b
t =
1
cbt

 H
0("^t)
G0("^t)

=
1
cbt
efpbt :
where  bt is the multiplier on the depositor break-even constraint. The external
nance premium on deposits efpbt =
 H0("^t)
G0("^t) is increasing in "^t from the monotone ha-
zard property: Rt+1 Rt+1 represents the spread between the expected rate of return
on the loan and on the deposits due to the bank nancing frictions. Absent the enfor-
cement problems between the bank and depositors we would have Rt+1 = Rt+1: By
linearizing the rst Euler equations for bank deposit demand and loan supply around
the steady state, and equating the resulting expressions for the bankers expected
consumption growth we obtain the following expression in percentage deviations from
the steady state :
Rt+1   R
R
  Rt+1  R
R
' Rbefp0b("^)"^[1 
sd
bolbo
]Et
"^t+1   "^
"^
+ Rb
G0("^)
G("^)2

H("^) +
G("^)
bR

Et
"t+1   "
"
:
The rst coe¢ cient is positive because the steady state deposits to loans ratio sd
bolbo
is less than 1. Therefore, Rt+1  Rt+1 is increasing in Et"^t+1 to a rst order approxi-
mation. The second coe¢ cient cannot be signed conclusively, but for all attempted
calibrations H("^) + G("^)
bR
> 0, making Rt+1   Rt+1 increasing in Et"t+1: This shows
the potential for feedback between the default rates of banks and borrowers. Higher
expected bank default rates raise Rt+1   Rt+1 which for any given expectations on
future borrower collateral values and any given loan raise expected borrower default
rates, which in turn raise Rt+1 Rt+1: However, this does not imply that Rt+1 Rt+1
is countercyclical in general equilibrium. First, borrowers will respond to a higher
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Rt+1 by reducing their lending and increasing their work e¤ort which alleviates the
need for "t+1 to rise. Second, consumption smoothing by borrowers and lenders will
tend to raise dt
lt
in a boom. This increases the nancing frictions between banks and
depositors and raises Et"^t+1: As a result Rt+1 Rt+1 may be procyclical even if Et"t+1
is countercyclical.
3.2.3 Production
Housing is produced by a representative rm owned by the savers. The rm
purchases Iht units of the consumption good from savers and turns it into I
h
t =
ht (1 )ht 1 units of housing while paying an adjustment cost of h2 ( I
h
t
ht 1
 ))2ht 1.
Note that the rm takes the aggregate housing stock ht 1 as given when choosing Iht :
With these assumptions, the housing producers problem reduces to picking Iht each
period to maximise prots
sht = (qt   1)Iht  
h
2
(
Iht
ht 1
  h))2ht 1:
The rst order condition for housing supply is :
qt = 1  hh + h I
h
t
ht 1
= 1  h + h
ht
ht 1
:
In the steady state q = 1 and the housing producer makes no prots:
Final output is produced by perfectly competitive nancially unconstrained
rms using capital and labour. The rms are owned by savers. The representative
rm produces
yt = ztk

t n
1 
t ,
where zt is an aggregate productivity shock, equal to 1 in the steady state.
ln zt =  ln zt 1 + ezt ; e
z
t v N(0; z):
Firms pick sequences of capital and labour fkt+1; ntg to maximise their present
value
E0
1
t=0
t 1
cst
[ztk

t n
1 
t   wtnt   (kt+1   (1  )kt)]:
The rst order conditions for this problem are :
1 = Et
cst
cst+1

1 + 
yt+1
kt+1
  

(1  ) yt
nt
= wt:
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Given the importance of the labour market for the models dynamics, we also solve
a version of the model with capital adjustment costs of the same form as the housing
adjustment costs in order to examine the e¤ect of a less elastic labour demand curve.
We assume that savers own the capital producing rm. Prot maximisation by
capital producers yields the supply curve
qkt = 1   + 
It
kt
:
Finally we also examine extensions allowing for variable capital utilisation rates
and labour adjustment costs. Our main interest in adding these features is to see how
modications in the factors shifting labour demand a¤ect the impact of nancing
frictions on the transmission of shocks. Variable capital utilisation ut modies the
production function zt(utkt)n1 t : As in Burnside and Eichenbaum(1996)[25] increa-
sing capacity utilisation raises the depreciation of capital and modies the capital
accumulation equation to kt+1 = It+ (1  0ut )kt:We model labour adjustment costs
as a quadratic function n(
nt nt 1
nt 1
)2nt 1 as in Cooper and Willis(2006)[44].
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Calibration
We solve the model at a quarterly frequency. Since our main focus is on the models
dynamics in response to stationary shocks we abstract from long run growth and set
z = 1 in the steady state: Table 1 provides a summary of our calibration. We use
standard values from the real business cycle literature for most parameters that are
not related to the nancing frictions. These include ; , h, and : We set n and
h to match a steady state work share of around
1
3
and an annualized housing stock
to output ratio of around 1.35, in line with the estimates for the US in Iacoviello and
Neri (2008)[74].
 is set to 0:25= as in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)[19]. There is much
less evidence on the adjustment cost parameter for housing supply. We set h = 1
based on the estimates in Topel and Rosen (1988)[113] on the short run elasticity of
housing prices in the US. For the model with variable capital utilisation rates, the
curvature of the cost of varying utilisation rates  can be found from the steady state
rst order condition for ut after setting u = 1 and  = 0:02 in the steady state. For
the model with labour adjustment costs we use n = 2 based on estimates in Cooper
and Willis (2006)[44].
We set the share of patient agents s = 0:65 in line with the estimates in Iacoviello
(2005)[72]. The impatient householdsdiscount factor of 0.97 is in the middle of the
range of estimates for poorer households who are more likely to be heavily in debt
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as reported in Iacoviello (2005)[72] and Cagetti (2003)[26]. There is little evidence
on the cost of loan enforcement parameter  for household loans. We use  = 0:25
as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997)[31], which is in the upper range of estimates used
in rm level nancial accelerator models, since we suspect that the losses in home
foreclosures are higher than the costs for business default 10. Since we have not found
any direct evidence on b we assume as a benchmark that b =  and do sensitivity
analysis with respect to b=: Given  and 
bo we calibrate  to try to match a
steady state annual household bankruptcy rate in the US of around 1% as reported
in Athreya (2001)[13].  = 0:12 produces a steady state annual default rate of 1:27%:
Again, the results reported below are not very sensitive to moderate changes in 11:
We set b to match a nancial sector loans to bank capital ratio (the models
leverage ratio) of around 6 as reported in Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap and Stein
(2008)[65]. This is lower than the leverage ratio of around 7:15 used in Meh and
Moran (2008)[92] or the ratio of 10 used in Aikman and Paustian (2006)[3]. We
end up using a lower leverage ratio because we net out the assets and liabilities owed
among di¤erent nancial intermediaries. This is consistent with the models denition
of leverage which only includes the assets and liabilities of the banking sector with
respect to the non-nancial sector. Finally, we examine two scenarios for the wage
garnishment rate. The benchmark scenario treats wages like housing and sets sw = 0:
The second scenario examines the other extreme and sets sw = 1:
3.3.2 Impulse Response Function Analysis
We linearize the models equations around the deterministic steady state and
solve the approximate model using a standard linear rational expectations algorithm
(Klein 2000)[84]. We compare impulse response functions for 3 models : a standard
Real Business Cycle model (henceforth RBC model) with housing but without any
nancing frictions, a model with borrower-lender frictions but without any banking
related nancing frictions, and nally the full model with a role for bank capital.
We rst consider the e¤ect of a 1% increase in total factor productivity (henceforth
TFP) relative to the steady state (gures 1-3). The responses of the RBC model
without nancing frictions to a temporary but persistent increase in total factor
productivity are by now well documented. The only twist to the standard story is the
addition of housing to the model. Without housing adjustment costs households at
rst reduce investment in housing in order to allow the rms they own to invest more
in capital and to increase more valuable non durable consumption. Afterwards, as
TFP converges back to the steady state value and the returns to investing in capital
10We have only recently become aware of a paper by Krueger and Jeske(2005) which reports
a deadweight loss in foreclosure estimate of 0:22, based on comparing resale values of foreclosed
properties with an estimate of their market value without foreclosure. Based on sensitivity analysis,
we suspect that using  = 0:22 wouldnt have a signicant impact on the results.
11We also report some results for bo = 0:98; in which case we recalibrate  = 0:2:
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decline households start increasing investment in housing relative to the steady state.
With adjustment costs, it no longer makes sense to rst reduce investment housing and
increase it later. Instead households increase their investment in housing gradually
with a peak around 15 quarters after the shock.
Adding nancing frictions for households dampens the response of output to the
shock in the short run. On impact the rise in output is smaller by 0:11% with house-
hold nancing frictions. However, the increase in output is slightly more persistent in
the model with borrowing constraints. In fact if we simulate the response to the shock
for a longer horizon, the increase in output relative to the steady state is larger in the
model with credit constraints than in the standard RBC model after 57 quarters, but
by then the original TFP shock has almost completely died out and the di¤erence is
very small. The credit constraints create a di¤erence in the composition of the res-
ponse to the shock. Consumption relative to the steady state increases signicantly
more than in the RBC model initially, but is lower than in the RBC model after 11
quarters. In contrast both investment in housing and capital increase by less than in
the RBC model. Together with the smaller rise in labour supply this explains why
output does not respond as much as in the model without nancing frictions.
To understand these di¤erences in more detail, we now examine the dynamics of
borrowers and savers separately. For borrowers, the increase in wages makes external
nancing for a given level of borrowing less expensive. Since borrowers are credit
constrained , their steady state consumption and housing stock is signicantly below
that of savers. As a result, they take advantage of the reduction in borrowing costs
to sharply increase their non durable consumption and their stock of housing. The
increase in aggregate housing demand raises house prices which further relaxes the
borrowing constraint of borrowers for a given wage. Note that borrowing costs decline
because loan demand increases by less than the value of borrower collateral. This
is a reection of the borrowers desire to smooth his nondurable consumption. As
productivity converges back towards its steady state level, wages and house prices
decline . This increases the cost of nancing for a given level of borrowing. As a
result, the rise in non durable consumption and housing investment by borrowers is
strongest on impact and declines slowly over time. Meanwhile, given the role of wage
income as collateral, the relaxation of the borrowing constraint reduces the value of
working for borrowers. In combination with the strong wealth e¤ect generated by the
rise in consumption, this encourages borrowers to reduce labour supply. The decline in
borrower labour supply is strong enough to actually reduce aggregate labour supply.
This lower labour supply also reduces the marginal value of capital and investment.
For savers, the key di¤erence in comparison to the RBCmodel is the extra demand
for loans from borrowers in a boom. Initially, interest rates are actually higher in the
RBC model, due to the lower demand for capital, but eventually the e¤ect of higher
borrower loan demand dominates and the risk free rate in the borrowing constrained
economy rises relative to the RBC economy risk free rate. Patient households increase
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their savings at the expense of lower housing investment and consumption, both
because of the standard intertemporal substitution e¤ect but also because higher
future interest rates reduce the present value of their future income stream. The
lower increase in saver consumption also raises the marginal value of saverslabour
supply, and as a result they work more than in the RBC economy. However, this is not
enough to prevent aggregate labour supply from being less procyclical relative to the
RBC economy. The analysis so far highlights two di¢ culties in amplifying exogenous
shocks using household level credit frictions. First, to the degree that borrowing ability
is positively linked to labour income (either because it serves as collateral or more
generally because there are limits on borrowing related to income) and to the degree
that borrowersconsumption is more responsive to shocks than that of savers, there
may be strong income e¤ects on borrower labour supply that dampen the change
in labour supply in response to shocks. Second, the greater increase in consumption
and housing investment by borrowers must be nanced in general equilibrium by
more modest increases (or even declines)in the consumption, housing and capital
investment of savers if production does not increase su¢ ciently. Overall, the e¤ects
of adding nancing frictions on dynamics is modest if one only looks at aggregate
consumption or output or investment. The nancing frictions do have a large impact
on the distribution of consumption and housing investment, with consumption and
housing investment being signicantly more procyclical for borrowers than for savers
.
The addition of bank-depositor frictions has virtually no impact on aggregate
output, investment, consumption and labour supply. The only perceptible e¤ect is on
bank and lending related variables. Note that if there were no spread between the
expected rate of return for bank and for depositors ( Rt+1 = Rt+1), then the model
reduces to the standard case of direct intermediation between savers and borrowers.
The movement in spreads in response to tfp shocks is minimal with a maximum
change of 6
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: Of course even if there were no deviation of the spread from the
steady state value the existence of a spread in the steady state also a¤ects dynamics.
However this e¤ect seems to be quite small. The inability to generate large variations
in this spread explains why banking frictions have a small impact on real variables.
With the addition of banks, we see a modest increase in the deposits to loans ratio
accompanied by a rise in bank prots, in line with the empirical evidence of procyclical
nancial intermediary leverage(see Adrian and Shin (2008) [1], Meh and Moran (2007)
[91]). On one hand, consumption smoothing by bankers and increasing bank prots
would tend to decrease the deposits to loans ratio as bankers attempt to increase
savings. At the same time consumption smoothing by savers tends to raise deposits,
and consumption smoothing by borrowers means that despite the relaxation of the
borrowing constraint borrowers dont increase their demand for loans by as much as
savers increase their supply of deposits. The second e¤ect dominates in equilibrium,
and the banks leverage increases. The banksincreasing reliance on external funding
through deposits raises their external nance premium and the spread between Rt+1
and Rt+1 by a small amount: As a result, the strength of the bank nancing frictions in
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the model is procyclical. One could argue that perhaps the result that bank depositor
frictions dont matter for the main aggregate macroeconomic quantities is due to our
assumption that the enforcement cost parameter of the bank b =  of the borrower.
But this result is robust to making b >  ( e.g.  = 3) or b <  (e.g. b = =3
)12. Finally one may argue that the weak e¤ects of bank-depositor frictions is due
to our calibration of the banks discount factor which produces a very low steady
state external nance premium for banks. To test this, we reset the bankersdiscount
factor to b = 0:985; generating a bank leverage ratio of 37 at the steady state.
Even with this unrealistically high steady state di¤erence between risk free rates and
bank lending rates, the impulse responses for the model with bank-depositor frictions
were practically indistinguishable from those of the model with only borrower-lender
nancing frictions. For high bank leverage ratios, we can obtain a countercyclical
spread Rt+1   Rt+1, while preserving the procyclical bank leverage ratio and prots.
This occurs because the positive link between "t+1 and Rt+1   Rt+1 now dominates
the e¤ect of higher bank leverage on the spread (recall our linear approximation for
this spread). However, movements in this spread in response to shocks are still quite
small (on the order of 10 5).
In an attempt to reverse the declining labour supply of the borrowers, we examine
a version of the model in which labour income is fully exempt from seizure by the
bank (gures 4-6). In this version of the model, labour income is no longer part
of the loanss collateral. Therefore, a reduction in the costs of borrowing no longer
directly encourages workers to reduce their labour supply. Borrowerslabour supply
now increases for the rst 3 periods . It then declines relative to the steady state
due to the strong income e¤ect generated by the boom in borrower consumption,
but by less than in the case without an exemption. The response of output is a
bit stronger than in the case without exemptions, but the IRFs are otherwise very
similar. Once again, the impact of adding bank-depositor frictions is minimal. Another
factor that a¤ects the labour supply of borrowers is the degree of borrower impatience.
Lower impatience reduce the optimal amount of borrowing and lowers the steady state
external nance premium of borrowers. As a result the increase in borrowerswork
e¤ort due to nancing frictions is smaller. We raised bo to 0:98 and recalibrated  to
match an annual default rate of around 1%: Now borrower labour supply increases in
response to a positive tfp shock, but the increase is still much smaller than for savers.
Finally, we experimented with version of the model incorporating other features such
as variable capacity utilisation rates, capital adjustment costs and labour adjustment
costs. These extensions did not change the main conclusions on the e¤ect of borrower
and bank nancing frictions.
Next we analyse the e¤ect of a demand shock in the model (gures 7-10). We
use shocks to agentsdiscount factors to examine the model economys response to
12We also did sensitivity analysis to changes in the cost of auditing ; the idiosyncratic volatility
, the adjustment cost parameters for housing and capital h and  . In all these cases bank funding
frictions had a similarly small e¤ect on non-bank related variables.
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demand shocks. The discount factor is now bt: Justiniano et al. (2006)[102] have
shown the importance of allowing for such shocks to the models Euler equations.
If taken literally as random changes in the level of impatience, it is hard to inter-
pret these shocks as structural which may cast some doubt on analysing them as
exogenous. A possibly more structural interpretation is suggested by Browning and
Tobacman (2007)[24] who show that changes in the impatience level are isomorphic
to changes in agentsexpectation about future paths of income : in particular one
cannot use observations on consumption or saving to disentangle higher impatience
from more optimistic expectations on future income. Under this interpretation the
demand shocks in the model can be seen as temporary deviations from rational ex-
pectations due for example to overoptimistic forecasts of future productivity levels or
future asset prices. As such, they can provide insight into the impact of the nancial
frictions in the model on the response to news shocks as in Jaimovich and Rebelo
(2008)[75] or to asset price bubbles as in Bernanke and Gertler(2000)[18]. Similar to
the productivity shock, the discount factor shock bt equals 1 in the steady state and
its percentage deviation from the steady state follows b^t = bb^t 1+"
b
t ; where "t is i.i.d
and 0 < b < 1: Following the estimation results of Justiniano and Primicieri we set
b = 0:83: We assume that the preference shock is the same for bankers, borrowers
and savers.
Like the typical RBC model our model cannot generate demand driven booms.
In the version without nancing frictions, an increase in bt encourages agents to
increase non durable consumption. However due to the wealth e¤ect on labour supply,
households reduce labour supply. Labour demand does not move on impact since
productivity has not changed and capital is predetermined. As a result output falls,
and non durable consumption crowds out investment in housing and capital. Despite
the fact that the preference shock also increases the relative utility of current housing,
households prefer to increase non durable consumption at the expense of lower housing
investment due to the lower utility weight of the housing stock. The reduction in
investment sustains the decline in output despite the decline in bt over time. Adding
nancial frictions on the household side reduces the decline in output signicantly.
The fall in housing investment relative to the steady state leads to a decline in house
prices. This increases the external nance premium faced by borrowers despite the
increase in wages. Holding the wealth e¤ect from increasing non durable consumption
constant, the increase in the cost of borrowing pushes impatient households to increase
labour supply in the model without any labour income exemption. In addition, due to
the increase in nancing costs the increase in borrower consumption is smaller than
that of the saver. This reduces the negative wealth e¤ect on borrower labour supply,
relative to saverslabour supply. Overall labour supply declines by less and therefore
the decline in output is lower than in the RBC model without nancing frictions.
The e¤ect of nancial frictions between banks and depositors is, as for TFP shocks,
virtually non existent for non-banking related macroeconomic aggregates. The banks
deposits to loans ratio declines, mostly because savers reduce deposits to increase
104
their consumption by more than the fall in borrowers loan demand. The higher ex-
ternal nance premium leads to a reduction in loans, but by less than the decline
in deposits, due to the countervailing e¤ect of borrowersdesire to consume more.
The external nance premium on deposits rises on impact since the banksleverage
ratio is predetermined and the borrowers external nance premium has increased. In
subsequent periods the external nance premium on deposits falls due to the fall in
bank leverage. This leads to a fall in Rt+1  Rt+1 and in banksprots.
Comparison of model second moments to the data
This section examines the e¤ect of nancing frictions on various statistics of key
economic aggregates (table 2). We compare the model with both household and bank
funding frictions, the model with only household funding frictions and the Real Bu-
siness Cycle model without any nancing constraints to US data from 1955 to 2004
(see the data appendix for details). Since preference shocks do not generate realistic
business cycles, we examine the benchmark calibration for models driven only by the
productivity shock. For the volatility of the TFP innovation, we use the estimates
in Cooley (1995) [43], setting z = 0:007: As expected from the analysis of Impulse
Response Functions, the time series moments for the model with bank nancing
constraints are virtually identical. Household credit constraints increase the volatility
of consumption by around 17%; reduce the volatility of investment by around 12%
and reduce the volatility of output by around 6%. At the same time, the correlations
between various aggregates and output are very similar to those in the model without
any credit constraints. While the models match the volatility of output, investment
and wages reasonably well, they underestimate the volatility of consumption, housing
investment and hours by a wide margin. Again, these mismatches are shared by the
model with nancing frictions and the frictionless model.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper has developed a model of the interaction between household credit
frictions and bank capital based on imperfect diversication of bank loan portfolios
and costly nancial distress. The analysis so far has not found an important role
for the bank capital channel for the transmission of non-nancial shocks. Instead
of amplifying the e¤ect of the more standard household nancing frictions, bank
nancing frictions in the model dampen their e¤ect on business cycles, due the e¤ects
of consumption smoothing by borrowers and savers on bank leverage. In the current
version of the model credit frictions only have a modest impact on aggregate output
uctuations though they have signicant distributional consequences both in terms
of the ratio of consumption to investment and in terms of the di¤erent responses of
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borrowers and lenders to shocks. In response to supply shocks, the credit frictions
in the model dampen output uctuations while increasing their persistence. This is
due in large part to the income e¤ect generated by changes in the costs of external
nancing on labour supply.
There are several issues that we have ignored in the current model and that could
give bank nancing frictions a more important role. We have abstracted from issues
related to maturity mismatch and lending among nancial intermediaries. At the
same time while allowing for costs related to defaults in bank loan portfolios we have
omitted any asymmetric information related to the quality of the loans before default.
For example we have assumed perfect information about the volatility of the bank
specic shocks . It is possible that asymmetric information about the uncertainty
of loan outcomes could generate a more important role for bank nancing frictions
frictions. In theory incorporating this feature should not be di¢ cult, at least if we
start with the simple case in which  can take two values. In the current model we
have followed BGG (1999)[19] in assuming that loan rates could be made contingent
on the aggregate state of the economy. A more realistic assumption is that loan rates
are predetermined with respect to the aggregate state of the economy, and that they
can only be partially renegotiated. Finally, we have assumed that rms are una¤ected
by nancing frictions. Adding rm nancing frictions to in a model where banks lend
to both rms and households would allow us to analyse the possibility of contagion
between the cost of bank nancing for the household and rm sectors. We leave these
extensions for future research.
Appendix :
Linearized equations :
n.b : all variables below are in either %deviations of in deviations from SS, whether
theyre hatted or not
Savers :
Budget Constraint-
csc^st + h
sq^t+h
sh^st +dd^t = (1  h)hsh^st 1+Rd(R^t+ d^t 1)+wns(n^t+ w^t)+ht +t
deposits Euler equation-
c^st = Etc^
s
t+1   R^t+1
Housing Euler equation-
(c^st   q^t) = 
hcs
hs
h^st + (1  h)Et(c^st+1   qt+1)
Labour supply-
ns
1 ns n^
s
t = w^t   c^st :
Borrowers :
Budget constraint-
cboc^bot +h
bo [1  (1  h)(1 + (1  sh)H("))] q^t+hbohbot = H 0(")" ~Abo"t+(1 h)hbo[1+
(1  sh)H(")]h^bot 1
+[1 +H(")(1  sw)]nbow
 
w^t + n^
bo
t

+ ll^t:
Bank break-even constraint-
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G0(")" ~Abo"t +G(")(1  h)(1  sh)hbo(q^t + hbot 1) +G(")(1  sw)wnbo(w^t + n^bot ) =
Rl( Rt + l^t 1):
Loan Euler equation-
c^bot =  Et ^t+1   Rt+1
Housing Euler equation-
1
cbo
(c^bot   q^t) =
h
hbo
h^bot +
bo(1 h)1+(1 sh)H(")cbo Etc^bot+1 bo(1 h)
h
1+(1 sh)H(")
cbo
+  G(")(1  sh)
i
Etq^t+1 
bo(1  sh)(1  h) G(")Et ^t+1
Labour supply-
n
(1 nbo)2n
bon^bot =

 G(")(1  sw) + 1+(1 sw)H(")cbo

ww^t 1+(1 sw)H(")cbo wc^bot + G(")(1 
sw)w ^t
Optimal default threshold
  ^t =
H0(")
G0(")cbo c^
bo
t +

H0(")G00(") H00(")G0(")
G0(")2

"
cbo
"t
Note that using this expression for  ^t and the steady state condition  c
bo =
 H0(")
G0(") ; we can get a borrowers counterpart to the savers linearized Euler equation of
the form : c^bot = Etc^
bo
t+1 A"Et"t+1  Rt+1; where A" =

H0(")G00(") H00(")G0(")
G0(")2

"
 cbo
> 0
. This highlights the key modication of the borrowers linearized Euler equation
relative to the standard one : in addition to Rt+1; the borrower faces a linearized
external nance premium A"Et"t+1 which depends on changes in the expected future
default rate.
Banks :
Banks balance sheet/budget constraint :
cbc^bt + 
boll^t = 
boHb("^) Rl
 
Rt + lt 1

+ bo RlH
0("^)
G(")
"^"^t   bo Rl H("^)G(")2G0(")""t + sddt
Depositor break-even constraint :
boGb("^) Rl
 
lt 1 + Rt

+ bo G
0("^)
G(")
Rl"^"^t   bo G("^)G(")2 RlG0(")""t = sRd (dt 1 +Rt)
Deposit Euler equation :
cbt =  Et bt+1  Rt+1
Loan Euler equation :
1
cb
cbt = 
b RH
b("^)
cb
Etc
b
t+1  1cb Rt+1 b R bGb("^)Et bt+1+b R G
0(")
G(")2

H("^)
cb
+  bG("^)

"Et"t+1:
"^t foc :
 bt =  cbt + 1cb b dd"^

 H0("^)
G0("^)

"^"^t
Housing supply :
q^t = 
h(h^t   h^t 1)
ht t
hh
s
q^t
hh^t = 
shsh^st + 
bohboh^bot
nal output prot :
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t = 
st = (y   wn)yt   k [kt+1   (1  )kt]
Labour demand :
yt   nt = wt:
Labour adjustment costs modify this to
(1  ) y
n
y^t   [(1  ) yn + n(1 + )]n^t + nn^t 1 + nEtn^t+1 = ww^t
capital :
cst = Etc
s
t+1    yk (Etyt+1   kt+1)
With capital adjustment costs we have
cst = q^
k
t + Etc
s
t+1    yk (Etyt+1   kt+1)  (1  )Etq^kt+1 ,
q^kt = (k^t+1   k^t);
^kt = kq^
k
t :
With variable capacity utilisation rates we have
y^t   k^t = qkt + u^t;
cst = q^
k
t + Etc
s
t+1    yk (Etyt+1   kt+1)  (1  )Etq^kt+1 + Etu^t+1:
production function
yt = zt + kt + (1  )nt
or
yt = zt + (kt + u^t) + (1  )nt with variable capacity utilisation.
TFP shock process : z^t = z^t 1 + ezt
3.5 Data Appendix
We use US aggregate data from the rst quarter of 1955 to the 4th quarter of
2004. All time series are from the Federal Reserve Economic Data at http ://re-
search.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ :
1) Yt : Real GDP in chained 2005 dollars divided by civilian population over the
age of 16.
2) Ct : Real Personal Consumption Expenditures in chained 2005 dollars divided
by civilian population over the age of 16.
3) Iht : Real Private Residential Fixed Investment in chained 2005 dollars divided
by civilian population over the age of 16.
4) It : Real Private Non Residential Fixed Investment in chained 2005 dollars
divided by civilian population over the age of 16.
5) Nt : Non Farm Business Sector Hours all Persons divided by civilian population
over the age of 16.
6) Wt : Non Farm Business Sector Real Compensation per Hour.
7)Rt+1 1 : the real risk-free interest rate is approximated by taking the arithmetic
average of nominal annualised monthly 3 month T-bill rates and subtracting the
quarterly annualised ination rate. We calculate the ination rate as the growth rate
in the Implicit GDP deator.
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Table 1
Calibration
Parameter Description Value
 Patient householdsdiscount factor 0.99
bo Impatient householdsdiscount factor 0.97
b Bankersdiscount factor 0.9899
 capital share 0.34
 capital depreciation rate 0.02
h housing depreciation rate 0.005
hh elasticity of q
h
t to I
h
t =ht 1 1
 elasticity of qt to It=kt 0.25
n labour adjustment cost parameter 2
 persistence of tfp shock 0.95
 curvature of capital depreciation function 1.5051
n weight of leisure in utility function 1.8
h housing weight in utility function 0.12
s proportion of patient households 0.65
 enforcement cost parameter for households 0.25
b enforcement cost parameter for banks 0.25
 standard deviation of borrower segment specic shock 0.12
sw exemption level for wage income 0 or 1
109
Table 2
Comparison of US time series statistics with model generated statistics
Statistic US data All frictions Only household frictions no frictions
y 1.54 1.2717 1.2727 1.3385
c 1.21 0.4549 0.4552 0.3895
Ih 9.63 0.3033 0.3032 0.3233
I 4.75 4.209 4.2121 4.768
N 1.74 0.5703 0.5717 0.6714
w 0.91 0.716 0.7155 0.6862
Rt+1 2.36 0.2678 0.2679 0.2818
(c; y) 0.87 0.9497 0.9497 0.9013
(Ih; y) 0.64 0.8795 0.8793 0.8677
(I; y) 0.77 0.993 0.993 0.9926
(N; y) 0.87 0.9858 0.9859 0.9856
(w; y) 0.24 0.9910 0.9915 0.9863
(Rt+1; y) 0.03 0.6367 0.6368 0.6304
(Ih; I) 0.25 0.8176 0.8173 0.801
US data is from the rst quarter of 1955, to the 4th quarter of 2004. x is the
standard deviation of x in percentages: (x; y) is the correlation of x and y: All series
except the interest rate were logged, linearly detrended and then HP ltered with
 = 1600. Interest rates are annualised. Model statistics are based on averages of
1000 simulations of 1000 periods using the rst order approximation, with the rst
800 periods of each simulation discarded to reduce the e¤ect of initial conditions, and
HP ltering just like for data time series.
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Fig. 3.1  1% positive tfp shock, sw=0, aggregates. Red is RBC model with no
nancial frictions, green is model with borrowing frictions but no banking frictions,
blue is full model with banking frictions.
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Fig. 3.2 1% positive tfp shock, sw=0, borrowers and savers. Red is RBC model
with no nancial frictions, green is model with borrowing frictions but no banking
frictions, blue is full model with banking frictions.
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Fig. 3.3 1% positive tfp shock, sw=0, bank and other variables. Red is RBC model
with no nancial frictions, green is model with borrowing frictions but no banking
frictions, blue is full model with banking frictions.
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Fig. 3.4  1% positive tfp shock, sw=1, aggregates. Red is RBC model with no
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Fig. 3.5 1% positive tfp shock, sw=1, borrowers and savers. Red is RBC model
with no nancial frictions, green is model with borrowing frictions but no banking
frictions, blue is full model with banking frictions.
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Fig. 3.6 1% positive tfp shock, sw=1, bank and other variables. Red is RBC model
with no nancial frictions, green is model with borrowing frictions but no banking
frictions, blue is full model with banking frictions.
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Fig. 3.7 1% positive preference shock, sw=0, aggregates. Red is RBC model with no
nancial frictions, green is model with borrowing frictions but no banking frictions,
blue is full model with banking frictions.
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Fig. 3.9  1% positive preference shock, sw=0, bank and other variables. Red is
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nancial frictions, green is model with borrowing frictions but
no banking frictions, blue is full model with banking frictions.
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Conclusion
Dans cette thèse jai examiné plusieurs aspects de linuence du défaut sur les
contrats dans la macroéconomie. Dans le premier chapitre jai étudié une extension
du modèle de dette avec défaut de Townsend (1979) [114] qui permet aux entreprises
de choisir entre un prêt bancaire et un prêt du marché nancier (un bon à court
terme ou du papier commercial). Ce modèle a mis lemphase sur lavantage comparatif
des banques dans la surveillance des compagnies en détresse pour reproduire le lien
négatif entre la taille de lentreprise (mesurée par la valeur nette de lentreprise) et
la dépendance sur les prêts bancaires. Lidée essentielle est que les entreprises plus
petites ont une plus grande probabilité de faire défaut sur leur dette. Dans ce cas, ils
accordent plus de valeur aux coûts de gestion de détresse plus faibles de la banque,
même si ce bénéce coûte plus cher ex-ante pour ladministration du prêt. Par contre,
il est di¢ cile dexpliquer la prépondérance si forte des prêts bancaires en Europe juste
avec ce facteur. Pour cela, il faut tenir compte aussi des coûts xes plus élevés de
lémission de bons en Europe, au moins jusqua létablissement de lEuro. Dans la
mesure où larrivée de lEuro a facilité une intégration et une plus grande e¢ cacité
des marchés de dette en Europe, il est possible que cette discrepance entre lutilisation
de la dette de marché entre lEurope et les Etats Unis va se réduire signicativement.
Un autre résultat intéressant est quune baisse globale du coût de gestion de détresse
pour tous les types de prêts réduit la proportion de prêts bancaire dans le modèle.
Ceci fournit une explication possible pour le recours plus grand par les entreprises
aux marchés de dette dans les 30 dernières années, dans la mesure où la technologie
nancière sest améliorée.
Le deuxième chapitre examine la possibilité dinteractions entre les niveau den-
dettement et les couts de nancement externe des entreprises et des ménages en
équilibre général. Dans un modèle avec prix et salaires exibles, je trouve que lin-
teraction est négative, même en tenant compte des di¢ cultés dajuster la production
entre les secteurs de biens de consommation et dinvestissement. Dans une récession,
le coût plus grand de nancement externes des ménages endettées tend à augmen-
ter lo¤re de travail et à réduire la demande de prêts des ménages. Ces deux e¤ets
réduisent indirectement le coût de nancement externe des entreprises. Jai discuté
plusieurs extensions qui pourraient changer les résultats en donnant des conclusions
plus Keynésiennes. Premièrement, on pourrait regarder un modèle plus détaillé des
coûts dajustement entre les secteurs de consommation et dinvestissement. Deuxié-
ment, un modèle avec un niveau dhétérogénéité plus réaliste dans la distribution de
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richesse pourrait changer les résultats. Troisièment, jai omis le rôle des immeubles
commerciaux dans la production. Dans la mesure ou il y à un lien rapproché entre
le prix de la propriété commerciale et résidentielle, et dans la mesure où on réussit
à produire des uctuations plus grandes dans la demande dimmeubles résidentiels à
travers les contraintes de crédit sur les ménages, ceci donnerait un autre mécanisme
dinteraction entre les entreprises et les ménages. Lautre contribution de ce chapitre
est de fournir un modèle alternatif des contraintes nancières qui tient compte des
primes de défaut entre les taux dintérêt sans risque et les taux dinterêt aux en-
treprises et aux ménages tout en permettant laversion au risque des emprunteurs,
contrairement aux modèle plus fréquemment utilisé de Kiyotaki et Moore (1997) [83]
et de Bernanke et al. (1999) [19] .
Le dernier chapitre construit un modèle permettant linteraction entre la probabi-
lité de faillites des ménages et des banques. Contrairement aux modèles standard de
frictions nancières en équilibre général (par exemple Bernanke et al. (1999) [19], les
intermédiaires nanciers dans notre modèle ne peuvent pas complètement diversier
le risque lié a leur prêts. Ceci les expose à un risque de défaut nancier quand le ren-
dement de leurs prêts est plus bas. Ce type de modèle peut expliquer la procyclicalité
des prots et des ratios de dette des banques, mais tout au moins pour des chocs de
productivité agrégés le¤et des frictions bancaires sur la production, la consommation
et linvestissement est limité. Plusieurs éléments omis du modèle pourrait changer ce
résultat. Premièrement, le modèle suppose une information parfaite sur le niveau de
risque et la probabilité de défaut des prêts. Deuxiement, nous avons supposé que les
taux demprunt pouvaient être conditionnés parfaitement sur létat aggregé de léco-
nomie, ce qui est rarement le cas. Finalement, nous avons ignoré linteraction possible
avec le risque de défaut des entreprises. Ces éléments pourraient servir de base pour
des extensions importantes du modèle de ce chapitre.
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